DUKE 

UNIVERSITY 


LIBRARY 


HEGEL’S  LOGIC 


BOOKS  BY 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 


HEGEL’S  “LOGIC.”  An  Essay 
in  Interpretation.  12mo. 

$1.25  net. 

THE  PROBLEMS  OP  PHILOSO- 
PHY. An  Introduction  to  the 
Study  of  Philosophy.  12mo. 
$1.00. 

INDUCTIVE  LOGIC.  12mo. 

$1.50. 


HEGEL’S  LOGIC 


AN  ESSAY  IN  INTERPRETATION 


JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN,  Ph.D. 

STUART  PROFESSOR  OF  LOGIC  IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 
1902 


COPYRIGHT,  1902,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 

Published  November,  1902. 


Nortoooli  iPress 

J.  S.  Cushing  & Co.  — Berwick  & Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


193.  'S’ 
H 69V-H 


2Ea 

J.  D.  H. 

Drei  Schwestern,  Giite,  Heiterkeit,  Yerstand, 
Du  hast  zu  Deinen  Parzen  sie  erkoren  ; 

Sie  sind’s,  die  weben  Deines  Lebens  Band. 


— Hegel. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/hegelslogic01hibb 


PREFACE 


In  his  Logic  Hegel  has  endeavored  to  incor- 
porate the  essential  principles  of  philosophy 
which  in  the  development  of  the  world’s  thought 
have  forced  themselves  upon  men’s  convictions, 
and  have  been  attested  by  a general  consensus 
of  opinion.  An  insight  into  the  Hegelian  sys- 
tem means,  therefore,  a comprehensive  and  ap- 
preciative grasp  of  the  history  of  philosophy  in 
the  salient  features  of  its  progress.  The  Logic 
serves  also  as  an  excellent  introduction  to  the 
more  specific  study  of  German  philosophy  which 
has  been  most  profoundly  affected  by  the  writ- 
ings of  Hegel,  both  in  the  philosophical  schools 
whose  doctrines  have  been  grounded  confess- 
edly upon  Hegelian  principles,  and  also  among 
those  which  represent  a radical  reaction  against 
Hegel.  Moreover,  the  system  of  philosophy  as 
outlined  in  the  Logic  is  not  merely  a speculative 
system  of  abstract  thought,  but  is  at  the  same 
time  an  interpretation  of  life  in  all  the  fulness 
of  its  concrete  significance.  Upon  these  con- 
siderations, therefore,  it  is  evident  that  a 
knowledge  of  the  Hegelian  system  must  prove 
vii 


Vlll 


PREFACE 


of  inestimable  value  to  the  student  of  philoso- 
phy. Unfortunately  the  proverbial  obscurity 
of  Hegel  has  deterred  many  from  undertaking 
a systematic  study  of  his  works.  It  is  my  con- 
viction that  the  text  of  the  Logic  is  self-illumi- 
nating. It  has  been  my  endeavor,  therefore, 
to  simplify  all  technical  terms  and  explain  their 
significance  in  the  light  of  the  definitions  as 
given  by  Hegel  himself,  and  as  indicated  in 
the  context  where  such  terms  severally  occur. 
There  has  been  throughout  an  attempt  to  render 
intelligible  the  fundamental  Hegelian  doctrines 
by  means  of  simple  statement  and  illustration. 
The  method  of  interpretation  has  grown  out  of 
the  belief  that  the  best  commentary  upon  Hegel 
is  Hegel  himself.  The  basis  of  this  exposition 
has  been  the  Logic  of  the  Lncyklopadie  der  plii- 
losophischen  Wissenschaften,  Hegel’s  Werke,  VI. 

During  the  preparation  of  this  volume  I have 
received  valuable  suggestions  from  my  friend, 
Professor  Creighton  of  Cornell  University,  to 
whom  I gladly  express  my  indebtedness. 


Princeton  University, 
October  6,  1902. 


J.  G.  H. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER 

PAGE 

I. 

The  Logic  as  a System  of  Philosophy  . 

3 

II. 

The  Various  Attitudes  of  Thought  to- 

wards the  Objective  World.  The 

Metaphysical  Systems  .... 

23 

III. 

The  Empirical  School  .... 

38 

IV. 

The  Critical  Philosophy  .... 

45 

V. 

The  Theory  of  Intuitive  Knowledge 

61 

VI. 

A General  Survey  of  the  Logic 

68 

PART  I 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 

VII. 

Quality 

85 

VIII. 

Quantity'  ....... 

105 

IX. 

Measure  ....... 

119 

PART  II 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 

X. 

The  Doctrine  of  Essence  in  its  General 

Eeatures  

135 

XI. 

Essence  as  the  Ground  of  Existence 

148 

XII. 

Appearance,  or  the  Phenomenal  World 

167 

XIII. 

Actuality',  or  the  Real  World 

183 

ix 


X CONTENTS 

PART  III 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XIV.  The  General  Nature  of  the  Notion  . 205 
XV.  The  Subjective  Notion  ....  215 

XVI.  The  Objective  Notion  ....  249 

XVII.  The  Idea  or  the  Eternal  Reason  . . 269 

XVIII.  The  Relation  of  the  Logic  to  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Nature  and  the  Philosophy 
of  Mind 288 


APPENDIX 

A Glossary  of  the  more  important  Philosophical 

Terms  in  Hegel’s  Logic  .....  295 


INDEX 


309 


INTRODUCTION 


Von  der  Grosse  und  Macht  des  Geistes  kann  der 
Mensch  niclit  gross  genug  denken.  Das  verschlossene 
Wesen  des  TJniversums  hat  keine  Kraft  in  sich, 
icelche  dem  Muthe  des  Erkennens  Widerstand  leisten 
konnte,  es  muss  sich  vor  Him  auftliun  und  semen 
Eeichthum  und  seine  Tiefen  ihm  vor  Augen  legen 
und  zum  Genusse  bringen.  — Hegel. 


INTRODUCTION 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
EGEL’S  Logic  is  not  a logic  in  the  formal 


and  restricted  sense  in  which  that  term 
is  usually  understood,  as  the  science  or  the  art 
of  reasoning.  It  has  a far  larger  scope,  embrac- 
ing as  it  does  a complete  system  of  philosophy 
in  itself.  Philosophy,  according  to  Hegel,  is  a 
science  of  things  in  a setting  of  thoughts ; it  is 
the  science  of  the  universe  as  it  is  interpreted 
by  thought,  and  as  it  has  significance  for  the 
mind  which  observes  the  wealth  of  its  varied 
manifestation.  The  intelligence  which  contem- 
plates the  universe  finds  therein  a like  intelli- 
gence revealing  itself,  as  face  answereth  to  face 
in  a glass.  That  intelligence  which  character- 
izes the  observing  mind  and  the  world  which 

O 

is  the  object  of  the  observation  is  one  and  the 
same.  In  order  to  understand  the  essential 
features  of  the  Hegelian  system,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  appreciate  at  the  beginning  the  funda- 


3 


4 


INTRODUCTION 


mental  characteristics  of  the  intelligence  which 
constitutes  its  centre  and  core. 

With  Hegel  thought,  whether  manifested  in 
the  activity  of  mind  or  revealed  in  the  order 
and  harmony  of  the  universe,  has  four  distinc- 
tive features. 

It  is  essentially  active  and  never  passive. 
The  mind  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a plastic 
medium  upon  which  impressions  are  produced 
by  the  varied  stimulation  of  the  several  senses. 
The  mind  is  not  a photographic  plate  to  hold 
whatever  may  be  printed  upon  it  and  then  to 
give  back  upon  demand  whatever  it  may  have 
received.  Thought  is  the  rather  to  be  conceived 
as  a force,  a dynamic  centre.  Its  function  is  con- 
structive. The  creative  and  sustaining  source 
of  the  universe  is  a thought  force ; and  the 
thought  activity  which  we  are  conscious  of  ex- 
ercising partakes  of  the  same  nature. 

The  second  function  of  thought  is  to  trans- 
mute the  crude  material  given  by  the  senses 
into  a systematic  body  of  knowledge.  Out  of 
a chaos  of  sensations,  perceptions,  feelings,  and 
the  like,  thought  builds  up  an  orderly  cosmos. 
To  extend  the  figure  already  employed,  thought 
interprets  the  world  in  a series  of  portraits 
rather  than  photographs.  And  as  an  interpre- 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY  5 


tation  by  means  of  a portrait  always  involves 
an  ideal  element,  so  in  the  interpretation  of 
the  world  of  thought  there  is  always  an  ideal 
element.  But  the  introduction  of  an  ideal  ele- 
ment does  not  render  the  interpretation  unreal. 
On  the  contrary,  whenever  a superficial  view  of 
the  world  gives  place  to  a deeper  insight,  when 
thought  like  the  great  creative  Spirit  broods 
over  it,  we  are  persuaded  that  the  change  which 
is  wrought  by  thought  brings  us  nearer  to  the 
heart  and  truth  of  things  themselves. 

It  is  of  the  nature  of  thought  in  the  third 
place  to  seek  the  universal  significance  of  every 
particular  experience  by  which  it  is  confronted. 
The  animal  lives  and  moves  and  has  its  being 
in  the  midst  of  particular  experiences,  and  it 
does  not  possess  the  capacity  of  reflecting  upon 
them,  or  possesses  it  in  a very  restricted  manner. 
Reflection,  which  is  the  characteristic  mode  of 
thought,  may  be  defined  as  the  reference  of  a 
particular  experience  to  its  appropriate  univer- 
sal. Man  as  the  reflective  animal  alone  pos- 
sesses this  power  of  seeing  things  in  their 
universal  aspect.  It  is  often  said  that  man 
differs  from  the  animal  in  that  he  is  endowed 
with  a conceptual  capacity,  that  is,  the  capacity 
to  form  universal  ideas.  Thus  when  one  says, 


6 


INTRODUCTION 


“ This  is  a man,  a dog,  a horse,”  etc.,  he  is  sim- 
ply referring  the  particular  object  of  perception 
which  occupies  the  centre  of  the  field  of  vision 
for  the  moment  to  the  appropriate  class  or  group 
or  kind  to  which  it  belongs.  Such  a group  or 
class  idea  is  a concept  and  has  always  a univer- 
sal significance,  and  all  of  our  assertions  contain 
some  such  reference  to  a universal.  Moreover, 
language  itself  as  the  vehicle  of  thought  is  a 
system  of  symbols  which  represent  universal 
ideas,  and  which  thought  employs  for  the  pur- 
pose of  a complete  characterization  of  particular 
experiences  which  must  remain  without  meaning 
until  they  are  properly  interpreted  in  the  light 
of  their  universal  relations. 

In  the  fourth  place,  every  thought  reference 
carries  with  it  a consciousness  of  the  Ego,  or 
the  personality  which  makes  the  reference. 
Every  conscious  thought  process,  however  sim- 
ple, and  however  relatively  unimportant,  is  in 
itself  the  declaration  of  a free  personality. 
Wherever  there  is  thought,  there  is  person- 
ality, according  to  Hegel’s  fundamental  dictum. 
Therefore  the  intelligence  which  is  so  variously 
manifested  in  the  world  about  us  bespeaks  an 
all-embracing  Ego,  which  is  the  great  universal 
and  to  which  all  separate  Egos  are  to  be  referred 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY  7 


as  individuals  to  their  corresponding  genus. 
Such  an  Ego,  as  a cosmic  centre,  gives  unity 
to  the  activities  of  all  personalities  throughout 
the  universe,  comprehending  all  in  one  system, 
which  in  every  part,  however  minute,  is  charac- 
terized by  intelligence. 

Such  being  the  nature  of  thought  in  general, 
a dynamic,  constructive,  interpretative,  and  per- 
sonal force,  we  will  now  examine  its  functions 
more  in  detail.  Occupying  as  it  does  the  cen- 
tral place  in  the  Hegelian  system,  it  is  necessary 
at  the  outset  to  understand  fully  Hegel’s  con- 
ception of  thought  activity.  It  is  obvious  that 
thought  manifests  its  activity  in  numerous  ways. 
In  the  reference  of  the  individual  experience  to 
its  appropriate  universal  there  is  an  incalculable 
number  of  universals,  as  various  as  the  manifold 
possibilities  of  the  world  of  experience  itself. 
In  this  connection  there  is  a question  which 
naturally  suggests  itself,  and  which  is  also  one 
of  the  fundamental  problems  of  philosophy, 
“Are  there  not  in  thought  a certain  definite 
number  of  comprehensive  universals  to  which 
all  others  may  be  referred,  and  which  will  serve 
to  mark  off  well-defined  areas  of  knowledge  or 
modes  of  thought,  so  that  when  we  speak  of  the 
world  of  knowledge  these  divisions  may  be  re- 


8 


INTRODUCTION 


garded  as  constituting  the  great  continents  of 
thought?” 

Such  large  divisions  of  our  knowledge  are 
called  categories  ( die  Denkbestimmungen). 

The  original  meaning  of  category  is  found  in 
the  Greek  verb  Kar^yopelv , to  predicate,  that  is, 
the  categories  are  the  possible  ways  one  can 
predicate  various  attributes  of  any  subject,  so 
that  together  they  form  a natural  classification  of 
the  most  comprehensive  themes  of  our  think- 
ing. They  indicate  the  different  ways  in  which 
the  mind  can  view  the  world  of  experience. 
They  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  typical  modes  of 
thought. 

As  an  illustration,  we  may  take  the  table  of 
the  categories,  as  outlined  by  Aristotle,  which 
is  as  follows  : — 

1.  Substance. 

2.  Quantity. 

3.  Quality. 

4.  Relation. 

5.  Action. 

6.  Passion  (i.e.  the  object  of  action). 

7.  Where  (i.e.  space). 

8.  When  (i.e.  time). 

9.  Posture. 

10.  Habit. 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY  9 


When  we  have  described  anything  as  regards  its 
substance,  how  large  it  is,  what  its  nature  is,  its 
relations  to  other  things,  how  it  acts,  how  it  is 
acted  upon,  its  space  and  time  conditions,  its 
posture  and  its  habit,  then  we  have  well-nigh 
exhausted  the  possibilities  of  description. 

Hegel’s  system  of  philosophy  as  contained  in 
his  logic  may  be  appropriately  styled  a natural 
history  of  the  categories,  being  essentially  an 
exposition  of  their  nature,  their  relations,  and 
the  mode  of  their  development.  The  main  doc- 
trines of  the  logic  concerning  the  categories 
may  be  summarized  briefly  as  follows  : — 

The  categories  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  sepa- 
rate and  isolated  points  of  view.  They  sustain 
such  reciprocal  relations  that  together  they  form 
a single  and  harmonious  system.  This  system, 
moreover,  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a series,  in 
which  the  several  terms  may  be  grouped  in  the 
order  of  their  progressive  complexity,  the  first 
term  being  the  simplest,  and  the  succeeding 
terms  more  and  more  complex.  Every  term  also 
contains  two  kinds  of  elements,  — the  explicit  and 
the  implicit.  Explicitly  every  term  is  the  result 
of  all  the  terms  which  precede  it,  and  implicitly 
it  is  the  potential  of  all  which  are  to  follow. 

It  is  the  nature  both  of  thought  itself,  and 


10 


INTRODUCTION 


also  of  things  as  interpreted  by  thought,  that 
when  we  start  at  the  lowest  category  where 
knowledge  is  reduced  to  a minimun,  i.e.  the 
least  that  can  be  possibly  predicated  of  any- 
thing, there  is  a natural  constraint  of  the  mind 
to  pass  on  to  a higher  category,  a higher  level  of 
thought,  in  order  to  complete  the  defects  and  to 
remove  the  limitations  of  the  lower ; and  so  on 
and  on,  until  the  highest  possible  category  is 
reached  which  will  comprehend  and  explain  all 
the  others.  This  movement  of  thought  is 
occasioned  by  the  circumstance  that  the  mind 
revolving  about  itself  in  the  sphere  of  a single 
category  is  always  confronted  by  two  disquiet- 
ing considerations.  It  is  never  satisfied  with  a 
result  that  is  partial,  and  it  will  not  tolerate  a 
contradiction  or  inconsistency.  Hence  arises 
this  inner  constraint  to  transcend  the  limits  of 
the  single  category  in  question,  that  is,  a partial 
point  of  view,  in  order  to  overcome  its  defects 
and  contradictions.  This  progressive  movement 
of  thought  is  called  the  dialectic,  and  is  the  dis- 
tinctive feature  of  the  Hegelian  method  in  the 
construction  of  his  system  of  philosophy. 

The  term  “dialectic  ” originates  in  the  ancient 
Greek  philosophy,  probably  with  the  old  Eleatic 
Zeno,  and  it  has  been  made  familiar  in  the  teach- 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OE  PHILOSOPHY  11 


ings  of  Socrates  and  the  dialogues  of  Plato.  The 
latter  recall  to  mind  a picture  of  two  disputants, 
the  one  maintaining  a proposition,  the  other 
opposing  it,  while  out  of  the  discussion  there 
emerges  a more  exact  and  adequate  statement  of 
truth.  This  is,  in  substance,  the  method  of 
Hegel : the  examination  of  a positive  statement 
or  thesis,  which  is  confronted  by  an  opposed 
statement  or  antithesis,  and  out  of  the  opposition 
there  results  a synthesis,  which  is  a resolution  of 
the  existing  contradiction  upon  a higher  plane 
of  thought.  Upon  the  same  level  or  from  the 
same  point  of  view  contradictory  statements 
must  ever  remain  obstinately  irresoluble ; it  is 
only  in  a higher  sense  that  they  can  be  regarded 
as  half  truths  combining  to  form  truth  entire. 
Such  a synthesis,  therefore,  always  represents  a 
progress  in  thought,  an  advance  to  a higher 
point  of  view,  a more  comprehensive  survey,  a 
deeper  insight,  a wider  prospect. 

In  order  to  understand  the  dialectic  method, 
the  following  observations  must  be  carefully 
considered : — 

The  first  stage,  that  of  the  so-called  thesis,  is 
designated  by  Hegel  as  the  stage  of  the  abstract 
understanding ; the  second,  the  antithesis,  which 
is  a representation  of  the  incompleteness  of  the 


12 


INTRODUCTION 


first  by  showing  its  obverse  side,  is  known  as  that 
of  the  negative  reason ; the  third,  the  synthesis, 
is  known  as  the  speculative  stage,  or  that  of 
positive  reason. 

The  terms  which  are  here  employed  — the 
abstract  understanding,  the  negative  reason, 
and  the  positive  reason  — are  used  in  a sense 
peculiar  to  Hegel.  There  is  a fundamental 
distinction  drawn  between  abstract  and  con- 
crete, a distinction  which  runs  through  the 
entire  philosophical  system  of  Hegel.  Abstract 
is  used  always  in  the  sense  of  a one-sided  or 
partial  view  of  things.  Concrete,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  used  to  indicate  a comprehensive  view 
of  things  which  includes  all  possible  considera- 
tions as  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  itself,  its 
origin,  and  the  relations  which  it  sustains ; it 
is  the  thing  plus  its  setting. 

The  first  of  the  three  stages  is  referred  to  also 
as  the  product  of  the  understanding  ( der  Ver- 
stand ),  the  second  and  third,  as  that  of  the  nega- 
tive and  positive  reason  ( die  Vernunft ) respec- 
tively. There  is  evidently  a distinction  drawn 
between  the  understanding  and  the  reason. 
Hegel  does  not  intend  to  leave  the  impres- 
sion, however,  that  there  is  a certain  definite 
faculty  of  the  mind  which  we  call  the  under- 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OP  PHILOSOPHY  13 


standing,  and  still  another  quite  distinct  which 
we  call  the  reason.  Such  a view  fails  wholly 
to  grasp  his  meaning.  Hegel  maintains  that 
the  mind  works  as  it  were  upon  two  levels, 
a lower  and  a higher,  and  yet  one  and  the 
same  mind  withal.  Upon  the  lower  certain 
considerations  are  overlooked  which  are  the 
characteristic  and  essential  features  of  the 
higher.  Upon  the  lower  level,  that  of  the  under- 
standing, the  mind  employs  one  of  its  functions 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  rest;  namely,  that  of 
discrimination,  the  seeing  of  things  in  their 
differences,  and  therefore  as  distinct,  separate, 
and  isolated,  — out  of  relation  to  other  things 
and  to  the  unitary  system  which  embraces 
them  all.  While,  therefore,  the  function  of  the 
understanding  may  be  regarded  as  a process 
of  differentiation,  that  of  the  reason  is  essen- 
tially a process  of  integration.  Reason  is  the 
synthetical  power  of  thought.  It  is  the  put- 
ting of  things  together  in  their  natural  rela- 
tions. The  reason  takes  note,  it  is  true,  of  the 
differences  which  are  in  the  world  of  experience, 
and  yet  nevertheless  is  capable  of  apprehending 
the  unity  which  underlies  these  differences.  It 
sees  things  not  as  apart  and  separate,  but  as 
cohering  in  systems,  and  the  distinct  systems 


14 


INTRODUCTION 


themselves  as  forming  one  all-comprehending 
system,  the  universe  itself. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  understand- 
ing and  the  reason  are  not  necessarily  antitheti- 
cal terms.  The  work  of  the  understanding'  is 

O 

preliminary  to  that  of  the  reason.  Where  they 
appear,  as  they  often  do  in  the  Logic , as  antago- 
nistic, it  is  the  false  view  of  the  understanding 
which  is  the  object  of  the  Hegelian  scorn ; namely, 
that  view  which  regards  the  offices  of  the  under- 
standing as  complete  in  themselves,  and  needing 
no  higher  operation  of  the  mind  to  supplement 
or  correct  them. 

It  is  the  office  of  the  negative  reason  to  make 
manifest  the  limitations  of  the  understanding 
and  the  contradictions  which  every  one-sided 
and  partial  view  of  things  necessarily  involves. 
The  office  of  the  positive  reason,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  to  make  good  the  defects  which  the 
negative  reason  reveals.  In  this  connection 
Hegel  employs  two  technical  terms  which  ap- 
pear frequently  in  the  development  of  his  sys- 
tem. They  are  negation  and  absolute  negation. 
By  negation  is  to  be  understood  this  process  of 
negative  reason  which  results  in  the  denial  of 
the  primary  thesis.  By  absolute  negation  is 
meant  the  overcoming  in  turn  of  this  first  con- 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY  15 


tradiction  by  an  assertion  which  denies  it  and 
which  involves  a higher  point  of  view.  This 
is  equivalent  to  a negation  of  a negation,  which 
has  the  force  always  of  an  affirmation.  Duplex 
negatio  affirmat.  The  three  steps  of  the  dialectic, 
therefore,  are  affirmation,  negation,  then  a nega- 
tion of  this  negation  which  is  itself  an  affirma- 
tion. It  is  to  be  observed,  moreover,  that  the 
term  “ dialectic  ” is  used  in  two  senses  in  Hegel, 

— a general  and  a special  sense.  In  the  former 
sense  it  designates  the  threefold  process  of 
thought  as  a whole,  which  has  just  been  out- 
lined. In  its  special  use  it  is  applied  merely 
to  the  second  or  negative  stage  of  the  process, 

— the  limiting  of  the  original  statement  through 
its  contradiction. 

The  antithesis,  moreover,  which  opposes  in 
thought  the  primary  thesis  is  not  a chance  con- 
fronting of  a statement  by  another  which  hap- 
pens to  oppose  it.  The  contradiction  is  never 
external,  artificial,  or  arbitrary,  but  is  one  which 
grows  out  of  the  very  nature  of  the  original 
thought  itself.  Every  thought  which  is  one- 
sided, thereby  of  necessity  involves  its  own 
contradiction.  From  the  very  fact  that  it  is 
finite  and  therefore  incomplete,  it  must  at  some 
point  or  other  prove  inadequate,  and  therefore 


16 


INTRODUCTION 


fall  of  its  own  weight.  It  cannot  support  itself, 
nor  can  it  justify  itself.  Thus,  to  use  an  illus- 
tration of  Hegel,  we  say  that  man  is  mortal, 
and  seem  to  think  that  the  ground  of  this  mor- 
tality lies  in  the  external  circumstances  which 
constantly  surround  and  menace  him;  but  the 
true  view  of  the  matter  is  that  life  in  its  very 
nature  as  life  involves  the  germ  of  death,  and 
so  the  life  of  a finite  creature  being  essentially 
at  war  with  itself  works  its  own  dissolution. 
This  dialectic  may  be  seen  in  the  common  prov- 
erb summum  jus , summa  injuria  ; that  is,  to  push 
an  abstract  right  to  its  extreme  is  to  pass  in- 
sensibly to  its  contradictory,  and  to  cause  in 
reality  injustice  rather  than  justice.  So  also 
Hegel  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  the 
sphere  of  politics  extreme  anarchy  passes  over 
into  its  opposite  extreme  despotism;  and  that  in 
the  sphere  of  ethics  the  following  proverbs  attest 
the  same  general  principle,  — “ Pride  goeth  be- 
fore a fall”  and  “Too  much  wit  outwits  itself.” 
The  dialectic  finds  further  illustration  in 
the  history  of  philosophy  itself,  wherein  the 
several  systems  of  thought  are  confronted  each 
by  its  opposed  system,  while  out  of  the  contro- 
versies which  ensue  there  emerges  a more  com- 
plete system  which  combines  the  truth  and 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OP  PHILOSOPHY  17 


discards  the  errors,  which  each  of  the  conflicting 
systems  contained.  Such  a process  is  repeated 
again  and  again  in  the  gradual  development 
of  the  fulness  of  truth  which  only  centuries 
of  controversy  and  of  experience  are  able  to 
reveal. 

We  have  referred  thus  far  to  the  method  by 
which  Hegel  proposes  to  construct  the  world  of 
knowledge,  and  to  show  how  part  is  related  to 
part  throughout,  and  all  parts  to  the  whole  in  a 
progressive  development  wherein  every  advance 
marks  a growing  completeness  of  knowledge. 
But  this  is  but  one-half  of  his  system ; for 
Hegel  maintains,  as  one  of  the  cardinal  doc- 
trines of  his  philosophy,  that  the  laws  of  thought 
are  at  the  same  time  the  laws  of  things,  and  that 
the  categories  of  thought  correspond  precisely 
with  the  determining  characteristics  of  things. 
The  rational  system  of  thought  is  with  him 
equivalent  to  the  true  philosophy  of  all  being. 
Thus  with  him  epistemology  and  ontology  are 
one ; the  secret  of  the  mind  is  the  secret  of  the 
universe.  Man  as  a rational  being  is  veritably 
a microcosm.  “ Know  thyself  and  all  is  known.” 
This  is  all  summarily  expressed  in  the  Hegelian 
dictum,  “ The  real  is  the  rational,  and  the  ra- 
tional is  the  real.”  This  is  in  accord  with  the 


18 


INTRODUCTION 


doctrine  of  Spinoza,  who  affirms  that  “ the 
order  and  concatenation  of  ideas  is  the  same  as 
the  order  and  concatenation  of  things.”  1 Hegel 
regards  the  cosmos  and  the  cosmic  processes  as 
the  manifestation  of  reason.  Moreover,  it  is  of 
the  essence  of  reason  to  manifest  itself  in  the  ob- 
jective world.  Reason  has  two  sides, — a thought 
side  and  a force  side,  a rational  and  a dynamic 
essence,  — and  these  two  are  one.  Reason  is  to 
be  regarded,  therefore,  as  underlying  all  thoughts 
and  all  things.  In  the  physical  world  the  laws 
of  phenomena  finding  expression  in  mathemati- 
cal formulse  represent  the  thought  side  of  rea- 
son ; the  phenomena  themselves  are  but  the 
particular  manifestations  of  these  laws,  the  con- 
crete and  dynamic  realization  of  the  reason  im- 
plicit in  them.  Every  individual  thing  in  the 
universe  must  be  regarded  as  having  some  uni- 
versal law  or  principle  of  reason  as  the  very  root 
and  substance  of  its  being,  attributes  and  activi- 
ties. This  universal  principle  of  reason  is  the 
creative  and  constructive  force  of  the  universe. 
It  is  seen  in  the  architectonic  principle  which  is 
the  soul  of  the  plant,  in  the  creative  and  sustain- 
ing power  in  the  animal  and  in  man,  in  the 
formation  of  character,  in  the  building  of  insti- 
1 Spinoza,  Ethics , II,  p.  7. 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY  19 


tutions,  in  the  development  of  church  and  of 
state,  and  of  the  arts  and  sciences. 

This  principle  of  reason  Hegel  calls  the 
Begriff.  To  convey  its  full  significance  I have 
adopted  the  usual  translation  of  this  term ; 
namely,  the  notion.  It  will  be  necessary, however, 
to  enlarge  our  usual  connotation  of  the  term 
“ notion,”  so  that  as  an  equivalent  for  Begriff 
it  will  signify  this  universal  principle  of  reason 
which  is  active  in  all  thought  and  in  all  things. 
Let  us  examine  a few  passages  of  the  Logic  in 
order  that  at  the  beginning  we  may  form  a cor- 
rect idea  of  Hegel’s  own  interpretation  of  the 
term.  “ The  Begriff  is  the  principle  of  all  life ; 
it  is  at  the  same  time  the  absolutely  concrete, 
that  is,  finding  complete  manifestation  in  re- 
ality.” 1 

“ The  Begriff  is  found  in  the  innermost  heart 
of  things,  constituting  them  what  they  in  reality 
are.”2  “The  forms  of  the  Begriff  are  the  living 
spirit  of  reality,  and  whatever  is  real  is  such 
only  because  these  forces  are  active  in  them, 
making  them  what  they  are.”  3 

It  is  obvious  that  the  Hegelian  system  is  one 
of  idealism.  The  cosmic  force  is  to  be  regarded 

1 Hegel,  Werke,  VI,  § 160. 

2 VI,  § 166.  s VI,  § 162. 


20 


INTRODUCTION 


as  the  manifestation  in  its  various  phases  of 
the  all-embracing  reason,  and  all  history  as  an 
evolution  of  this  reason  in  the  progressive  un- 
folding of  its  inner  activity.  This  idealism  is, 
moreover,  an  absolute  idealism ; that  is,  the  un- 
derlying reason,  which  is  the  creative  and  sus- 
taining principle  of  all  things,  is  in  the  midst 
of  all  its  variety  of  manifestation  absolutely  one 
and  the  same,  from  which  nothing  can  be  taken, 
and  to  which  nothing  can  be  added.  It  is  com- 
pletely unconditioned  and  independent.  It  is, 
therefore,  the  Absolute,  that  is,  God.  The 
highest  manifestation  of  this  principle  of  reason 
Hegel  calls  the  Idea  ( die  Idee'),  desiring  to  indi- 
cate by  a single  word  that  the  supreme  power 
of  the  universe  is  not  mechanical  and  material, 
but  essentially  rational  and  spiritual.  The  Idea, 
the  Absolute,  God,  are  to  be  regarded  as  strictly 
synonymous  terms  used  by  Hegel  interchange- 
ably, and  with  no  shade  of  distinction  in  their 
meaning. 

In  the  exposition  of  Hegel’s  system  he  en- 
deavors to  show  that  the  world  of  knowledge 
unfolds  by  the  inner  constraint  of  its  own  dia- 
lectic from  the  simplest  beginnings  through 
more  and  more  complex  stages  until  it  reaches 
complete  fulfilment  in  the  all-embracing  Abso- 


THE  LOGIC  AS  A SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY  21 


lute.  But  though  the  Absolute  is  the  consum- 
mation of  the  process  as  a whole,  nevertheless 
the  Absolute,  as  the  creative  and  sustaining 
principle  of  reason  itself,  must  be  both  the  be- 
ginning of  the  process,  and  must  underlie  every 
succeeding  stage  of  the  process  as  well.  There- 
fore every  cross-section,  as  it  were,  of  this 
process  of  evolution  reveals  some  phase  of  the 
Absolute,  incomplete  it  is  true,  and,  therefore, 
if  taken  by  itself  misleading,  but  so  far  forth  it 
remains  an  unmistakable  manifestation  of  the 
divine  reason  which  is  its  ground  and  justifica- 
tion. Thus  Hegel  defines  the  Absolute  as  the 
essence  of  all  being  in  general ; as  cause,  and  as 
law  in  the  physical  universe ; as  consciousness, 
purpose,  beneficence,  justice,  etc.,  in  the  realm 
of  mind.  From  this  point  of  view  Hegel’s  sys- 
tem may  be  characterized  as  the  progressive 
revelation  of  God. 

Hegel’s  method  of  exposition  in  general  may 
be  summarized,  therefore,  as  an  attempt  to  show 
the  various  stages  of  development  in  the  mani- 
festation of  the  principle  of  reason  as  a growing 
revelation  of  the  Absolute  in  such  a manner  that 
every  stage  by  itself  is  partial,  and  therefore 
involves  its  own  contradiction ; but  that  these 
contradictions  contain,  nevertheless,  common 


22 


INTRODUCTION 


elements  by  which,  from  a higher  point  of  view, 
they  may  be  reconciled  and  combined.  Such  a 
point  of  advantage  being  gained  in  the  progress 
of  thought,  there  will  be  disclosed,  however,  a 
new  contradiction,  again  to  be  resolved  by 
earnest  consideration  and  penetrating  insight 
in  a higher  synthesis,  and  so  on  and  on  through 
every  stage  of  the  process  to  the  end  where 
alone  there  may  be  found  an  abiding  place  in 
the  Absolute,  wherein  there  is  found  no  contra- 
diction and  no  incompleteness.  The  process  is 
one,  the  underlying  ground  is  one,  and  any  ele- 
ment in  the  process  receives  its  full  significance 
solely  in  the  light  of  the  whole  ; then  and  then 
only  is  its  truth  revealed.  Truth  with  Hegel 
means  always  that  knowledge  which  embraces  its 
object  upon  all  possible  sides  and  in  all  of  its  possi- 
ble relations  as  the  complete  expression  of  the  eter- 
nal reason  which  underlies  it.  This  is  a thought 
akin  to  that  of  the  old  Hebrew  poet  and  philoso- 
pher who  said,  “ In  thy  light  shall  we  see  light,” 
and  that  of  the  later  Hebrew  who  so  constantly 
insisted  that  everything  is  known  only  as  it  is 
viewed  sub  specie  aeternitatis. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  VARIOUS  ATTITUDES  OF  THOUGHT  TOWARDS 
THE  OBJECTIVE  WORLD.  THE  METAPHYSICAL 
SYSTEMS 

THE  fundamental  conception  of  the  Hegelian 
system  of  philosophy  is  that  of  universal 
reason  dominating  all  thoughts  and  all  things. 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  at  the  very  beginning 
to  appreciate  the  inherent  relation  between 
thoughts  and  things  in  general,  or  more  specifi- 
cally between  the  thinking  mind  and  the  objec- 
tive world.  Jn  order  to  understand  fully  the 
Hegelian  attitude  of  thought  to  the  objective 
world,  the  world  which  furnishes  us  the  materials 
of  knowledge,  and  of  which  we  ourselves  are 
but  a part,  it  will  be  worth  our  while  to  examine 
somewhat  in  detail  the  doctrines  of  other  philo- 
sophical systems  upon  this  subject  in  the  light 
of  Hegel’s  criticism  of  them.  Their  divergence 
from  the  Hegelian  system  will  serve  by  contrast 
to  mark  the  characteristic  features  of  that  system 
itself.  There  are  four  typical  views  as  to  the 
23 


24 


INTRODUCTION 


relation  of  the  thinking  subject  to  the  objective 
world.  They  are  as  follows  : — 

1.  The  metaphysical  systems. 

2.  The  empirical  schools. 

3.  The  critical  philosophy. 

4.  The  theory  of  intuitive  or  immediate 
knowledge. 

The  first  of  these  attitudes  of  thought  re- 
gards the  external  world  as  perfectly  pictured 
in  thought.  The  question  is  not  raised  as  to 
the  difficulty  of  passing  from  the  object  which 
is  perceived  to  the  thinking  subject  which  per- 
ceives it.  The  way  is  regarded  as  open  and 
free.  The  objective  reality  of  the  outer  world 
is  assumed  as  a matter  of  fact.  The  testimony 
of  the  senses  is  taken  as  unquestionable.  It 
is  the  standpoint  of  naive  realism,  which  rests 
upon  the  assumption  that  all  things  are  in  their 
essence  what  they  seem  to  be  in  our  perception 
of  them.  A natural  result  of  this  point  of  view 
and  of  this  method  of  interpreting  the  world  of 
experience  was  that  abstract  and  empty  phrases, 
refined  metaphysical  distinctions,  in  short,  the 
terminology  of  the  schools  came  to  be  used  in- 
stead of  living  words  in  tbe  description  of  living 
experience.  No  wonder  that  philosophy  became 
sterile  and  dry  as  dust  when  the  truth  of  the 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


25 


world  of  reality  was  expressed  in  the  desiccated 
formulae  of  metaphysical  speculation.  In  other 
words,  the  actual  world  of  living  experience 
was  forced  in  a purely  artificial  and  arbitrary 
manner  into  metaphysical  molds.  For  these 
molds  were  cast  with  no  consideration  what- 
soever of  the  patterns  which  the  real  world 
might  have  furnished.  They  were  fashioned 
according  to  the  caprice  of  speculation,  and 
the  demands  of  certain  postulates  of  thought 
which  had  no  basis  in  reality.  In  respect  to 
all  this,  Hegel’s  contention  is  that  a genuine 
knowledge  of  the  external  world  must  come 
through  a process  in  which  the  particular  ob- 
jects of  knowledge  are  allowed  actually  to  char- 
acterize themselves;  in  other  words,  we  must 
interrogate  the  facts  of  experience  and  allow 
them  to  tell  their  own  story.  We  must  not 
take  for  granted  certain  characteristics  and  cer- 
tain relations  as  necessarily  obtaining  because 
our  speculations  seem  to  demand  them.  We 
dare  not  apply  to  concrete  objects  of  thought 
predicates  which  have  been  derived  elsewhere 
and  without  any  consideration  of  the  nature  of 
the  objects  themselves.  We  should  not  antici- 
pate experience,  but  faithfully  interpret  it. 
Take  for  example  the  supreme  object  of  all 


26 


INTRODUCTION 


thought,  God  Himself.  It  is  but  a poor  and 
inadequate  conception  of  God  which  results 
merely  from  ascribing  to  Him  a series  of  predi- 
cates which  have  been  deduced  from  certain 
metaphysical  necessities.  However  many  such 
predicates  may  be,  they  together  fail  utterly  to 
exhaust  His  infinite  nature.  The  Orientals 
appreciated  this  when  in  the  Hindoo  philosophy 
God  is  declared  to  be  the  many-named,  or  the 
many-sided,  and  this  without  limit  of  any  kind 
or  degree,  so  that  if  the  resulting  names  should 
be  formed  together  to  constitute  a series,  the 
result  would  of  necessity  be  an  infinite  series. 

Moreover,  Hegel  insists  that  the  various  meta- 
physical schools  all  adopted  a wrong  criterion 
in  that  they  are  content  to  derive  their  defini- 
tions from  popular  conceptions.  Any  popular 
conception  of  God,  of  the  world,  or  of  the  soul 
is  necessarily  inadequate  and  therefore  false, 
for  it  must  be  colored  necessarily  by  the  nature 
of  the  age,  or  of  the  race  whence  it  emerges, 
and  so  far  forth  it  is  particular,  local,  and  mis- 
leading. Any  definition  of  God  which  embodies 
a popular  conception  of  Him,  however  complete 
that  conception  may  be,  fails  to  sound  the 
depths  of  His  being  and  nature.  It  is  Hegel’s 
most  vehement  contention  that  the  only  true 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


27 


method  of  building  up  the  world  of  knowledge 
is  to  allow  the  objects  of  thought  freely  and 
spontaneously  to  expound  their  own  characteris- 
tics. Thus  God’s  being  is  known  only  as  re- 
vealed in  the  continuous  unfolding  of  Himself 
in  the  cosmic  processes,  in  nature,  in  history,  in 
man.  And  so  we  may  define  man  as  a rational 
animal ; but  at  best  this  is  only  a vague  groping 
in  the  dark,  for  our  knowledge  of  man  cannot 
be  compressed  into  a single  judgment.  That 
was  the  snare  of  the  metaphysical  schools,  the 
belief  that  all  objects  of  knowledge  could  be 
expressed  completely  within  the  scope  of  a 
formal  definition  or  a stereotyped  formula. 
What  man  is,  in  all  the  possibilities  of  his  devel- 
opment as  artisan,  mechanic,  scholar,  soldier, 
citizen,  statesman,  martyr,  or  reformer,  and  so 
on  without  limit,  that  the  complete  history  of 
humanity  alone  can  reveal.  The  term  “ra- 
tional,” as  used  in  the  traditional  definition  of 
man,  conceals  a vast  territory  of  knowledge  which 
lies  behind  it.  We  appreciate  the  limitless  extent 
of  this  region  when  we  even  superficially  medi- 
tate upon  the  many-sided  manifestations  of 
which  the  idea  of  rationality  is  capable.  It  is 
only  in  the  free  activity  of  the  constructive 
principle  working  within  an  object  of  knowl- 


28 


INTRODUCTION 


edge  that  its  essential  characteristics  are  re- 
vealed. 

Moreover,  the  old  metaphysic  was  dogmatic 
in  the  extreme.  Although  the  results  of  such 
speculation  were  partial  and  one-sided,  they  were 
nevertheless  stoutly  maintained  as  absolute  and 
final.  This  insistence  upon  the  ultimate  nature 
of  partially  conceived  truth  indicates  the  char- 
acteristic spirit  of  the  school.  Content  with  the 
half  truth  and  the  twilight  of  the  understanding 
they  never  attained  the  full  knowledge  as  re- 
vealed in  the  light  of  reason.  In  addition  to  the 
general  point  of  view  and  method  of  the  meta- 
physical systems,  their  treatment  of  several 
special  problems  is  not  only  a matter  of  inter- 
est in  itself,  but  has  an  indirect  bearing  upon 
some  important  points  of  the  Hegelian  system. 
These  problems  are  four  in  number. 

1.  As  to  the  nature  of  being  in  general,  — 
ontology. 

2.  As  to  the  nature  of  the  soul,  — rational 
psychology  or  pneumatology. 

3.  As  to  the  nature  of  the  world,  — cos- 
mology. 

4.  As  to  the  being  and  nature  of  God,  — 
natural  or  rational  theology. 

The  doctrine  of  being,  or  ontology,  resulted 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


29 


from  the  attempt  to  answer  the  question  as  to 
how  being  in  general  might  be  adequately  char- 
acterized. The  distinctions  raised  by  the  meta- 
physical schools  were  largely  verbal.  Whenever 
certain  absolute  terms  were  found  which  seemed 
to  involve  no  contradiction  to  the  generally 
received  conceptions  of  the  day,  then  the  meta- 
physician was  completely  satisfied  that  he  had 
given  expression  to  the  truth  in  its  fulness. 
He  did  not  pause  to  inquire  as  to  the  concrete 
significance  of  the  terms  which  he  used  or  as 
to  their  illustration  in  actual  experience.  Such 
terms,  for  example,  as  existence,  finitude,  sim- 
plicity, complexity,  and  the  like,  were  used  as 
the  current  coin  of  expression  by  the  metaphysi- 
cal school,  and  with  but  little  thought  as  to 
their  precise  meaning  and  the  definite  scope  of 
their  application.  Hegel’s  criticism,  at  this 
point,  is  quite  characteristic  and  illustrative  of 
his  general  method.  He  insists  that  every  term 
which  we  employ  in  philosophical  thinking 
should  represent  a notion,  that  is,  an  idea  of 
universal  and  necessary  significance,  and  that 
such  a notion  cannot  have  a one-sided,  abstract, 
and  rigid  meaning,  but  must  have  a wealth  of 
meaning  in  itself.  Every  notion,  moreover, 
must  be  regarded  as  a small  world  within  itself, 


30 


INTRODUCTION 


having  manifold  characteristics  connected  and 
interrelated  in  an  indefinite  variety  of  ways. 
The  term  which  represents  such  an  idea  can 
therefore  never  be  employed  in  a stereotyped 
manner  as  was  the  custom  of  the  metaphysi- 
cians. The  very  fact  that  such  an  idea  embodies 
within  itself  inner  connections  or  relations 
renders  it  necessary  that  contradictions  must 
arise  which  can  be  resolved  only  by  viewing 
them  in  the  light  of  the  whole  body  of  knowl- 
edge. To  cut  such  an  idea  off  as  a finished 
product,  incapable  of  further  modification  or 
development,  is  to  deal  with  it  in  a manner 
extremely  artificial  and  unphilosophical  as  well. 
Ideas  are  living  processes  and  not  dead  prod- 
ucts. “ Let  us  avoid,  therefore,”  Hegel  would 
say,  “ the  use  of  terms  to  which  we  have  attached 
partial  and  poor  meanings.  Let  the  supreme 
task  of  thought  be  to  overcome  the  superficial 
and  the  abstract.” 

The  second  question  discussed  by  the  meta- 
physicians was  that  of  rational  psychology,  or 
pneumatology ; it  had  special  reference  to  the 
nature  of  the  soul.  The  pre-Kantian  meta- 
physic regarded  the  soul  as  a thing,  an  in- 
dependent entity.  This  conception  at  once 
suggested  the  question,  which  proved  to  be  an 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


31 


utterly  futile  and  misleading  inquiry,  as  to  the 
seat  of  the  soul ; and  the  further  question  as 
to  whether  the  soul,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a thing, 
should  be  regarded  as  simple  or  composite.  It 
was  thought  that  upon  the  fact  of  its  simplicity 
depended  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  of  immortal- 
ity, inasmuch  as  whatever  is  not  composed  of 
parts  can  suffer  no  dissolution.  Hegel  insists 
at  this  point  that  the  inner  life  of  the  mind  or 
soul  cannot  be  regarded  as  a finished  thing,  a 
product  once  for  all  complete,  without  possibil- 
ity of  development.  Such  a conception  renders 
impossible  also  any  processes  of  action  and  re- 
action between  the  several  elements  which  con- 
stitute the  essence  of  the  soul’s  life  and  varied 
activity,  and  leaves  unexplained  the  external 
phenomena  of  the  mind  which  are  so  incalcula- 
bly complex  in  all  the  variety  of  their  many- 
sided  manifestations.  The  mind  must  be 
regarded,  according  to  Hegel,  as  a concrete 
reality  which  is  evidenced  by  its  manifestations. 
It  is  not  a “ thing,”  as  the  metaphysicians  use 
the  term  “thing,”  but  rather  an  inward  con- 
structive force  determining  the  various  phases 
of  its  external  phenomena  in  an  unlimited,  pro- 
gressive development. 

The  third  branch  of  the  traditional  metaphysic 


32 


INTRODUCTION 


was  that  of  cosmology.  The  topics  which  it 
embraced  were  the  world,  its  contingency  or 
necessity,  its  eternity  or  its  necessary  limita- 
tion in  time  and  space,  the  formal  laws  of  its 
changes,  the  freedom  of  man,  and  the  origin  of 
evil.  The  general  standpoint  of  the  metaphy- 
sician before  the  time  of  Kant  was  that  thought 
presents  to  us  a number  of  alternative  judg- 
ments, one  of  which  must  he  wholly  true  and 
its  opposite  wholly  false.  Therefore,  in  refer- 
ence to  the  particular  questions  which  arose  in 
the  sphere  of  cosmology,  the  metaphysicians 
held  that  one  is  of  necessity  constrained  to 
choose  between  the  theory  that  the  world  is 
created  or  that  it  is  eternal ; that  man  is  the 
product  of  the  law  of  necessity  or  that  he  is 
free.  They  held,  moreover,  that  the  good  and 
evil  in  the  world  are  natural  opposites,  and  can 
never  be  reconciled.  Hegel  characteristically 
opposes  this  one-sided  view  of  things  by  main- 
taining that  the  world  contains  on  all  sides  an 
indefinite  number  of  opposites,  and  that  it  is 
the  peculiar  function  of  the  reason  to  reconcile 
and  harmonize  them  completely.  His  system 
is  essentially  a universal  resolution  of  all  the 
contradictions  and  inconsistencies  of  existence 
in  the  all-embracing  synthesis  of  the  reason. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


33 


Thus  the  idea  of  freedom  which  involves  no 
necessity,  and  the  idea  of  necessity  which 
involves  no  freedom,  are  alike  merely  the 
partial  abstractions  of  the  understanding.  In 
the  actual  world,  the  world  in  which  we  live, 
and  move,  and  have  our  being,  freedom  and 
necessity  are  not  divorced.  For  there  can  be 
freedom  only  in  that  community  wherein  liberty 
is  guaranteed  by  law.  And  as  regards  the 
necessity  which  nature  everywhere  imposes 
upon  us,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  free 
activity  of  the  individual  is  possible  only  to  the 
extent  to  which  he  can  depend  implicitly  upon 
the  uniformity  of  nature’s  laws  ; for  were  nature 
without  law,  and  its  phenomena  the  result  of 
the  caprice  or  whim  of  ruling  deities  as  in  the 
old  mythological  conception,  the  free  purpose 
of  man  would  be  constantly  thwarted  and 
annulled. 

The  fourth  branch  of  metaphysics  is  that  of 
natural  or  rational  theology.  It  is  concerned 
with  the  fundamental  conception  of  God,  His 
attributes,  and  the  proof  of  His  existence. 
The  radical  error  of  the  metaphysical  logic 
is  revealed  in  their  attempt  to  discover  some 
objective  ground  for  the  being  of  God.  The 
resulting  idea  of  God  thus  formed,  creates  the 


34 


INTRODUCTION 


impression  of  being  derived  from  something 
external  to  God  Himself.  But  God  must  be 
conceived  as  the  sole  ground  of  all  things  vis- 
ible and  invisible,  and  therefore  as  independent 
of  anything  in  the  nature  of  a foundation  or 
support  of  His  being  and  existence.  For  if 
God  is  regarded  as  a being,  derived  from  the 
world,  then  the  very  finitude  of  the  world 
processes  would  cling  to  the  idea  of  a God  thus 
conceived.  As  Hegel  suggests,  the  metaphysi- 
cian is  confronted  with  the  following  dilemma  : 
either  God  is  the  actual  substance  of  the 
world,  including  the  mind  of  man,  which  is 
endeavoring  to  come  to  a knowledge  of  Him,  — 
which  is  pantheism  ; or  God  is  an  object  distinct 
from  the  apprehending  mind,  the  subject,  — 
which  is  dualism.  Hegel  in  the  development  of 
his  system  endeavors  to  effect  a synthesis  of  the 
divine  and  human  consciousness  in  such  a way 
as  to  avoid  the  two  extremes  of  dualism  and  of 
pantheism ; it  is  only,  however,  when  the  entire 
system  is  unfolded  before  us  that  we  have  any 
basis  for  judging  whether  he  has  succeeded  in 
this  difficult  undertaking.  At  this  stage  of  the 
discussion  it  is  sufficient  merely  to  mark  his 
general  purpose  in  this  regard  as  a radical  point 
of  departure  from  the  metaphysical  view. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


35 


There  is  a phrase  which  is  often  employed 
in  speculations  concerning  the  being  of  God. 
It  is  this,  “ Consider  nature,  and  nature  will 
lead  you  to  God.”  Hegel  in  this  connection 
enters  a vigorous  protest,  inasmuch  as  this 
phrase  seems  to  imply  that  God  is  the  consum- 
mation merely  of  the  great  cosmic  process, 
whereas  the  truth  lies  in  the  thought  that 
while  God  may  be  regarded  in  a certain  sense 
as  the  final  consummation  of  all  things,  yet 
nevertheless  He  must  be  regarded  also  as  the 
absolute  ground  of  the  initial  stage  and  every 
subsequent  stage  of  the  cosmic  development. 
God  is  the  beginning  as  well  as  the  end  of 
the  world’s  evolution.  It  is  only  in  a very 
partial  sense,  therefore,  that  we  are  justified  in 
saying  that  nature  leads  man  to  God,  for  in 
another  and  deeper  sense  we  are  constrained 
to  believe  that  it  is  God  Himself  who  makes 
nature  possible.  Nature  leads  backward  as 
well  as  forward  to  God. 

As  to  the  attributes  of  God,  they  were  con- 
ceived by  the  metaphysicians  in  so  indefinite 
and  vague  a manner  as  to  be  utterly  devoid 
of  any  genuine  significance.  These  schools  of 
thought  seemed  to  possess  a natural  dread  of  as- 
signing to  God  any  attributes  whatsoever  which 


36 


INTRODUCTION 


were  distinctively  human  upon  the  ground 
that  to  think  of  God’s  nature  as  at  all  resem- 
bling human  nature  would  be  to  degrade  and 
dishonor  Him.  Fearing  that  they  might  be- 
come anthropomorphic,  they  lapsed  into  a 
vague  indefiniteness  which  was  without  any 
significant  content  whatever.  Yet  they  seemed 
oblivious  of  this  evident  defect,  and  satisfied 
with  a summary  of  the  divine  attributes  in 
some  such  vague  and  unmeaning  expression 
as  the  following,  “ God  is  the  most  real  of 
all  beings.”  But  Hegel  in  criticising  such  a 
statement  as  this  insists  that  the  most  real  of 
all  beings  of  whom,  however,  nothing  is  af- 
firmed definitely,  is  after  all  the  very  opposite 
of  what  it  purports  to  be,  and  what  the  under- 
standing supposes  it  to  be.  Instead  of  a 
being  ample  and  above  all  measure,  the  idea 
is  so  narrowly  conceived  that  it  is  on  the 
contrary  poor  and  altogether  empty.  It  is 
with  reason  that  the  heart  craves  an  answer 
to  its  question  as  to  the  nature  of  God  which 
will  mean  something.  When  the  idea  of  God 
is  reduced  to  an  indefinite  and  meaningless 
formula,  God  is  then  removed  to  a sphere  so 
foreign  to  our  thought  and  life  as  to  be  reduced 
to  an  absolute  zero.  Without  a content  pos- 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  SYSTEMS 


37 


sessing  any  positive  significance  our  tliought  is 
shorn  of  all  meaning  whatsoever.  As  Hegel 
puts  it  in  striking  epigram,  “ Mere  light  is 
mere  darkness.” 1 Notwithstanding  Hegel’s 
radical  difference  in  general  point  of  view, 
however,  and  his  critical  attitude  toward  the 
metaphysical  schools,  nevertheless  he  frankly 
acknowledges  that  there  is  something  of  per- 
manent value  in  one  feature  at  least  of  their 
teachings,  — namely,  in  their  insistence  upon 
the  fundamental  truth  that  thought  constitutes 
the  essence  of  all  that  is.  And  this  truth  he 
has  incorporated  in  his  own  philosophical  sys- 
tem as  its  cardinal  doctrine.  Thought,  how- 
ever, with  Hegel  does  not  consist  in  abstract 
definitions  and  formulae,  but  is  revealed  in  its 
fulness  only  in  the  concrete  realities  of  life. 

1 Werke,  VI,  § 36,  Zusatz. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  EMPIRICAL  SCHOOL 

IN  the  course  of  the  development  of  philo- 
sophical thought  it  was  natural  that  there 
should  follow  a reaction  against  the  abstract, 
vague,  and  indefinite  results  which  had  been 
the  outcome  of  the  metaphysical  speculations. 
This  reaction  found  expression  in  the  teachings 
of  the  empirical  school  of  philosophy.  The 
empiricists  insisted  that  the  starting-point  of 
all  thought  must  be  something  definitely  fixed 
and  secure,  some  concrete  reality  such  as  can 
be  found  only  in  actual  experience.  The 
metaphysical  procedure  started  with  abstract 
universals,  and  the  difficulty  which  it  could 
not  overcome  lay  in  the  fact  that  there  was  no 
way  of  passing  from  vague  generalities  to  the 
abundant  variety  of  particular  manifestations 
which  correspond  to  such  universals  in  the 
world  of  reality.  It  is  the  function  of  thought 
to  interpret  experience  and  not  to  anticipate  it. 
Therefore  the  empiricists  urged  that  the  logical 
38 


THE  EMPIRICAL  SCHOOL 


39 


and  natural  beginning  of  all  inquiry  after  truth 
should  be  the  particular  instances  which  nature 
presents  in  such  prodigal  profusion.  They  in- 
sisted, moreover,  that  the  true  and  only  source 
of  all  experience  is  to  be  found  in  our  sensa- 
tions and  perceptions.  According  to  this  view 
the  foundations  of  knowledge  rest  solely  upon 
the  direct  testimony  of  the  senses ; here,  and 
here  alone,  can  consciousness  be  certain  of  itself 
and  the  results  of  its  own  operations.  What- 
ever may  be  doubted,  here  at  least  is  certitude, 
a firm  footing,  and  the  assurance  of  substantial 
progress.  And  so  we  find  the  fundamental 
doctrine  of  empiricism  formulated  in  the 
words,  “ Whatever  is  true  must  be  in  the 
actual  world  and  present  to  sensation.”  This 
would  seem  to  be  indeed  a common-sense  basis 
for  all  serious  investigation  and  for  the  con- 
struction of  a sound  practical  philosophy ; and 
there  is,  indeed,  much  to  recommend  and  to 
justify  its  claims.  Hegel  calls  attention  to 
the  very  valuable  contribution  to  thought 
which  has  come  directly  from  the  empirical 
school,  and  to  which  he  himself  fully  sub- 
scribes, — namely,  that  it  is  necessary  for  every 
man  to  see  for  himself  and  to  feel  that  he  is 
present  in  those  primary  facts  of  knowledge 


40 


INTRODUCTION 


which  he  feels  constrained  to  accept.  If  one 
is  really  to  know  things,  he  must  see  them  as 
they  are.  This  is  certainly  in  complete  accord 
with  the  modern  scientific  spirit  of  inductive 
inquiry  which  grounds  all  investigation  upon 
a study  of  actual  sources,  and  that,  too,  at  first 
hand. 

The  weakness  of  empiricism,  however,  as 
Hegel  points  out  most  conclusively,  consists  in 
the  fact  that  any  sensation,  or  combination  of 
sensations  which  according  to  the  empiricist  is 
the  ultimate  ground  of  appeal,  is  always  a par- 
ticular and  individual  experience.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  pass  from  such  experiences  to  the 
universal  idea  or  law  which  they  illustrate 
without  introducing  some  conceptions  which 
transcend  the  purely  empirical  presupposition 
that  we  know  only  particular  phenomena  and 
their  immediate  connections  and  relations. 

Hume  had  long  since  drawn  attention  to  the 
fact  that  when  we  interpret  the  phenomena  of 
experience  as  manifesting  universal  principles 
and  as  related  by  necessary  causal  connections, 
we  are  thereby  reading  into  the  phenomena  what 
they  themselves  do  not  contain,  but  that  with 
which  they  have  been  invested  by  our  thought. 
Granted  that  necessity  and  universality  are  found 


THE  EMPIRICAL  SCHOOL 


41 


everywhere  in  our  consciousness,  what  reason 
have  we,  Hume  would  say,  to  assert  that  these 
characteristics  are  also  the  attributes  of  things 
themselves.  If  sensation  is  to  maintain  its 
claim  to  be  the  sole  basis  of  all  that  men  hold 
as  truth,  then  these  ideas  of  universality  and 
necessity  must  be  regarded  as  merely  conven- 
ient fictions  of  the  mind,  clever  it  is  true,  but 
by  no  means  trustworthy.  Hume  very  frankly 
accepted  this  conclusion;  and  so  must  every 
thoroughgoing  empiricist.  Hegel  insists,  how- 
ever, that  the  reason  joins  to  these  fundamental 
processes  of  sensation  and  perception  its  pecul- 
iar function  of  interpreting  in  the  light  of  their 
universal  and  necessary  significance  that  which 
they  present  as  particular  experiences.  This 
relation  between  the  reason  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  elementary  data  of  the  senses  on  the 
other,  follows  logically  from  the  basal  postulate 
of  the  Hegelian  system  that  whatever  is  found 
to  be  an  ultimate  characteristic  of  reason  must 
also  apply  in  like  manner  to  reality  itself. 

Again,  the  method  of  empiricism  is  essentially 
one  of  analysis,  — that  is,  the  subjecting  of  our 
experiences  to  a kind  of  dissecting  process  which 
separates  them  into  their  constituent  elements. 
The  defect  of  such  a method  is  that  it  makes 


42 


INTRODUCTION 


no  provision  whatsoever  for  any  corresponding 
synthesis.  After  the  work  of  analysis  is  com- 
plete, it  is  necessary  to  have  some  unifying  and 
constructive  function  of  the  mind  as  its  natural 
and  necessary  complement.  It  is  such  a function 
which  enables  us  to  pass  from  phenomena  to  the 
laws  which  underlie  them.  Dissection  as  an 
exclusive  process  is  suggestive  only  of  death, 
and  can  never  reproduce  the  living  organism. 

Moreover,  if  thought  is  active  in  systematizing 
the  crude  material  which  is  given  by  the  senses, 
then  it  must  bring  to  the  process  something 
more  than  that  which  the  crude  sensation  of 
itself  is  able  to  give. 

As  to  the  questions  which  are  of  special  mo- 
ment for  the  philosophical  thinker,  concerning 
God,  the  soul,  and  the  world,  the  empirical  school 
took  the  position  that  the  mind  of  man  is  so 
constituted  that  it  can  deal  only  with  finite 
material.  Finding  truth  only  in  the  outer  world 
as  mediated  by  the  senses,  they  insisted  that  even 
if  the  existence  of  a supersensible  world  be 
granted,  any  knowledge  of  that  world  would  be 
impossible.  From  this  point  of  view  it  follows 
that  there  is  no  place  in  such  a system  either  for 
a theory  of  morals  or  a philosophy  of  religion. 
Both  ethics  and  religion  thus  lose  all  objective 


THE  EMPIRICAL  SCHOOL 


43 


character,  and  at  the  same  time  their  universal 
validity.  The  logical  outcome,  therefore,  of  this 
doctrine  is  materialism,  which  in  its  general 
methods  and  results  is  diametrically  opposed  to 
Hegelianism.  There  have  been,  however,  some 
philosophers  who  have  styled  themselves  disci- 
ples of  Hegel  and  yet  have  been  pronounced 
materialists.  They  are  the  so-called  Hegelians 
of  the  left;  they  are  such  writers  as  Feuer- 
bach and  Strauss.  This  peculiar  development  of 
the  Hegelian  school  must  be  regarded  as  a perver- 
sion of  Hegel’s  teaching  rather  than  the  logical 
outcome  of  his  system.  Hegel’s  criticism  of  ma- 
terialism is  so  clear  and  emphatic  as  to  give  no 
uncertain  sound.  He  draws  attention  to  the 
fact  that  materialists  in  general  regard  matter 
in  the  light  of  an  abstraction ; it  is  after  all  the 
unknown  somewhat  behind  phenomena,  of  which 
they  are  merely  the  manifestation.  And  when 
the  materialists  come  to  explain  what  matter 
itself  is,  its  fundamental  nature  and  essential 
characteristics,  they  are  constrained  to  employ 
certain  concepts  as  force,  causation,  action  and 
reaction,  and  the  like,  which  are  essentially  meta- 
physical concepts  for  which  materialism  pure 
and  simple  can  give  no  warrant  whatsoever. 

Moreover,  the  world  of  sense-perception,  as 


44 


INTRODUCTION 


materialism  conceives  it,  can  give  only  a series 
of  isolated  and  separate  phenomena.  To  think 
of  them  as  forming  component  parts  of  an  in- 
terrelated system,  and  as  sustaining  necessary 
relations  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole,  would 
be  equivalent  to  the  rationalizing  of  the  material 
universe,  and  this  means  the  introduction  of 
some  non-materialistic  factors.  This  procedure, 
of  course,  would  contradict  the  fundamental 
postulate  of  materialism,  that  all  knowledge  is 
confined  to  the  material  data  furnished  by  the 
senses.  Materialism  is  here  confronted  by  a 
practical  dilemma.  To  defend  its  position,  it 
must  use  the  weapons  of  metaphysics ; but  the 
moment  one  appears  as  a metaphysician  he 
ceases  immediately  to  be  a materialist.  The 
materialistic  creed,  therefore,  must  suffer  either 
from  inadequacy  or  inconsistency.  And  it  is  to 
overcome  these  limitations  that  Hegel  seeks  a 
solution  in  the  creed  of  absolute  idealism. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 
HE  critical  philosophy  takes  its  name  from 


the  fundamental  Kantian  point  of  view  that 
thought  must  itself  investigate  how  far  it  has 
a capacity  of  knowledge,  and  in  this  way  become 
critical  of  itself.  Inasmuch  as  the  sensation 
regarded  as  a pure  sensation  can  never  give 
in  and  of  itself  the  idea  of  necessity  and  univer- 
sality, and  yet  we  are  conscious  that  our  whole 
body  of  knowledge  depends  upon  this  very  idea 
for  its  primary  features  of  order  and  uniformity, 
therefore,  the  source  of  this  idea,  according  to 
Kant,  must  lie  in  the  very  nature  of  thought 
itself.  Moreover,  he  insists  that  this  source  is 
not  to  he  sought  for  in  the  thought  of  any 
individual,  regarded  merely  in  his  individual 
capacity,  but  in  the  thought  which  is  the  com- 
mon possession  of  all  individuals  alike,  — that  is, 
in  the  very  nature  of  thought  itself  as  pure 
thought  irrespective  of  the  peculiar  modes,  or 
habits  of  thought  incident  to  the  peculiarities  of 


45 


46 


INTRODUCTION 


any  particular  individual  whatsoever.  These 
fundamental  ideas  which  seem  to  be  the  com- 
mon property  of  all  rational  creatures,  and 
which,  together  with  their  relations  and  con- 
nections, form  the  determining  factors  in  reduc- 
ing the  crude  material  of  sensation  to  a system 
of  knowledge  characterized  by  order  and  law, 
are  the  so-called  categories,  — such  as  the  ideas 
of  necessity,  cause  and  effect,  unity,  plurality, 
and  the  like. 

The  critical  philosophy  sets  itself  the  task  of 
testing  the  value  of  these  categories  in  reference 
to  their  application  to  the  sciences,  to  the  sphere 
of  metaphysics,  and  to  our  ordinary  conceptual 
processes.  It  also  seeks  to  determine  the  pre- 
cise nature  and  function  of  these  categories  so 
as  to  distinguish  in  our  knowledge  between  that 
which  is  subjective  and  that  which  is  objective. 
These  terms  “ subjective  ” and  “ objective  ” play 
such  an  important  role  in  philosophical  discussions 
generally,  and  especially  in  the  systems  both  of 
Kant  and  of  Hegel,  that  it  will  repay  us  at  this 
stage  of  our  investigation  to  inquire  somewhat 
in  detail  as  to  the  meaning  and  usage  of  these 
terms.  Hegel  draws  attention  to  three  distinct 
senses  in  which  the  term  “ objective  ” is  used : — 

In  the  first  place,  objective  is  used  in  a loose 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


47 


and  rather  popular  manner  to  designate  what- 
ever subsists  externally,  in  contrast  to  which 
•'he  subjective  comes  to  be  regarded  as  that 
which  exists  only  in  our  fancy,  hopes,  or 
dreams. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Kantian  use  of  objec- 
tive consists  in  an  application  of  the  term  to  the 
elements  in  thought  which  are  universal  and 
necessary,  — that  is,  what  all  men  are  constrained 
to  think,  in  contrast  to  the  subjective  character 
attached  to  individual  experiences  which  give 
them  a certain  particular  and  occasional  color- 
ing. 

In  the  third  place,  the  Hegelian  use  of  the 
term  objective  has  regard  to  the  universal  and 
necessary  elements  of  thought  in  general  after 
the  manner  of  Kant,  but  in  addition  Hegel  con- 
siders these  universal  and  necessary  elements 
of  thought  as  representing  at  the  same  time 
the  real  essence  of  existing  things. 

This  latter  distinction  marks  the  point  of 
departure  of  Hegel  from  Kant.  For,  as  Hegel 
maintains,  if  the  necessary  and  essential  factors 
in  the  building  up  of  our  world  of  knowledge 
belong  only  to  the  processes  of  thought,  then 
all  thought  must  be  forever  separated  from  the 
thing  itself  as  the  object  of  our  thought  which 


48 


INTRODUCTION 


perceives  it,  and  as  it  exists  apart  from  our  per- 
ception of  it.  And  although  it  is  true  that  the 
categories  as  causality,  necessity,  universality 
and  the  like  lie  strictly  within  the  province  of 
thought,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  they 
must  be  ours  merely  in  a subjective  sense  and 
not  at  the  same  time  also  the  essential  charac- 
teristics of  things  themselves.  Hegel,  moreover, 
will  not  allow  that  the  convenient  Kantian  fic- 
tion of  the  thing-in-itself  ( das  Bing  an  sicli ) can 
possibly  express  the  real  nature  of  the  object 
when  we  have  eliminated  all  that  is  present  in 
consciousness  relative  to  it, — all  the  deliverances 
of  feeling  and  all  specific  judgments  concerning 
it  as  to  its  evident  attributes  and  qualities. 
What  is  left,  Hegel  asks,  but  an  utter  abstrac- 
tion, a total  emptiness? 

When  the  balance  between  subjective  and 
objective  is  struck  by  Kant,  the  totality  of 
knowledge  is  found  to  be  on  the  side  of  the 
subjective,  while  nothing  at  all  remains  to  the 
credit  of  the  objective.  For  when  Kant  speaks 
of  the  unity  of  consciousness  as  transcendental, 
he  means  by  this  phrase  that  our  body  of  knowl- 
edge regarded  as  constituting  a system  possess- 
ing order  and  unity  throughout  has  validity 
only  for  our  thoughts,  and  not  for  objects  apart 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


49 


from  our  knowledge.  What  they  are  in  them- 
selves must  remain,  therefore,  an  unknown 
quantity,  — the  insoluble  x of  the  equation  of 
knowledge. 

It  is  characteristic,  moreover,  of  the  Hegelian 
method  that  the  significance  which  he  attaches 
to  the  term  objective  is  in  reality  a synthesis 
of  the  two  other  views  mentioned  above.  The 
first  holds  that  objectivity  refers  to  the  exter- 
nal thing;  the  second  that  objectivity  refers 
to  the  necessary  and  universal  thought ; while 
Hegel  insists  that  the  objective  is  the  combina- 
tion of  the  two,  being  the  true  thought  concern- 
ing the  real  thing.  The  subjective  would  signify, 
therefore,  that  which  for  the  time  being  has  a 
place  in  our  thoughts  but  has  no  reference  to 
reality,  and  which  others  under  similar  circum- 
stances might  not  be  constrained  necessarily  to 
entertain. 

Kant’s  position  is  known  as  one  of  subjective 
idealism,  — that  is,  the  things  which  we  know 
are  appearances  merely,  and  we  possess  no 
certitude  as  to  the  truth  of  what  they  are  in 
themselves.  Hegel’s  position,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  one  of  absolute  idealism,  as  has  been 
already  mentioned, — that  is,  it  is  conceded  that 
the  objects  of  our  knowledge  are  phenomena, 


£ 


50 


INTRODUCTION 


but  nevertheless  must  be  regarded  by  us  as  the 
true  representation  of  the  things  themselves. 
The  warrant  for  such  a belief  lies  in  the  postu- 
late that  what  thought  discovers  in  phenomena 
is  a manifestation  of  the  divine  and  universal 
reason,  of  which  the  very  thought  itself  is  a 
kindred  manifestation.  To  show  how  this 
must  be  so,  and  to  indicate  its  significance  as 
the  corner-stone  of  the  entire  Hegelian  system, 
is  the  purpose  of  the  Logic  itself,  and  can  be 
appreciated  in  its  fulness  only  after  a mastery 
of  the  detailed  exposition  which  the  Logic  con- 
tains. 

As  to  the  special  problems  of  the  soul,  the 
world,  and  of  God,  Kant’s  position  may  be  out- 
lined as  follows  : — 

As  to  their  teaching  concerning  the  nature  of 
the  soul,  Kant  and  Hegel  are  at  one  in  their 
criticism  of  the  old  metaphysical  definition  of 
the  soul  as  substantial,  simple,  selfsame,  and 
maintaining  its  independence  in  its  intercourse 
with  the  material  world.  Such  a definition  they 
both  hold  to  be  eminently  unsatisfactory.  The 
reasons  assigned  for  this  opinion,  however,  are 
quite  different.  Kant  affirms  that  the  meta- 
physical definition  is  unsatisfactory  because  the 
reason  has  no  more  of  a warrant  in  making  the 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


51 


transition  from  the  soul  as  we  think  it  to  be, 
to  the  soul  as  it  really  is  in  itself,  than  in  the 
procedure  from  the  appearances  of  things  as 
perceived  by  thought  to  the  things  as  they  are 
in  themselves.  Hegel,  however,  repudiates  the 
metaphysical  definition  on  the  ground  that  these 
attributes  enumerated  as  the  elementary  char- 
acteristics of  the  soul  are  totally  inadequate  to 
express  the  concrete  wealth  of  content  which 
our  idea  of  the  soul  should  embrace. 

As  to  the  problem  of  the  world,  Kant  draws 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  thought  in  en- 
deavoring to  comprehend  the  unconditioned 
nature  of  the  world  stumbles  upon  certain  con- 
tradictions which  are  called  antinomies,  for  it 
is  frequently  found  necessary  to  maintain  two 
contradictory  propositions  about  one  and  the 
same  object  in  such  a way  that  each  one  of  the 
mutually  destructive  propositions  seems  of  itself 
to  have  the  stamp  of  necessity  and  of  universal 
validity.  The  Kantian  antinomies  are  four  in 
number  and  are  as  follows  : — 

1.  The  world  is  limited  as  to  space  and  time. 

The  world  is  not  limited  as  to  space  and 

time. 

2.  Matter  is  indefinitely  divisible. 

Matter  is  not  indefinitely  divisible. 


52 


INTRODUCTION 


3.  The  will  must  be  free. 

The  will  must  be  determined. 

4.  The  world  is  caused. 

The  world  is  uncaused,  eternal. 

Kant’s  explanation  of  these  seemingly  contra- 
dictory statements  is  that  the  difficulty  is  not 
inherent  in  the  objects  themselves  which  are 
under  contemplation,  but  attaches  only  to  the 
reason  which  fails  to  comprehend  them  in  their 
true  significance.  At  this  point  Hegel  takes 
exception  to  Kant’s  explanation,  and  insists  that 
there  are  not  merely  four  antinomies,  but  that 
there  is  an  indefinite  number  of  such  contradic- 
tions arising  from  the  essential  nature  of  all 
being  itself.  The  difficulty,  therefore,  lies  not 
in  the  defects  of  reason.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
the  peculiar  office  of  reason  to  show  that  these 
contradictions  attach  to  the  things  themselves 
and  that  they  are  necessary  in  order  to  assume 
a progressive  development  whose  very  essence 
consists  in  overcoming  contradictions  and  in 
establishing  a higher  unity  in  the  midst  of  all 
differences.  It  is  only  the  absolute  reason, 
according  to  Hegel,  which  is  capable  of  con- 
structing such  a unity,  and  so  far  forth  as  the 
reason  of  man  partakes  of  the  divine  reason 
is  he  capable  of  comprehending  it.  Here,  again, 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


53 


we  obtain  a characteristic  glimpse  of  the  fun- 
damental Hegelian  conception,  and  a sugges- 
tion as  to  the  working  of  his  dialectic  method. 

As  to  the  final  problem,  the  theistic  question, 
it  would  be  well  to  examine  briefly  the  Kantian 
criticism  of  the  proofs  concerning  the  being  of 
God.  These  proofs  may  be  divided  into  two 
kinds  according  to  one  or  the  other  of  two 
methods  of  procedure : — 

We  may  begin,  on  the  one  hand,  with  an 
analysis  of  being  and  through  that  process 
reach  the  idea  of  God. 

Or,  on  the  other  hand,  we  may  begin  with 
an  analysis  of  the  idea  of  God,  and  through 
that  process  reach  the  ground  of  His  being. 

The  former  of  these  methods  of  procedure 
will  give  either  the  cosmological  or  the  physico- 
theological  proof  of  the  being  of  God.  The 
cosmological  proof  reasons  from  the  variously 
related  and  interconnected  phenomena  of  the 
universe  to  a first  cause  as  necessary  to  account 
for  their  origin  and  their  sustained  existence. 
This  proof  turns  upon  the  concept  of  causation. 
The  physico-theological  proof  reasons  from  evi- 
dences of  design  manifested  in  phenomena  to 
the  existence  of  One  who  is  the  great  architect 
of  them  all,  and  this  proof  turns  upon  the  con- 


54 


INTRODUCTION 


cept  of  final  cause.  Kant’s  criticism  of  these 
proofs  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  in  the  transi- 
tion from  the  world  which  is  finite  to  God  who 
is  infinite,  there  is  in  the  conclusion  far  more 
than  is  contained  in  the  premises,  and  therefore 
the  inference  is  an  unwarranted  one.  For  if 
we  may  not  logically  pass  from  the  crude  mate- 
rial of  the  sensations  to  the  ideas  of  universality 
and  necessity,  neither  may  we  pass  from  the 
same  beginnings  to  the  idea  of  God.  Hegel 
contributes  two  thoughts  of  special  significance 
to  the  general  conclusions  of  Kant ; the  first  is 
concerned  with  a question  of  form,  the  second 
with  the  question  of  matter  or  of  content. 

As  to  the  first,  that  of  the  formal  process 
involved  in  our  reasoning;  if  we  regard  the 
transition  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite  as  rep- 
resented by  a syllogistic  process,  the  starting- 
point  must  involve  some  theory  of  the  world 
which  makes  it  an  aggregate  either  of  contin- 
gent facts,  or  of  relations  implying  design. 
But  the  world  as  thus  conceived  is  no  longer 
a world  of  mere  sensations.  It  is  a world  of 
sensations  as  they  have  been  transmuted  by 
thought,  and  as  they  contain  the  elements  of 
necessity  and  universality ; for  we  have  seen 
that  it  is  the  fundamental  nature  of  thought  to 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


55 


exercise  this  function  of  transmuting  sensations 
into  these  higher  forms  of  the  mind.  But  in 
such  a process  the  crude  sensation  is  destroyed 
as  a sensation.  This  is  what  Hegel  calls  the 
element  of  negation  in  the  process  of  transition 
from  the  world  to  God.  The  world  regarded 
as  an  aggregate  of  sensations  has  disappeared. 
Out  of  its  ashes  rises  the  new  world  as  inter- 
preted by  the  categories  of  thought,  and  such  a 
world  with  its  implications  of  universality  and 
necessity  is  an  adequate  starting-point  for  the 
proof  of  the  being  of  God. 

Hegel’s  second  contribution  to  this  general 
discussion  relates  to  the  matter  or  body  of  truths 
to  which  the  transition  from  the  world  to  God 
at  first  leads,  such  truths  as  concern  the  nature 
of  the  world’s  substance,  its  necessary  essence, 
and  the  cause  which  regulates  and  directs  it 
according  to  design.  These  ideas  express  but  a 
very  partial  and  inadequate  knowledge  of  God, 
and  yet  they  are  necessary  to  a complete  con- 
ception of  Him.  Hegel  insists  that  while  they 
should  not  be  overlooked,  they  must  nevertheless 
be  supplemented  by  higher  truths,  and  that  while 
inanimate  nature  gives  us  intimations  of  God, 
there  is  a higher  revelation  of  Him  when  we 
start  with  living  organisms.  Thence  we  reach 


56 


INTRODUCTION 


the  idea  of  God  as  the  source  of  life.  In  a 
similar  way,  there  is  still  a higher  level  which 
may  be  taken  as  our  starting-point.  This  higher 
level  is  that  of  mind  itself ; it  is  through  mind 
alone  that  we  reach  the  highest  possible  con- 
ception of  God.  His  nature,  therefore,  can  be 
adequately  defined  only  when  we  regard  Him  as 
the  absolute  mind. 

The  second  general  method  of  proof  is  the 
inverse  process  of  the  first.  It  starts  with  the 
idea  of  God  and  reaches  His  being  as  the  con- 
clusion. It  is  the  so-called  ontological  argu- 
ment for  the  being  of  God.  Beginning  with 
the  idea  of  God  as  the  most  perfect  being  con- 
ceivable, it  proceeds  to  the  belief  in  the  actual 
being  of  God.  Kant’s  criticism  is  that  we  may 
not  reason  from  the  thought  in  the  mind  to  the 
actual  existence  of  the  object  of  that  thought 
outside  of  the  mind,  and  he  illustrates  this  point 
by  showing  that  a hundred  thalers  as  conceived 
in  the  mind  does  not  put  a hundred  thalers  in 
one’s  purse.  Hegel’s  criticism  of  Kant,  how- 
ever, puts  the  matter  in  a very  different  light. 
He  insists  that  no  such  analogy  as  drawn  by 
Kant  can  discredit  the  ontological  argument, 
because  the  idea  of  God  which  we  are  con- 
strained to  entertain  is  wholly  unique.  The 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


57 


very  nature  of  any  finite  thing  is  expressed 
by  saying  of  it  as  Kant  does  that  its  being  in 
time  and  space  is  very  different  from  our  notion 
of  it.  But  of  the  idea  of  God  it  must  be  said, 
and  of  Him  alone  can  it  be  said,  that  He  can  be 
thought  of  only  as  existing.  He,  the  infinite 
One,  occupies  in  our  thoughts  a position,  there- 
fore, accorded  to  nothing  that  is  finite.  In  God 
and  in  God  alone  is  the  idea  of  Him  and  His 
being  one  and  the  same.  Here  is  the  supreme 
illustration  that  the  rational  is  the  real  and  the 
real  is  rational. 

In  the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  Kant 
indicates  his  position  in  reference  to  the  moral 
life.  The  free  control  of  its  own  activity 
which  Kant  denied  to  the  pure  reason,  he  has 
vindicated  for  the  practical  reason  which  mani- 
fests itself  in  the  various  phases  of  human  con- 
duct. By  practical  reason  he  means  the  will 
that  determines  itself  according  to  universal 
laws,  and  these  universal  laws  he  claims  pos- 
sess objective  validity,  — that  is,  they  are  recog- 
nized by  the  human  intellect  everywhere  and  at 
all  times,  and  they  impose  a common  obligation 
upon  all  mankind.  Kant’s  special  contribution 
to  ethical  thought  consists  in  his  protest  against 
the  prevailing  ethical  theory  of  his  day,  — that 


58 


INTRODUCTION 


of  eudsemonism,  the  philosophy  which  finds 
man’s  chief  end  in  some  form  of  happiness,  and 
fundamentally  happiness  as  interpreted  in  the 
gratification  of  the  selfish  appetites  and  desires 
which  are  dictated  by  the  pleasures  and  pains 
of  life.  Hegel’s  criticism  of  Kant  is  that  his 
theory  gives  the  form  of  morality  in  a universal 
law  of  conduct,  but  that  the  formal  expression 
of  the  law  of  conduct  to  do  that  which  is  right 
by  no  means  determines  the  content  of  that 
law,  and  thereby  does  not  definitely  inform  us 
as  to  what  is  the  right  in  concrete  cases. 

It  is  thoroughly  characteristic  of  the  Hegelian 
method  that  it  always  criticises  a one-sided  view 
of  things,  and  then  seeks  to  correct  it  by  show- 
ing the  other  and  complementary  side.  So  here, 
Hegel  agrees  with  Kant  completely,  only  he 
adds  that  the  Kantian  system  is  inadequate  and 
needs  to  be  rounded  out  in  some  way  that  will 
provide,  not  merely  for  the  basis  of  a formal 
ethic,  but  for  a material  ethic  as  well,  so  that 
the  two  may  be  regarded  as  mutually  related 
elements  which  together  form  the  complete 
whole. 

In  the  third  division  of  Kant’s  great  work, 
The  Critique  of  the  Judgment , the  reflective 
power  of  judgment  is  declared  to  be  equiva- 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


59 


lent  to  the  function  of  the  intuitive  under- 
standing. In  this  position  Kant,  in  a dim 
way  at  least,  approaches  the  Hegelian  concep- 
tion of  reason  as  the  basis  of  all  things,  in 
affirming  that  everything  which  exists  manifests 
its  nature  according  to  its  inner  idea,  if  we  may 
here  use  an  Hegelian  phrase.  Thus  in  the  in- 
tuitive judgment  of  beauty  in  nature  or  in  art, 
in  the  judgment  of  an  ideal  end  which  is  being 
realized  in  all  the  living  organisms  throughout 
the  vast  range  of  nature,  — in  all  this  man  rises 
to  the  height  of  comprehending  in  some  measure 
that  the  mere  phenomena  of  the  universe  reveal 
in  themselves  an  ideal  and  a purpose.  The 
universe  is  thus  to  be  regarded  as  the  incarna- 
tion of  reason. 

Hegel’s  system  marks  a point  of  departure  in 
that  he  holds  that  this  ideal,  this  incarnate  reason, 
is  not  merely  revealed  to  the  artistic  instinct  of 
the  genius  or  of  the  poet,  but  may  be  made 
manifest  to  humbler  minds  through  the  simple 
operations  of  pure  thought  alone. 

Kant  went  so  far  towards  the  Hegelian  posi- 
tion as  to  assert  that  the  natural  purposiveness 
seen  in  nature  was  not  an  external  principle  of 
finality,  but  was  immanent  within  each  organ- 
ism, wherein  the  final  cause  is  active  as  a mold- 


60 


INTRODUCTION 


ing  principle,  forming  a constructive  dynamic 
centre.  He  fails,  however,  to  attain  to  the 
Hegelian  doctrine  in  its  completeness,  because 
he  says  that,  at  the  last  analysis,  the  idea  of  an 
immanent  finality  can  be  affirmed  with  positive 
assurance  only  of  our  thought  of  things  and  not 
of  the  things  themselves.  Whereas  Hegel 
insists  that  there  is  an  objective  finality  as  well 
as  a subjective,  or  rather  that  the  subjective  and 
the  objective  are  here  one  and  the  same ; the 
finality  is  both  in  our  thoughts  and  also  charac- 
teristic of  things  as  well. 

In  the  summary  of  his  review  of  the  critical 
philosophy  of  Kant,  Hegel  assigns  to  it  two 
points  of  merit,  in  that,  positively,  it  emphasizes 
the  independence  of  reason,  and,  negatively,  it 
insists  that  the  categories  of  the  understand- 
ing are  finite.  Kant’s  weakness,  on  the  other 
hand,  lies  in  affirming  that  what  is  false  or  inad- 
equate in  knowledge  is  due  solely  to  the  limi- 
tations of  our  mental  faculties.  Hegel  insists, 
on  the  contrary,  that  the  defects  of  knowledge 
must  be  ascribed  to  the  finite  nature  of  the 
objects  of  thought  themselves  and  not  to  the 
categories  by  which  they  are  constructed  into 
a system  of  knowledge. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  THEORY  OF  INTUITIVE  KNOWLEDGE 

HE  chief  representative  of  the  doctrine 


of  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge  is 
Jacobi,  who  insists  that  all  knowledge  obtained 
through  the  categories  of  the  understanding  is 
derivative  and  therefore  finite  and  conditioned, 
and  because  finite  and  conditioned,  therefore  un- 
satisfactory. Moreover,  through  any  process 
of  reasoning  whatsoever,  it  is  impossible  to  rise 
to  the  high  level  of  apprehending  the  true,  the 
infinite,  the  unconditioned,  that  is,  God  Himself. 
But  by  an  immediate  revelation  of  the  reason 
we  may  know  God  intuitively.  The  being  of 
God  cannot  he  proved,  but  it  can  be  immediately 
recognized.  The  words  “ knowledge,”  “ faith,” 
“intuition,”  are  the  terms  used  to  indicate  this 
immediate  deliverance  of  the  consciousness. 
Hegel’s  criticism  of  this  position  is  somewhat 
as  follows  : Although  the  knowledge  of  God  may 
be  regarded  as  an  immediate  intuition,  never- 
theless, it  is  an  intuition  which  must  be  con- 
sidered as  an  intellectual  product,  that  is,  it 


61 


62 


INTRODUCTION 


must  rise  above  the  things  of  sense.  It  must 
deal  with  facts  which  have  special  reference  to 
our  thinking  mind,  with  facts  of  inherently 
universal  significance.  Pure  and  simple  intui- 
tion, therefore,  is  nothing  more  or  less  than 
pure  and  simple  thought.  The  distinction 
between  thought  and  intuition  is  merely  a ver- 
bal one.  The  fundamental  difficulty  with  the 
position  of  Jacobi  is  this,  that  while  he  claims 
the  intuition  to  be  immediate,  he  overlooks  the 
possibility  that  what  may  seem  to  be  complete 
in  itself  is  nevertheless  a product,  though  it  be 
a finished  product,  and  as  a product,  therefore 
the  result  of  some  process  which  has  produced 
it.  Hegel’s  position  is  that  in  all  immediate 
knowledge  the  elements  which  are  immediate 
have  behind  them  somewhere  a process,  and  by 
that  process  they  are  mediated.  For  instance, 
a seed  is  an  immediate  existence  as  regards  the 
flower  and  fruit  which  may  spring  from  it.  As 
we  hold  the  seed  in  our  hand,  we  have  no  hesi- 
tancy in  calling  it  a finished  and  complete  thing 
in  itself.  The  flower  and  fruit,  however,  are 
mediated  by  the  processes  which  are  started  by 
the  vital  force  latent  in  the  seed.  And  yet 
from  a similar  point  of  view,  the  seed  itself 
may  be  regarded  as  a product  resulting  from  a 


THE  THEORY  OF  INTUITIVE  KNOWLEDGE  63 


process  by  which  it  has  been  mediated,  and 
comes  to  be  what  it  is  in  its  seemingly  complete 
and  independent  state.  We  may  further  illus- 
trate the  Hegelian  idea  of  mediation  by  the 
knowledge  which  we  may  have  of  a book  whose 
title,  author,  and  general  point  of  view  we  know 
only  by  common  report,  but  we  ourselves  have 
never  read  the  book  itself.  Such  knowledge 
Hegel  would  call  immediate  in  a general  and 
abstract  sense,  and  that  kind  of  immediate 
knowledge  would  have  no  special  significance 
or  value.  However,  after  reading  the  book  and 
marking  the  relation  of  step  to  step  in  the  grad- 
ual unfolding  of  the  author’s  conception,  and 
the  bearing  of  each  part  to  the  whole  as  it 
finally  reaches  its  complete  expression,  we  find 
that  our  knowledge  has  grown  in  definiteness 
and  consequent  value  through  this  process  which 
is  one  of  mediation.  And  then  also  the  book 
as  a whole  will  be  found  to  leave  upon  our 
mind  a certain  final  impression  as  a summary 
of  its  total  significance,  which  in  turn  we 
would  call  immediate  knowledge ; for  in  the 
course  of  time  the  various  steps  of  the  process 
of  mediation  become  merged  in  the  very  result 
of  the  process  itself,  and  we  come  to  retain  in 
consciousness  only  the  finished  product  as  a. 


64 


INTRODUCTION 


whole.  Such  immediate  knowledge,  however, 
which  is  the  result  of  a mediating  process,  is 
vastly  different  from  the  vague  and  indefinite 
knowledge  which  goes  before  and  is  indepen- 
dent of  all  mediation  whatsoever.  This  distinc- 
tion gives  a deep  insight  into  the  Hegelian 
method  and  general  point  of  view. 

So  also  religion  and  morals  contain,  of  course, 
as  their  most  marked  characteristics,  the  ele- 
ments of  faith,  or  immediate  knowledge,  and 
yet  from  another  point  of  view  they  must  be 
regarded  as  conditioned  on  every  side  by  the 
mediating  processes  of  development,  education, 
and  the  formation  of  character.  Hegel  holds 
that  everything  from  one  point  of  view  is  imme- 
diate, but  from  another  point  of  view  is  to  be 
regarded  as  mediated.  The  relation  between 
mediation  and  immediacy  is  one  of  the  keys 
to  a thorough  understanding  of  the  Hegelian 
system.  It  need  be  only  referred  to  here  in 
passing  by  way  of  anticipation,  inasmuch  as  this 
relation  is  developed  at  length  in  the  second 
part  of  the  Logic.  His  doctrine  of  essential 
being  as  there  expressed  is  made  to  rest  upon 
the  unity  which  underlies  the  seeming  antithesis 
of  mediation  and  immediacy. 

Hegel  further  criticises  the  theory  of  immedi- 


THE  THEORY  OF  INTUITIVE  KNOWLEDGE  65 


ate  knowledge  on  the  ground  that  the  criterion 
of  truth  is  found  not  in  the  character  of  that 
which  purports  to  be  true,  but  in  the  bare  fact 
that  it  has  found  a place  in  consciousness. 
This  makes  subjective  knowledge  the  sole  basis 
of  truth.  Whatever  is  discovered  as  a fact  in 
the  individual  consciousness  is  thereby  declared 
to  be  a fact  evidenced  by  the  consciousness  of 
all,  and  to  be  regarded  even  as  the  very  essence 
of  thought  itself.  This,  however,  does  not  neces- 
sarily follow  ; and  if  granted,  it  proves  too  much, 
for  as  a result  of  such  an  argument  there  may 
be  found  as  valid  a warrant  for  the  superstitions 
of  savage  peoples  as  for  the  doctrines  of  the 
Christian  religion.  As  Hegel  remarks,  “ It  is 
because  he  simply  believes  in  them  and  not 
from  any  process  of  reasoning  or  argument  that 
the  Indian  finds  God  in  the  cow,  the  monkey, 
the  Brahmin,  or  the  Lama.”  1 

It  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  the  im- 
mediate knowledge  of  God  merely  tells  us  that 
He  is.  Thus  the  idea  of  God  as  an  object  of 
religion  is  narrowed  down  to  an  indefinite, 
vague,  supersensible  being  devoid  of  all  posi- 
tive attributes.  From  this  point  of  view  He 
must  ever  remain  the  Unknown  God.  Such 
1 Hegel’s  Werke,  VI,  § 72. 


66 


INTRODUCTION 


an  idea  of  God  is  upon  the  same  level  as  Her- 
bert Spencer’s  characterization  of  God  as  “ the 
Unknowable.” 

Moreover,  the  abstract  thought  of  the  meta- 
physician and  the  abstract  intuition  are  one  and 
the  same  thing.  From  either  point  of  view, 
God  is  conceived  as  a being  vaguely  indefinite 
and  undetermined.  To  call  God  a spirit  and  to 
say  that  we  know  Him  as  a spirit  immediately, 
Hegel  insists,  is  only  an  empty  phrase ; for  the 
consciousness,  or  better  the  self-consciousness, 
which  the  idea  of  spirit  implies,  would  neces- 
sarily render  that  idea  more  specific  and  defi- 
nite by  analyzing  it  in  sucli  a way  as  to 
show  the  various  elements  which  constitute 
its  essence  and  by  separating  it  from  all  else 
that  might  be  confused  with  it.  But  such 
an  act  of  thought  is  itself  a process  of  media- 
tion. Thus  all  strictly  immediate  knowledge 
is  vague  and  indefinite,  and  the  very  act  of 
making  it  definite  and  distinct  necessitates  the 
subjecting  of  its  immediacy  to  a process  of 
mediation.  Without  such  a process  all  knowl- 
edge is  both  unscientific  and  unphilosophical. 

The  results  which  have  been  reached  through 
Hegel’s  criticism  of  the  various  attitudes  of 


THE  THEOKY  OP  INTUITIVE  KNOWLEDGE  67 


thought  to  the  objective  world  may  be  briefly 
summarized  as  follows : — 

The  metaphysician  has  his  abstract  forms  of 
thought,  but  they  prove  to  be  empty. 

The  empiricist  has  a vast  wealth  of  material 
but  no  thought  forms  in  which  to  express  the 
same. 

The  critical  philosopher  has  his  thought 
forms,  but  that  which  seems  to  be  the  material 
at  hand  ready  for  the  casting,  proves,  upon  in- 
vestigation, to  be  shadowy  and  unsubstantial. 

The  intuitionist  possesses  thought  forms  but 
they  lack  any  distinctive  pattern  ; and  therefore 
whatever  may  be  the  material  which  is  run  into 
them,  the  casting  which  results  is  always  the 
same,  possessing  no  specific  characteristics  and 
therefore  without  significance  or  value. 

The  evident  defects  of  these  various  types  of 
philosophy  Hegel  seeks  to  obviate  by  uniting 
into  one  system  the  partial  truths  which  they 
severally  contain.  By  what  method  this  is 
attempted  and  with  what  success  it  is  attended, 
we  shall  hope  to  see  in  the  detailed  exposition 
of  the  Logic , — the  task  which  lies  immediately 
before  us. 


CHAPTER  VI 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  LOGIC 

HE  Logic  is  divided  into  three  parts:  — 


I.  The  Doctrine  of  Being.  ( Die  Lehre 
vom  Seyn. ) 

II.  The  Doctrine  of  Essence.  (Lie  Lehre 
vom  TVesen.) 

III.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Notion.  (Lie 

Lehre  vom  Begriff.') 

These  divisions  represent  the  successive  stages 
in  the  progressive  unfolding  of  our  knowledge 
through  which  the  various  processes  of  thought 
come  to  their  complete  and  final  expression. 
They  are  to  be  regarded  as  successive  stages 
only  in  the  sense  that  by  our  analysis  we  sepa- 
rate them  in  our  thoughts,  and  think  of  one  as 
following  the  other.  But  in  reality  we  should 
conceive  of  these  elements  of  knowledge  in  such 
a manner  as  to  regard  one  as  lying  within  the 
other,  and  this  in  turn  within  the  third.  The 
progress  indicated  in  their  development  is  one 
not  of  advance  so  much  as  a deepening  insight 


68 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  LOGIC  69 


into  more  and  more  fundamental  attributes  and 
relations. 

The  doctrine  of  being  is  the  result  of  an 
answer  to  the  question  as  to  what  a thing  is. 

The  doctrine  of  essence,  in  answer  to  the 
question  of  ivhat  is  it  composed  and  by  what 
is  it  constituted. 

The  doctrine  of  the  notion,  in  answer  to  the 
question,  to  what  end  is  it  designed  and  is  it 
capable  of  progressing. 

The  complete  knowledge  of  a thing,  therefore, 
embraces  the  categories  of  its  being,  the  ground 
of  its  being,  and  the  purpose  of  its  being. 

It  will  be  readily  seen  that  the  first  category 
involves  the  second,  in  order  to  complete  its 
meaning,  and  that  the  second  involves  the  third 
in  a like  manner,  and  that  the  third  underlies 
the  other  two.  For  the  being  of  a thing 
becomes  definitely  known  to  us  only  when 
we  are  able  to  refer  it  to  its  appropriate  ground, 
and  when  we  possess  some  insight  as  to  whence 
it  came  and  by  what  processes  its  being  is  main- 
tained and  perfected ; also  the  ground  of  its 
being  finds  its  full  significance  only  in  the  con- 
sideration of  the  end  which  it  is  realizing  and 
which  its  being  subserves.  Thus,  the  question 
what  implies  the  question  whence  ; and  the  ques- 


70 


INTRODUCTION 


tion  whence  leads  irresistibly  to  the  question 
whither. 

We  may  call  the  category  of  being  the  logic 
of  description  ; that  of  essence,  the  logic  of 
explanation ; that  of  the  notion,  the  logic  of 
the  final  cause. 

The  first  category,  that  of  being,  represents 
knowledge  when  reduced  to  its  simplest  terms. 
The  affirmation  of  all  others  that  possesses  the 
least  significance  is  that  merely  of  being  pure 
and  simple  when  it  stands  without  further  quali- 
fication or  specification,  so  that  were  anything 
less  asserted  of  an  object,  knowledge  would  be 
reduced  to  zero. 

There  are  certain  terms  by  which  Hegel  is 
wont  to  characterize  being,  and  an  understand- 
ing of  which  will  give  us  an  insight  into  the 
meaning  of  the  doctrine  of  being  and  at  the 
same  time  prepare  us  for  the  appreciation  of 
the  fundamental  distinction  which  he  draws 
between  being  and  essence.  Being,  for  instance, 
is  referred  to  by  Hegel  variously  as  abstract,  as 
identity,  as  absolute  identity ; again  as  abstract 
identity,  as  immediate,  as  undetermined,  and  as 
being  in  itself  (an  sich). 

By  “ abstract  ” is  meant  that  which  is  partial 
and  incomplete.  The  category  of  being  is  always 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  LOGIC  71 


spoken  of  as  abstract,  representing  as  it  does 
the  first  rough  draft  of  knowledge,  and  neces- 
sarily marking  the  beginning  of  that  which  as 
yet  is  incomplete  and  undeveloped. 

The  term  “ identity  ” as  applied  to  being  means 
a uniform  sameness  or  homogeneity,  which  shows 
no  distinction  of  parts  or  diversity  of  elements 
within  itself,  and  which  sustains  no  relations, 
as  far  as  known,  to  anything  beyond  itself.  It 
is,  therefore,  a term  used  to  imply  that  mere 
being  as  regards  any  definite  characteristics  or 
qualities  which  it  may  possess  is  colorless,  and 
as  regards  any  relations  which  it  may  sustain 
to  other  things,  is  completely  isolated. 

The  phrase  “absolute  identity”  is  only  an 
emphatic  expression  for  the  term  “ identity,” 
and  is  equivalent  to  the  phrase  “mere  identity” 
or  mere  “ sameness.” 

The  phrase  “ abstract  identity  ” is  a combina- 
tion of  the  two  ideas,  abstract  and  identity.  It 
is  equivalent  to  the  phrase  “ an  incomplete  and 
colorless  view  of  things.” 

The  term  “immediate,”  as  we  have  already 
seen,  when  applied  to  knowledge,  signifies  that 
which  is  given  as  a totality,  without  any  reference 
to  the  elements  which  constitute  it,  or  to  the 
processes  by  which  it  is  produced.  Immediate 


72 


INTRODUCTION 


knowledge  is  that  which  is  not  subjected  to  any 
analysis  whatsoever,  and  such  is  the  nature  of 
mere  being. 

The  word  “ undetermined  ” signifies  the  lack 
of  any  definite  qualities  or  attributes,  and  has  the 
force  of  the  adjective  “ indefinite  ” when  applied 
to  being. 

The  phrase  “ in  itself  ” (an  sich ) means  that 
which  is  implicit  or  potential ; it  is  used  in 
distinction  to  the  phrase  “ of  itself  ” (fur  sich ) 
which  signifies  that  which  is  explicit.  While 
the  former  applies  to  being,  the  latter  applies 
to  essence,  indicating  that  the  one  is  explicitly 
what  the  other  is  implicitly.  Thus,  being  is  to 
be  regarded  merely  as  a transition  state  of 
knowledge,  the  veriest  beginning  of  knowledge 
in  fact,  inasmuch  as  that  which  may  become 
definite  and  determined  as  essential  being,  is 
still  indefinite  and  undetermined  as  mere  being. 
It,  however,  does  contain  the  potential  of  all 
that  appears  explicitly  in  essence. 

We  come  now  to  consider  the  chief  char- 
acteristics of  essence  in  contrast  to  those  of 
being.  The  essence  is  the  result  of  a deeper 
insight  than  is  represented  by  mere  being.  The 
essence  of  a thing  is  what  it  is,  regarded  no 
longer  as  an  isolated  fact,  but  as  a part  of  a 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OP  THE  LOGIC  73 


system  of  interrelated  elements.  The  idea  of 
system  is  closely  associated  with  a technical 
term  which  Hegel  uses  constantly  in  connection 
with  the  category  of  essence  ; it  is  the  word 
“ reflection.”  The  essence  of  a thing  is  revealed 
only  when  we  see  the  thing  in  its  complete 
setting,  and  when  we  possess  a thorough  knowl- 
edge of  the  relations  which  it  sustains  to  every 
part  of  the  system  to  which  it  may  be  referred. 
The  thing,  therefore,  does  not  shine  in  its  own 
light  so  much  as  in  the  light  reflected  from  all 
the  coordinate  elements  with  which  it  is  related. 
We  know  a thing  only  when  it  is  in  the  focal 
point  of  the  illumination  due  to  its  complete 
setting.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Hegel  says 
that  the  essence  of  a thing  is  known  by  means 
of  the  category  of  reflection. 

Moreover,  in  order  to  understand  fully  the  es- 
sence of  a thing  we  must  analyze  the  total  mass 
of  surface  appearances,  and  disclose  the  underly- 
ing elements  and  processes  which  have  given  rise 
to  its  being.  As  mere  being,  the  thing  appears  as 
an  unanalyzed  whole,  a simple  product  without 
any  reference  to  the  processes  which  have  pro- 
duced it.  In  this  analysis  into  constituent  ele- 
ments and  formative  processes  we  employ  in 
our  thought  the  category  of  mediation.  Media- 


74 


INTRODUCTION 


tion  is  the  process  by  which  a thing  comes  to 
be  what  it  is  as  regards  its  inherent  nature  and 
essential  characteristics  ; it  emphasizes  especially 
the  means  by  which  the  end  in  question  is 
attained. 

Again,  while  being  is  always  referred  to  as 
indefinite  and  undetermined,  essence,  on  the 
contrary,  is  being  which  has  become  definite 
and  determined.  The  definiteness  which  is  char- 
acteristic of  essence  is  reached  through  a process 
called  negation.  To  make  definite,  means  to 
mark  off  distinct  limits,  beyond  which  the  thing 
in  question  ceases  to  be  what  it  is.  The  process 
of  negation  is  therefore  the  setting  up  of  bounds 
about  a thing,  forming  an  enclosing  line  which 
we  may  call  the  line  of  negation,  as  beyond  that 
line  there  is  nothing  which  can  be  regarded  as 
properly  belonging  to  the  essence  of  the  thing 
which  is  thus  limited.  Mere  being,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  homogeneous  throughout,  lacking  all 
characteristic  color  and  determination,  and  this 
defect  of  being  is  obviated  by  disclosing  its 
various  parts  and  their  reciprocal  relations. 
But  in  doing  this  the  several  parts  must  be 
distinguished  one  from  another,  and  the  accom- 
plishment of  this  is  one  of  the  functions  of  the 
process  of  negation.  Negation,  therefore,  may 


A GENEBAL  SUB YE V OF  THE  LOGIC  75 


be  defined  as  the  process  of  revealing  the  specific 
differences  between  things,  or  between  the  sev- 
eral elements  and  functions  of  one  and  the  same 
thing.  It  is,  in  a sense,  a twofold  process,  — the 
discrimination  of  a thing  from  all  that  is  external 
to  it,  and  also  the  analysis  of  a thing  into  its 
component  elements  and  functions.  It  is  a term, 
as  used  by  Hegel,  which  is  equivalent  to  the  term 
“differentiation,”  which  has  entered  so  largely 
into  the  terminology  of  biological  investigation 
and  theory.  The  differentiation,  for  instance,  of 
an  egg  in  the  process  of  development  is  the  break- 
ing up  of  its  initial  homogeneity,  which  we 
might  call  its  mere  being,  into  the  related  parts 
revealed  in  the  living  organism  of  the  bird 
newly  hatched.  It  is  in  this  differentiation  that 
the  essential  nature  of  the  bird  is  fully  disclosed. 
The  Hegelian  idea  of  negation  is  embodied  in 
the  dictum  of  Spinoza : Omnis  determinatio  est 
negatio,  that  is,  we  determine  the  characteristic 
and  essential  feature  of  a thing  by  a sharp  dis- 
tinction between  that  which  it  is  and  that  which 
it  is  not.  When  no  line  of  distinction  is  drawn, 
knowledge  is  a blur.  It  is  without  definition  ; 
just  as  we  say  a photographic  plate  is  without 
definition  when  we  mean  that  the  lines  are  not 
clear  and  clean-cut. 


76 


INTRODUCTION 


As  essence  may  be  regarded  as  the  develop- 
ment and  completion  of  the  category  of  being, 
in  like  manner  the  category  of  the  notion  is  the 
development  and  completion  of  that  of  essence. 
Each  stage  marks  a deeper  penetration,  and  a 
progress  towards  the  fulness  of  knowledge. 
If  we  inquire  as  to  the  nature  of  the  process 
which  necessarily  underlies  anything  regarded 
merely  as  a product,  we  have  raised  the  ques- 
tion as  to  its  essence ; and  if  then  we  probe 
deeper  and  inquire  as  to  the  thought  which  has 
devised  the  process,  and  is  at  the  same  time 
both  the  dynamic  source  of  the  process  itself 
and  its  complete  realization  as  well,  we  have 
raised  the  question  as  to  its  notion,  — that  is, 
creative  and  sustaining  reason.  The  notion, 
therefore,  embraces  the  truth,  both  of  being  and 
of  essence. 

It  has  been  before  remarked  that  the  cate- 
gory of  being  represents  immediate  knowl- 
edge,— that  is,  the  acceptance  of  an  object  of 
knowledge  as  a fact  merely  while  yet  unana- 
lyzed and  unexplained  ; and  that  the  category  of 
essence  represents  mediated  knowledge, — that 
is,  knowledge  analyzed  and  explained.  The  cate- 
gory of  the  notion,  therefore,  may  be  regarded 
as  the  combination  of  these  two  kinds  of 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  LOGIC  77 


knowledge.  It  embraces  immediate  knowledge 
in  the  sense  of  comprehending,  from  the  begin- 
ning, the  end  to  be  realized  as  a finished  prod- 
uct ; it  is  mediated  knowledge  as  well,  in  the 
sense  of  its  being  the  knowledge  of  the  process, 
which  is  necessary  in  order  to  realize  the  end  in 
question.  It  possesses  at  the  same  time  the 
capacity  of  originating  and  directing  that 
process. 

Moreover,  being  has  been  represented  as 
knowledge  which  is  indefinite  and  undeter- 
mined, and  essence  as  knowledge  definite  and 
determined ; the  notion,  therefore,  in  this  con- 
nection may  be  defined  as  the  principle  of 
reason  which  has  the  capacity  of  determining 
itself,  — that  is,  of  transforming  the  indefinite 
and  undetermined  into  the  definite  and  deter- 
mined, by  its  own  inherent  self-activity. 

Again,  being  has  been  represented  as  homo- 
geneous, without  any  differentiation  of  its  parts, 
and  essence  as  the  breaking  up  this  dull  level  of 
sameness  into  distinct  parts ; the  notion,  there- 
fore, may  be  regarded  as  the  capacity  for  self- 
differentiation or  self-specification. 

As  being  is  the  potential,  and  essence  the 
actual,  the  notion  may  be  regarded  as  the  ca- 
pacity for  effecting  the  transition  from  the 


78 


INTRODUCTION 


potential  to  the  actual,  or  the  capacity  of  self- 
realization. 

These  ideas  of  self-realization,  self-determi- 
nation, and  self-specification,  characterize  the 
notion  under  the  several  aspects  of  develop- 
ment, freedom,  and  individuality.  Such  a prin- 
ciple as  this,  which  is  able  freely  to  realize  its 
own  ends,  is,  according  to  Hegel,  to  be  consid- 
ered not  so  much  in  the  light  of  a substance, 
underlying  and  constituting  the  essential  being 
of  all  things,  as  a subject,  because  every  manifes- 
tation of  which  it  is  the  ground  is  a self-manifes- 
tation. The  first  and  second  parts  of  the  logic, 
the  doctrines  of  being  and  of  essence,  Hegel  char- 
acterizes as  objective,  and  the  third,  the  doctrine 
of  the  notion,  as  subjective.  Being  and  essence 
represent  the  manifestation  in  the  world  of 
reality,  the  notion  represents  both  the  basis  of 
that  manifestation  and  the  end  of  it  as  well. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Hegelian  system,  as  a 
whole,  represents  a progressive  evolution,  and 
it  is  of  some  interest  to  note  that  as  a process 
of  evolution  it  is  characterized  by  Hegel  in 
almost  the  same  terms  as  Mr.  Spencer  employs 
in  his  well-known  definition  of  biological  evolu- 
tion. “ Evolution,”  says  he,  “ is  a change  from  an 
indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a definite, 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  LOGIC  79 


coherent  heterogeneity,  through  successive  dif- 
ferentiations and  integrations.  ” 

The  change  which  is  indicated  by  the  Spem 
cerian  definition  occurs  between  two  states  of  an 
organism ; the  first  corresponds  to  that  of  mere 
being,  the  second  to  that  of  essence.  The  same 
terms,  “indefinite”  and  “incoherent,”  are  used 
by  Hegel  to  characterize  the  state  of  mere  being. 
The  term  “ homogeneity  ” has  a significance  simi- 
lar to  the  Hegelian  phrase  of  abstract  identity, 
that  is,  without  distinction  and  characterization 
of  its  parts.  So  also  the  opposite  terms  “ defi- 
nite” and  “coherent”  permit  of  an  exact  ap- 
plication to  the  state  of  essence.  The  term 
“ heterogeneity  ” indicates,  moreover,  the  state  in 
which  the  initial  sameness  has  been  resolved  into 
separate  elements  possessing  distinctive  charac- 
teristics, and  may  in  all  propriety  be  applied  to 
the  Hegelian  conception  of  essence.  The  transi- 
tion from  the  one  state  to  the  other  is  regarded 
by  Spencer  as  a process  which  is  mediated 
through  successive  differentiations  and  inte- 
grations. “ Differentiation  ” corresponds  to  the 
process  of  mediation  by  negation  in  the  Hegelian 
terminology,  and  “ integration  ” to  the  synthesis 
which  is  the  resulting  product  of  such  a process. 
As  every  integration,  according  to  Spencer, 


80 


INTRODUCTION 


implies  a previous  differentiation,  so  according 
to  Hegel  every  so-called  immediate  element  of 
knowledge  must  be  regarded  as  a product 
implying  a previous  mediation  or  process  which 
has  produced  it.  Or,  to  use  another  character- 
istic phrase  of  Hegel’s,  while  the  Spencerian  idea 
of  differentiation  corresponds  to  the  process  of 
negation,  integration  may  be  regarded  as  corre- 
sponding to  the  process  which  Hegel  calls  abso- 
lute negation,  — that  is,  the  negation  of  a former 
negation,  which  produces  the  effect  of  a new 
synthesis  or  affirmation. 

There  is,  however,  a marked  point  of  depar- 
ture in  reference  to  the  Hegelian  conception  of 
evolution  in  contrast  to  that  of  Mr.  Spencer. 
The  latter’s  definition  contains  nothing  which 
corresponds  to  the  Hegelian  category  of  the 
notion.  As  to  what  may  underlie  the  series  of 
never  ceasing  changes,  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
series  itself  and  its  final  consummation,  there 
is  in  the  philosophy  of  Mr.  Spencer  only  the 
great  Unknowable.  Here,  Mr.  Spencer  would 
insist,  is  reason’s  barrier ; beyond  lies  the  region 
of  conjecture,  of  sentiment,  and  of  hope  but  not 
of  knowledge.  To  an  agnostic  position  such 
as  this,  Hegel  would  enter  a vigorous  protest, 
and  would  urge  that,  given  being  and  essence, 


A GENERAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  LOGIC  81 


the  tiling  and  its  historical  evolution,  forming 
a part  of  the  cosmic  series  of  progressive 
development,  the  thought  is  then  necessarily 
constrained  to  postulate  a constructive  and 
determining  principle  of  reason,  as  the  intelli- 
gent source  and  end  of  it  all.  Hegel  maintains, 
moreover,  that  this  principle  of  reason  which  is 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  cosmic  evolution 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end,  which  is  a self- 
contained,  free  activity,  creating  and  sustaining 
all  things  within  its  power,  its  wisdom  and  its 
goodness,  can  be  no  other  than  that  which  is 
the  Absolute,  which  is  God.  When  Hegel 
takes  the  position,  as  we  have  already  noticed, 
that  the  underlying  ground  of  all  things  must 
be  regarded  as  a subject  rather  than  a sub- 
stance, thence  the  transition  to  the  identifica- 
tion of  this  subject  with  the  Absolute  or  God 
seems  a most  natural  one.  And  it  will  be  seen 
as  we  advance  in  the  further  exposition  of  the 
Logic  that  the  momentum  of  the  entire  dialecti- 
cal movement  renders  such  a conclusion  neces- 
sary. 


<3 


- ..  . ...  ...  ..  . ; . ..  - . .. 


PART  I 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


Das  Seyn  ist  nicht  zu  empfinden,  nicht  anzur 
schauen  und  nicht  vorzustellen,  sondern  es  ist  der 
reine  Gedanke  und  als  soldier  m adit  es  den  Anfang. 
— Hegel. 


PART  I 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


CHAPTER  VII 

QUALITY 

HEGEL  discusses  the  doctrine  of  being 
( 'Die  Lelire  vom  Seyn ) under  its  three 
aspects  of  quality,  quantity,  and  measure. 
Before  entering  upon  the  exposition  of  the 
Hegelian  conception  of  quality,  it  would  be 
well  to  examine  somewhat  more  in  detail  the 
general  doctrine  of  being.  Such  an  under- 
taking will  serve  at  the  same  time  as  an 
introduction  to  his  more  specific  teaching  con- 
cerning the  quality  of  being. 

If  we  are  agreed  to  regard  knowledge  as 
an  evolution,  then  the  beginnings  of  that  ev- 
olution must  represent  the  minimum  of  knowl- 
edge. Such  a beginning  is  found  in  the 
category  of  being.  In  ascribing  to  an  object 
mere  being  without  any  further  characteriza- 
tion, we  render  our  assertion  as  indefinite  as 
85 


86 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


it  can  well  be  made.  The  knowledge  which 
ranges  upon  so  low  a level  is  equivalent  to 
no  knowledge  at  all,  or  as  Hegel  tersely  puts 
it,  “ Being  is  the  same  as  non-being.”  The 
identification  of  being  and  non-being  when 
thrust  upon  us  as  a bare  statement  and  with- 
out commentary  upon  it,  not  only  startles  us 
but  also  arouses  a very  natural  feeling  of 
protest,  and  perhaps  of  indignation.  We  say 
to  ourselves  “ Is  Hegel  a mere  juggler  with 
words?  Is  it  possible  that  behind  this  abrupt 
formula  he  is  secretly  laughing  at  us,  and 
that  his  whole  system  is  merely  a keen  satire 
upon  the  limitations  of  the  powers  of  reason?” 
So  it  would  seem,  at  least  after  a rapid  and 
superficial  glance  at  such  a proposition.  But 
when  we  come  to  analyze  the  statement  that 
being  and  non-being  are  the  same,  we  find 
that  it  is  only  an  epigrammatic  expression  of 
that  which  we  have  always  believed  most 
thoroughly ; for  we  are  accustomed  to  say 
that  any  statement  which  is  indefinite  and 
non-committal  is  of  no  value  or  significance 
as  knowledge.  If  it  should  be  put  to  us  in 
the  form  of  a promise,  it  would  carry  with 
it  no  weight  of  assurance  that  the  promise 
would  ever  be  fulfilled.  For  us  it  would 


QUALITY 


87 


amount  to  nothing.  This  is  expressed  in  the 
proverb : “ Some  time  is  no  time.  ” We  see,  then, 
that  Hegel’s  identification  of  being  and  non- 
being  is  equivalent  to  the  statement  that 
whatever  is  presented  to  us  as  wholly  in- 
definite, ranks  in  reference  to  its  worth  as 
knowledge  as  though  it  were  not.  If  it  is 
put  in  this  way,  the  Hegelian  epigram  wins  our 
assent  immediately.  The  critics  of  Hegel  have 
sought  to  entrap  him  by  asking  the  ques- 
tion, “ Do  you  mean  to  tell  us  that  a house 
is  the  same  as  no  house?  that  a man  is  the 
same  as  no  man?  that  a God  is  the  same  as 
no  God?”  Such  questions  indicate  a radical 
misunderstanding  of  Hegel’s  conception  of  the 
relation  of  being  to  non-being.  For  in  the 
examples  cited,  the  house,  man,  God,  we  have 
something  more  in  each  case  than  mere  be- 
ing; we  have  being  which  has  already  been 
rendered  definite  and  explicit,  and  possesses 
the  whole  concrete  content  which  these  terms 
severally  connote.  These  cases,  therefore,  fall 
wholly  outside  of  the  sphere  of  mere  being, 
and  hence  are  irrelevant  to  the  point  which 
has  been  raised.  What  Hegel  affirms  is  this : 
that  being,  mere  being,  without  any  character- 
ization whatsoever,  absolutely  indefinite  and 


88 


THE  DOCTRINE  OE  BEING 


undetermined  as  regards  its  essential  qualities, 
— that  such  being  is  as  nothing. 

But  while  being,  from  one  point  of  view  as 
abstract  being,  is  the  same  as  non-being,  from 
another  point  of  view,  however,  it  is  quite 
different  from  non-being.  For  being  in  the 
Hegelian  system  is  regarded  as  the  first  term 
in  a series  of  development.  It  marks  a be- 
ginning, therefore,  and  while  it  is  so  far 
nothing  explicitly  ( fur  sick ),  still  it  must  be 
regarded  as  something  implicitly  (aw  sicli),  — 
that  is,  it  must  contain  the  potentiality  of  some- 
thing which  is  to  appear  later  on  in  the  actual 
development.  In  it  must  be  the  “promise  and 
potency  ” of  all  that  is  to  follow  throughout 
the  subsequent  stages  of  its  evolution.  It 
would  be  a correct  statement  to  assert  con- 
cerning a stone  placed  upon  a parapet  at  the 
top  of  a house : “ This  stone  is  at  rest.  It 
has  no  motion.”  And  yet  if  it  should  be 
pushed  away  from  its  support,  it  would  fall 
to  the  ground  below,  because  of  the  gravity 
potential  which  it  possessed  by  virtue  of  its 
position  alone.  And  so  it  would  be  correct 
to  state  of  it  in  the  first  instance  that  it  is 
both  at  rest  and,  nevertheless,  potentially  at 
least,  possesses  motion.  The  motion  is  not 


QUALITY 


89 


actual,  it  is  true,  but  it  is  potential,  and  so  far 
forth  its  motion  is  real  in  a very  true  sense. 
If  being  is  to  be  regarded,  then,  as  the  initial 
term  in  a series  of  development,  we  must 
think  of  it  as  embodying  a high  potential  in 
reference  to  its  latent  qualities. 

Suppose,  therefore,  that  the  being  which  we 
have  conceived  as  the  starting-point  in  this  evo- 
lution begins  to  develop  its  potential  qualities 
into  actual.  We  will  find  that  whatever  has 
been  indefinite  now  tends  to  become  more  and 
more  definite,  and  whatever  has  been  undeter- 
mined will  now  grow  more  and  more  deter- 
mined, as  the  process  advances.  The  very 
idea  of  development  itself  implies  that  each 
succeeding  stage  of  the  series  is  a manifestation 
of  something  which  in  the  preceding  stage  had 
as  yet  no  actual  being.  It  is  in  this  sense  that 
Hegel  affirms  that  becoming  ( Werden ) is  the 
unity  of  being  and  non-being,  — that  is,  a 
transition  from  that  which  is  not  to  that 
which  is. 

Let  us  suppose,  for  instance,  that  there  is  an 
object  barely  discernible  in  the  twilight.  Our 
knowledge  of  it  is  completely  exhausted  by  the 
bare  statement  that  something  is  there.  What 
its  nature  may  be  more  specifically,  its  charac- 


90 


THE  DOCTBINE  OE  BEING 


teristics,  as  to  form,  color,  and  the  like,  — what 
it  is  in  fact,  that  is  unknown ; it  is  nothing. 

But  while  it  is  so  indefinite  as  far  as  our 
knowledge  of  its  true  nature  is  concerned  that 
we  correctly  designate  it  as  nothing,  neverthe- 
less, it  contains  at  the  same  time  the  poten- 
tiality of  something  which  under  proper 
circumstances  may  be  revealed.  And  so  we 
may  imagine  that  the  light  gradually  grows 
brighter,  penetrating  the  darkness  which  sur- 
rounds it ; and  with  the  growing  illumination 
the  object  becomes  clearer,  and  all  that  a mo- 
ment before  was  indefinite  and  unknown 
becomes  definite  and  known.  Such  a process 
is  one  of  becoming,  and  it  consists  of  a transi- 
tion from  the  unknown  to  the  known,  a revela- 
tion of  all  hidden  qualities ; and  this  process 
may  be  appropriately  characterized  as  the  unity 
or  the  uniting  of  that  which  is  not  to  that  which 
is,  or  as  Hegel  puts  it,  the  unity  of  non-being 
and  being. 

Hegel  maintains  that  his  system  of  thought- 
evolution  brings  together  in  one  all  the  differ- 
ent phases  of  philosophical  speculation  which 
in  turn  have  emphasized  exclusively  some  one 
stage  of  the  total  process  of  development,  and 
which  have  overlooked  the  relation  of  each  par- 


QUALITY 


91 


tial  point  of  view  to  the  whole.  In  a similar 
manner,  for  instance,  several  persons  might 
describe  a plant,  one  by  referring  to  the  kind 
of  seed  from  which  it  sprang,  another  by  draw- 
ing attention  to  its  blossom,  or  another,  to  its 
fruit,  and  still  another,  to  its  possible  use  for 
medicinal  purposes.  Each  would  represent  a 
stage  in  the  complete  process  of  its  growth. 
Each  is  partial,  and  all  should  be  brought  to- 
gether in  order  to  form  one  complete  descrip- 
tion. Thus,  in  the  system  of  Parmenides  the 
idea  of  being  was  regarded  apart  from  its  rela- 
tion to  non-being  and  becoming.  The  conse- 
quence was  that  his  system  represented  the 
world  as  consisting  of  rigidly  unalterable  ele- 
ments, mere  products  ready  made  and  un- 
changing, from  which  the  idea  of  any  process 
whatsoever  was  completely  excluded.  Heracli- 
tus, on  the  other  hand,  held  that  the  truth  of 
being  consisted  of  a perpetual  becoming,  7 ravTa 
pel,  he  said,  — all  things  flow.  Thus  the  cate- 
gory of  becoming  in  his  system  excludes  all 
others.  Heraclitus,  however,  marks  an  advance 
upon  Parmenides,  inasmuch  as  his  idea  of  be- 
coming carries  with  it  also  the  implication  of 
being,  so  that  while  he  destro}^  the  being  of 
Parmenides  with  one  hand,  he  restores  it  with 


92 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


the  other,  regarding  it  as  an  essential  factor 
in  the  process  of  becoming.  It  is  of  interest 
to  note  that  this  historical  difference  of  opinion 
has  followed,  as  it  were,  the  lines  of  a dialec- 
tic movement,  inasmuch  as  the  seemingly  con- 
tradictory positions  from  one  point  of  view 
are  brought  together  in  a higher  unity,  and 
from  a more  comprehensive  point  of  view,  as 
the  being  of  Parmenides  is  absorbed  in  the 
becoming  of  Heraclitus.  Hegel’s  dialectic,  as 
he  himself  claims,  is  only  a following  of  the 
lines  of  development  which  philosophical  thought, 
as  a whole,  has  described  in  its  path  of  progress. 

The  process  of  becoming,  moreover,  in  any 
concrete  instance,  must  result  in  some  defi- 
nite product.  The  process  of  becoming  Hegel 
likens  to  a fire  which  is  constantly  consuming 
its  material,  and  yet,  nevertheless,  does  not 
leave  an  empty  nothing  as  a result.  That 
which  is  destroyed  in  one  form  is  conserved  in 
another.  The  result  which  is  attained  by  the 
process  of  becoming  Hegel  calls  Daseyn,  — that 
is,  being  which  has  been  rendered  definite 
through  the  manifestation  of  its  characteristic 
qualities.  The  term  Daseyn  has  the  force  of  the 
phrase  “ definite  being,”  and  may  be  so  trans- 
lated. 


QUALITY 


93 


That  which  renders  being  definite  is  its  quality 
( die  Qualitcit).  It  is  that  which  constitutes  it 
what  it  is.  Modify  its  quality,  and  being  itself 
is  likewise  modified.  It  is  Hegel’s  plan  to  dis- 
cuss the  bare  idea  of  quality  in  general  and  not 
to  enter  upon  the  discussion  of  the  nature  of 
any  specific  qualities  in  particular.  The  ques- 
tion which  he  puts  is  this,  “ What  do  we  under- 
stand by  the  idea  of  the  quality  of  a thing  in 
respect  to  its  most  general  aspects?” 

He,  at  the  outset,  draws  a distinction  between 
the  categories  of  quality  and  of  quantity  (die 
Quantitaf).  Quality  may  be  defined  as  the 
internal  determining  factor  of  being ; and  quan- 
tity as  the  external  determining  factor.  Any 
variation  in  that  which  makes  being  what  it  is 
will,  of  course,  affect  the  nature  of  being  itself ; 
but  a variation  may  occur  in  that  which  deter- 
mines how  much  or  how  little  of  the  being  in 
question  may  be  taken,  and  yet  this  need  not 
necessarily  affect  the  nature  of  that  being  itself. 
A drop  in  the  ocean  does  not  differ  in  quality 
from  the  entire  body  of  which  it  is  but  an  in- 
finitesimal portion.  It  is  obvious  that  being 
and  its  quality  are  identical,  when  we  seek 
illustrations  in  the  sphere  of  nature.  It  is  not 
so  obvious  when  we  seek  them  in  the  sphere  of 


94 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


mind.  The  various  mental  functions,  for 
instance,  cannot  be  so  accurately  described  as 
consisting  of  certain  definite  and  invariable 
qualities.  The  very  complexity  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind  render  their  simplification 
by  means  of  definite  qualities  a more  difficult 
if  not  an  impossible  task.  There  is,  for  exam- 
ple, no  specific  memory  or  volitional  quality 
attaching  to  consciousness  as  such. 

The  category  of  quality  is  to  be  regarded 
as  having  a positive  and  a negative  aspect. 
Positively,  the  quality  of  a definitely  determined 
being  constitutes  its  reality,  — it  makes  it  what 
it  is.  Negatively,  the  quality  of  being  is  deter- 
mined by  a certain  natural  limit  beyond  which, 
if  we  proceed  in  thought,  there  is  immediately 
a marked  change  in  quality  and  consequently 
in  the  very  nature  of  being  itself.  There  are, 
however,  two  kinds  of  limit  ( die  Qranze'),  — a 
qualitative  and  a quantitative  limit.  Of  course 
the  reference  in  this  connection  is  to  the  quali- 
tative limit;  the  qualitative  is  essentially  a 
limit  as  to  kind,  and  its  bounds  mark  a definite 
change  of  kind.  The  quantitative,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  naturally  a limit  as  to  magnitude,  and 
marks  a purely  quantitative  change.  In  the 
purely  qualitative  limit  we  have  a form  of 


QUALITY 


95 


negative  determination,  in  the  sense  that  if  its 
bound  is  transcended,  the  being  in  question 
suffers  a radical  change  in  its  nature.  Such 
a limit  is,  therefore,  the  determining  point  of 
being.  To  understand  the  nature  of  the  being 
which  we  have  in  any  particular  instance,  we 
must  know,  not  only  in  a general  way  what 
kind  of  being  it  is,  but  we  must  know  definitely 
at  just  what  point  a variation  in  its  quality 
will  subject  it  to  a complete  transformation  into 
some  other  kind  of  being  altogether.  Hegel 
wishes  to  emphasize  especially  the  thought  that 
the  very  idea  of  a limit  signifies  that  it  marks 
a line  of  boundary  between  two  kinds  of  being. 
It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  a limit  which 
would  be  the  boundary  of  only  one  thing,  for 
while  it  bounds  one,  it  separates  at  the  same 
time  from  something  else.  Therefore,  every 
determinate  being  necessarily  implies  that  some- 
thing lies  beyond  its  limit ; this  something 
Hegel  calls  its  other.  This  conception  of  an 
other  (ein  Anderes'),  the  obverse  face,  as  it  were, 
of  every  definite  being,  plays  a very  conspicuous 
and  significant  rQle  in  the  Hegelian  system. 
The  other  which  stands  over  against  every 
definite  being  is  not  any  other  thing  whatso- 
ever which  happens  to  lie  outside  the  sphere 


96 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  BEING 


of  the  definite  being  in  question;  but  it  must 
be  that  particular  other  which  is,  as  it  were,  its 
next  of  kin.  It  would  be  incorrect  to  regard 
a triangle  and  a horse  as  an  example  of  a cer- 
tain definite  being  and  its  other.  The  other  is 
that  which  not  only  lies  outside  of  the  sphere 
of  some  definite  being,  but  at  the  same  time  it 
must  lie  within  the  boundaries  of  some  com- 
mon system  to  which  both  may  be  referred. 
For  instance,  a true  example  of  an  other  in 
the  Hegelian  sense,  would  be  that  of  the  ellipse, 
which  is  naturally  related  to  the  circle  as  its 
other.  The  cultivated  fruit  which  grows  on 
a branch  grafted  upon  a wild  stock  would  be 
regarded  as  the  other  in  reference  to  the  main 
tree. 

As  Hegel  puts  it,  every  definite  being  in 
the  process  of  development  has  a certain  mean- 
ing an  sick , — that  is,  considered  merely  within 
its  own  sphere  ; but  this  meaning  is  always  par- 
tial because  undeveloped,  and  for  its  completion 
necessitates  a consideration  of  the  nature  of 
the  limit,  and  this  in  turn  can  be  known  only 
as  we  pass  over  into  the  adjacent  sphere  of  its 
other.  The  full  meaning,  therefore,  of  any 
definite  being  can  be  grasped  only  when  we 
consider  it  not  merely  an  sick  but  also  fiir 


QUALITY 


97 


Anderes  as  well,  — that  is,  in  reference  to  its 
corresponding  other. 

This  conception  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  idea 
of  evolution,  which  is  a continuous  change  in 
such  a manner  that  every  advancing  stage  is 
the  necessary  other  of  that  which  immediately 
precedes  it.  As  the  great  cosmic  system  is  one 
of  evolution,  every  determinate  being  in  it  must 
show  inherently  this  tendency  to  a continuous 
alteration  (die  Veranderliclikeit")  a passing  over 
into  its  other.  But  when  we  pass  from  any 
definite  being  to  its  other,  this  other,  itself  pos- 
sessing definite  being,  must  also  have  its  other 
to  complete  its  meaning,  and  so  on  without 
limit.  We  thus  find  ourselves  launched  upon 
an  infinite  series  that  can  never  be  satisfactory, 
because  never  complete.  It  is  an  endless  pro- 
gression, and  can  only  bring  weariness  unutter- 
able to  the  mind  which  attempts  to  follow  it. 
Such  an  idea  of  an  infinite  series,  Hegel  styles  a 
false  or  negative  infinity  (die  schleclite  oder 
negative  Unendlichkeit ).  It  represents  merely 
a tedious  multiplication  of  finite  terms  in  a 
never  ending  process.  The  finite,  according  to 
Hegel,  may  be  defined  as  that  which  contains 
within  itself  its  own  contradiction.  Its  very 
incompleteness  is  the  cause  of  its  breaking  down 


H 


98 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  BEING 


of  its  own  weight.  As  Hegel  characteristically 
describes  it,  it  negatives  itself.  It  needs  always 
to  be  referred  to  some  other  being  as  its  cause 
and  explanation,  its  necessary  other.  But  such 
a process  is  without  limit,  as  we  have  seen. 
Hegel’s  idea  of  the  true  infinite  is  that,  in  spite 
of  this  indefinitely  continued  process  of  referring 
on  and  on  always  to  some  other  beyond,  there  is 
at  each  stage  of  such  a process  an  intimation 
that  the  underlying  ground  not  only  of  the 
particular  stage  of  the  process  in  question,  but 
of  the  entire  evolution  itself  of  which  it  is  but 
a very  small  phase,  rests  upon  some  absolute 
basis.  Therefore,  every  cross-section,  as  it  were, 
of  the  continuous  process  of  development  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a manifestation  of  the  eternal 
reason,  of  the  Absolute,  of  God.  This  is  in  full 
accord  with  Hegel’s  fundamental  principle  of 
absolute  idealism.  In  every  change,  therefore, 
from  any  imperfectly  determined  being  to  some 
other  there  is  nevertheless  a something  which 
remains  unalterable,  which  when  it  passes  over 
into  its  other  is  still  itself.  This  Hegel  calls  Fiir- 
sichseyn , or  being  for  itself,  — that  is,  a concep- 
tion of  being  as  possessing  a certain  constant 
core  of  self-identity  in  the  midst  of  all  variation, 
and  which  preserves  its  own  integrity  as  definite 


QUALITY 


99 


being  in  spite  of  all  modifying  forces  to  which 
it  may  be  subjected.  This  essentially  perma- 
nent element  in  being  partakes,  according  to 
Hegel,  of  the  nature  of  the  Absolute,  and  en- 
closes within  its  finite  appearance  a spark  of 
divinity.  It  is  the  true  infinity  ( die  wahrhafte 
Unendlichkeit) . 

Inasmuch,  therefore,  as  the  quality  of  any 
definite  being  is  determined  by  a process  of 
negation  which  assigns  to  it  a definite  limit, 
when  we  conceive  of  being  in  its  developed 
form  of  being-for-self,  we  must  regard  this  limit 
as  in  a certain  sense  obliterated,  because  the 
being  thus  conceived  and  its  other  fall  together 
within  one  and  the  same  sphere  of  common 
reference.  This  obliteration  of  a limit  or 
boundary  line  is  a process  of  negation ; but 
the  fixing  of  the  limit  in  the  former  process  is 
also  a negation.  The  obliteration  of  the  limit 
is  therefore  to  be  regarded  as  the  negation  of  a 
negation,  or,  as  Hegel  calls  it,  an  absolute  nega- 
tion, and  has,  therefore,  the  force  of  an  affirma- 
tion. Thus  the  seed  develops  the  first  shoots 
which  appear  above  the  ground,  these  change 
into  the  stalk  and  twigs,  these  put  forth  leaves, 
blossoms,  and  finally  bear  fruit.  Each  stage  of 
the  growth  changes  into  its  other,  but  they  are 


100 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  BEING 


all  embraced  in  one  ; for  the  various  limits  which 
mark  the  stages  of  transition  disappear  com- 
pletely in  our  thought  of  the  plant  as  a whole, 
which  perdures  in  its  integrity  throughout  the 
whole  process,  even  in  the  seed  itself.  The  best 
illustration  of  the  Hegelian  significance  of  being- 
for-self  is,  however,  not  found  in  the  sphere  of 
plant  life.  It  is  found  in  the  higher  sphere  of 
consciousness,  in  the  nature  of  personality,  of  the 
Ego.  The  personality  of  selfhood  remains  un- 
changed amidst  the  innumerable  alterations  of 
its  manifold  activities,  and  so  far  forth  partakes 
of  the  nature  of  that  absolute  permanency  which 
is  an  essential  attribute  of  the  infinite.  The 
idea  of  the  Ego,  of  consciousness  apart  from  its 
concrete  manifestation  in  any  particular  individ- 
ual (the  Kantian  Bewusstseyn  iiberhaupt')  may 
be  regarded  as  the  most  comprehensive  type  of 
the  Absolute.  And  every  individual  Ego  must 
therefore  partake  of  the  nature  of  the  Absolute 
whose  image  it  bears,  and  in  whom  “it  lives 
and  moves  and  has  its  being.” 

We  find,  moreover,  in  the  category  of  being- 
for-self  an  intimation  of  ideality.  Ideality, 
according  to  Hegel,  is  that  elemental  principle 
in  all  being  which  is  dynamic  and  construc- 
tive, working  out  its  ends  from  within.  It  is 


QUALITY 


101 


the  immanent  reason  within  all  being.  It  is 
the  architectonic  principle  which  is  self-direct- 
ing and  self-manifesting.  As  we  have  seen, 
determinate  being  is  to  be  referred  to  the 
category  of  reality ; but  we  are  constrained  to 
regard  being-for-self  under  the  category  of 
ideality.  The  two  are  not  contradictory,  how- 
ever, for  the  category  of  ideality  represents 
merely  a deeper  insight  and  implies  the  cate- 
gory of  reality  as  its  necessary  correlate. 
Hegel  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
term  “reality”  is  one  which  is  used  in  two 
senses.  In  one  sense,  as  has  already  been  pointed 
out,  reality  is  conceived  as  identical  with  the 
positive  side  of  determinate  being,  — that  is,  the 
manifestation  of  some  definite  quality  which 
renders  being  what  it  is.  Thus  we  speak  of 
the  reality  of  a plan  or  of  a purpose,  when  it 
remains  no  longer  merely  an  inner  and  subjec- 
tive thought,  but  has  been  realized  in  some 
definite  form  of  actual  being.  The  second 
sense  in  which  the  term  reality  is  used,  is  to 
signify  that  anything  is  in  a state  completely 
conformable  to  its  essential  nature,  or,  as  Hegel 
would  put  it,  when  it  conforms  completely  to  its 
notion  or  essential  idea.  For  instance,  when  we 
say,  “ That  is  a real  man,”  we  mean  by  such  a 


102 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


characterization  that  he  is  one  who  has  perfectly 
realized  the  ideal  of  manhood.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  Hegel  insists  that  reality  and  ideality 
are  to  be  regarded  as  inseparable  correlates. 
The  real,  therefore,  is  the  ideal,  and  the  ideal 
is  the  real. 

Inasmuch  as  being-for-self  and  being-for-its- 
other  are  brought  together  by  our  thought 
through  the  underlying  unity  which  embraces 
them  both  in  one  and  the  same  system,  — it  may 
be,  for  instance,  in  one  and  the  same  organism,  — 
we  consequently  may  regard  these  two  phases 
of  being  as  constituting  a closed  sphere.  While 
the  unit  thus  formed  is  complex,  it  is  neverthe- 
less to  be  regarded  as  one  by  itself,  and  separate 
from  all  others.  To  be  for  self,  signifies  to  be 
some  one  individual  thing  or  person.  This 
marks  the  final  stage  in  the  development  of  the 
category  of  quality,  and  at  the  same  time  it 
suggests  a natural  transition  to  the  category  of 
quantity.  For  the  very  idea  of  anything  which 
we  can  designate  as  one  and  individual  implies 
that  there  must  be  others  of  the  same  kind. 
The  idea  of  one  necessitates  the  complementary 
idea  of  the  many.  The  idea  of  one  would  be 
meaningless  were  it  not  for  the  suggested  con- 
trast between  the  one  and  the  many. 


QUALITY 


103 


As  now  we  can  conceive  of  many  ones  grouped 
together,  each  one  may  be  regarded  as  excluding 
every  other  one  from  itself,  and  a relation  such 
as  this  is  one  of  reciprocal  repulsion.  But  at 
the  same  time  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that 
though  in  a sense  reciprocally  repelling,  the 
many  ones  nevertheless  are  all  of  the  same  kind 
and  consequently  fall  together  in  a single 
system.  There  must  be  consequently  some 
bond  of  attraction  which  thus  holds  them 
together  in  an  underlying  unity. 

If,  now,  in  this  complex  unity  we  emphasize 
the  idea  of  the  separate  individuality  of  each  of 
its  elements,  we  bring  to  the  fore  the  concept  of 
repulsion  (die  Repulsion).  If,  however,  we 
emphasize  the  fact  that  each  one  is  grouped  with 
many  others  of  the  same  kind,  then  we  give 
prominence  to  the  concept  of  attraction  (die 
Attraktion ) which  constitutes  their  common 
being. 

The  concept  of  the  reciprocal  repulsion  of  the 
many  is  found  in  the  ancient  atomic  philosophy. 
But  there  the  common  bond  was  regarded  as 
that  of  chance.  The  falling  into  the  same  group 
of  a number  of  atoms  was  considered  to  be  wholly 
fortuitous.  In  the  Hegelian  system,  on  the 
contrary,  the  common  bond  which  gives  unity  to 


104 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


each  and  every  system  of  being,  and  also  unites 
all  systems  ultimately  into  one,  is  that  incarnate 
reason,  the  universal  creator  and  organizer. 

If  the  one  in  any  particular  system  of  being 
is  regarded  as  one  merely  of  many  where  all  are 
of  the  same  kind,  then  the  idea  of  quality 
becomes  irrelevant,  and  may  be  regarded  as  sus- 
pended altogether.  It  is  thus  that  the  transition 
is  made  to  the  pure  idea  of  quantity,  in  which 
the  idea  of  the  quality  of  a number  of  objects  is 
wholly  eliminated  because  reduced  in  every 
case  to  a dead  level  of  identity. 

Hegel’s  development  of  being  may  be  briefly 
summarized  as  consisting  of  three  stages,  and 
three  corresponding  processes.  The  three  stages 
are  : — 

1.  Indeterminate  being  QSeyri). 

2.  Determinate  being  ( Daseyn ). 

3.  Being-for-self  ( Fiirsichseyn ). 

The  three  corresponding  processes  are  : — 

1.  Becoming  ( Werderi). 

2.  Alteration  ( Veranderung ). 

3.  Attraction  and  repulsion  ( Attraktion  und 
Repulsion). 


CHAPTER  VIII 


QUANTITY 


HE  idea  of  quantity,  as  we  have  seen,  is 


that  aspect  of  mere  being  from  which  the 
idea  of  all  quality  has  been  eliminated.  The 
category  of  quantity  is  described  by  Hegel  from 
three  points  of  view  : — 

1.  Quantity  in  general  (die  Quantitat). 

2.  Determinate  quantity  ( das  Quantum). 

3.  Degree  ( der  Grad). 

It  will  be  seen  in  the  following  exposition 
that  these  three  aspects  of  quantity  correspond 
to  the  three  general  divisions  of  quality  : — 

1.  Being  in  general. 

2.  Determinate  being. 

3.  Self-determined  being. 

As  regards  quantity  in  general,  it  may  he  re- 
marked as  a matter  of  terminology  that  Hegel 
applies  the  term  magnitude  ( die  Grosse)  to 
determinate  quantity  rather  than  to  the  general 
notion  of  quantity.  Quantity  in  general,  how- 
ever, may  be  considered  apart  from  any  refer- 


105 


106 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


ence  to  definite  magnitude,  just  as  quality  in 
general  was  considered  apart  from  any  reference 
to  specific  qualities.  While  quantity  in  general 
may  be  regarded  by  itself  as  an  essential  mo- 
ment in  the  evolution  of  the  universal  reason,  it 
must  not,  however,  be  regarded  as  an  exclusive 
category.  Hegel  has  no  sympathy  with  the 
tendency  to  reduce  all  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse to  a quantitative  basis,  including  even  the 
phenomena  of  mind.  He  insists  that  a purely 
mechanical  view  of  the  universe,  which  such  a 
quantitative  reduction  of  all  things  implies,  is 
by  no  means  a complete  or  comprehensive 
view.  The  mechanical  view  may  seem  to 
suffice  in  its  application  to  the  inorganic  world, 
but  it  falls  short  of  an  adequate  explanation 
when  we  come  to  the  organic  world,  and  espe- 
cially when  we  seek  to  explain  the  phenomena 
of  free  activity  in  the  sphere  of  mind. 

Inasmuch  as  the  category  of  quantity  is  to  be 
regarded  as  a necessary  evolution  from  the  cate- 
gory of  being,  and  also  marks  a definite  charac- 
teristic of  being,  it  may  be  regarded  from  this 
point  of  view,  according  to  the  general  method 
of  Hegel,  as  an  attribute  of  the  Absolute  in  one 
of  its  manifold  phases  of  manifestation.  To 
define  the  Absolute  merely  as  quantity  would 


QUANTITY 


107 


represent,  of  course,  a very  one-sided  and  exceed- 
ingly limited  conception ; but  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  were  omitted  altogether,  the  idea  of  the 
Absolute  would  prove  wanting  so  far  forth  in  an 
essential  element  of  its  characterization. 

When  we  come  to  a more  specific  inquiry  as 
to  the  nature  of  our  idea  of  quantity,  we  find 
that  it  may  be  conceived  from  two  points  of 
view.  Quantity  may  be  either  continuous 
(JcontinuirlicTi)  or  discrete  ( diskret ).  If  we  re- 
gard quantity  as  an  aggregate  of  many  parts,  — 
or,  as  it  may  be  put,  the  one  which  is  composed 
of  the  many,  — and  if,  moreover,  we  emphasize 
the  unity  into  which  the  many  blend,  then  we 
have  quantity  represented  as  continuous.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  discount,  as  it  were,  in  our 
thought  the  connecting  bond,  and  emphasize  the 
isolation  and  reciprocal  exclusiveness  attaching 
to  the  several  parts,  then  quantity  will  appear 
as  discrete.  A line  may  be  taken  as  an  example 
of  continuous  quantity.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
bushel  of  apples  would  be  considered  as  a dis- 
crete quantity.  The  terms,  however,  “ continu- 
ous ” and  “ discrete,”  are  not  mutually  exclusive. 
Quite  in  keeping  with  the  Hegelian  point  of 
view,  either  one  of  these  terms  apart  from  the 
other,  and  excluding  the  other,  represents  a 


108 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


mere  abstraction,  — that  is,  a partial  and  there- 
fore misleading  conception.  Truth  is  found 
always  in  the  unity  of  the  two.  Every  contin- 
uous quantity  is  in  a sense  discrete  ; and  in  like 
manner  every  discrete  quantity  is  continuous. 
A line  may  he  regarded  as  discrete  in  the  sense 
that  it  may  be  viewed  as  composed  of  an  in- 
definite number  of  separate  points,  or  divided 
into  several  distinct  sections,  each  containing 
a definite  number  of  centimetres  or  millimetres. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  a bushel  of  apples  may 
be  regarded  as  a continuous  quantity  when,  for 
instance,  we  compare  the  price  of  apples  per 
bushel  this  year  with  that  of  last  year.  Here 
the  unit  which  is  emphasized  is  the  bushel  and 
not  the  single  apple.  The  bushel  regarded  as  a 
whole  from  this  point  of  view  represents  there- 
fore a continuous  quantity.  The  Kantian  an- 
tinomy in  reference  to  space  and  time,  or  the 
constitution  of  matter,  may  be  resolved  by  an 
application  of  these  considerations.  The  truth 
is,  that  regarded  as  continuous  magnitudes  they 
are  indefinitely  divisible,  but  regarded  as  discrete 
magnitudes  they  are  not  indefinitely  divisible. 
The  seeming  contradiction  arises  from -a  differ- 
ence in  point  of  view. 

When  we  come  to  the  idea  of  definite  quan- 


QUANTITY 


109 


tity,  or  quantum,  as  Hegel  styles  it,  we  find  that 
it  is  an  idea  which  arises  necessarily  in  answer 
to  the  question,  How  much  ? It  bears  the  same 
relation  to  quantity  in  general  that  definite 
being  does  to  being  in  general.  Every  quan- 
tum, or  definite  magnitude,  may  be  conceived, 
moreover,  as  composed  of  a number  of  parts 
which  are  themselves  quanta  of  lesser  magni- 
tude. Every  definite  magnitude,  regarded  as 
distinct  from  all  others,  forms  a unity,  a closed 
sphere,  as  it  were,  apart  and  by  itself,  but  sub- 
jected to  further  analysis  within  its  own  limits  ; 
it  is  a manifold  made  up  of  its  constituent  parts. 
From  these  considerations  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  idea  of  quantum  involves  that  of  number. 
For  number  may  be  regarded  as  a concept 
which  comprehends  the  two  momenta  or  factors 
which  are  found  in  the  idea  of  quantum.  These 
two  factors  are  the  idea  of  a sum  or  total,  which 
corresponds  to  that  of  a discrete  quantity,  and 
the  idea  of  unity,  which  corresponds  to  that  of 
a continuous  quantity.  Out  of  the  various  com- 
binations and  reciprocal  relations  of  these  two 
factors  we  may  develop  the  various  modes  of 
reckoning  which  obtain  in  arithmetic.  We 
may  regard  all  arithmetical  operations  as  based 
upon  the  principle  of  putting  numbers  in  the 


110 


THE  DOCTRINE  OE  BEING 


relation  of  unity,  and  sum  or  total  amount; 
and  of  establishing  the  equality  of  these  two 
functions. 

Thus  the  simplest  arithmetical  operation  is 
that  of  counting.  This  may  be  defined  as  a pro- 
cess which  aims  to  construct  an  aggregate  or  sum 
total  by  putting  together  the  separate  units,  one 
after  another.  In  this  operation  each  unit 
ranks  the  same  in  value  as  every  other.  There 
is  no  distinction  of  any  kind  between  them. 
But  it  is  possible  to  conceive  each  unit  in 
question  as  possessing  a value  different  from 
every  other,  — that  is,  each  unit  may  be  con- 
ceived as  itself  an  aggregate  or  sum,  possessing 
varying  values,  as  3,  7,  9,  4,  etc.  When  we 
come  to  enumerate  these  sums  in  order  to  find 
the  total  value  in  simple  units,  we  are  perform- 
ing the  operation  of  addition. 

In  multiplication  each  unit  is  also  an  aggre- 
gate, but  they  are  all  alike  and  do  not  vary  in 
value,  whereas  in  addition  they  are  ordinarily 
unlike.  However,  multiplication  may  be  repre- 
sented as  a kind  of  addition.  We  may  have  the 
following  aggregates  to  count : 8,  8,  8,  8,  8,  8,  8 ; 
and  we  may  do  this  by  addition,  regarding  it 
merely  as  a special  case  in  which  the  aggregates 
are  all  alike.  Or  we  can  obtain  the  result 


QUANTITY 


111 


directly  by  taking  eight  seven  times,  which  is 
the  process  of  multiplication.  In  multiplication 
it  is  a matter  of  indifference  as  to  which  of  the 
two  factors  we  regard  as  the  aggregate  and 
which  the  unit. 

The  process  of  raising  a number  to  a power  is 
a special  case  of  multiplication.  To  raise  any 
number  to  the  second  power,  for  instance,  the 
aggregate  is  taken  as  many  times  as  it  itself 
contains  simple  units.  Thus  82  is  8 times  8,  — 
that  is,  8 taken  8 times.  In  such  a process 
there  is  represented  the  equality  of  sum  total 
and  unity.  To  raise  a number  to  a higher 
power  requires  only  a continued  repetition  of 
the  process. 

Addition,  multiplication,  and  the  raising  to  a 
power  give  an  exhaustive  division  of  the  vari- 
ous modes  of  arithmetical  calculation.  The 
three  other  processes  of  subtraction,  division, 
and  taking  the  root  of  a number  do  not  repre- 
sent distinct  types  of  arithmetical  operations, 
but  are  to  be  regarded  merely  in  the  light  of 
inverse  operations  respectively  to  addition,  mul- 
tiplication, and  the  raising  to  a required  power. 

As  in  reference  to  quantity  in  general  we  have 
found  the  distinction  obtaining  between  con- 
tinuous and  discrete  magnitudes,  so  in  reference 


112 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


to  quantum  or  determinate  quantity,  there  is  a 
similar  distinction  expressed  by  the  opposite 
terms  of  extensive  and  intensive  quantity. 
Extensive  magnitude  corresponds  to  the  idea  of 
continuous  quantity  and  intensive  magnitude 
to  that  of  discrete.  This  correspondence  will 
be  seen  through  the  following  considerations. 
Definite  magnitude  is  such  only  as  it  possesses 
a definite  quantitative  limit.  If  the  magnitude 
is  regarded  as  a continuous  quantity,  then  the 
limit  is  marked  simply  by  the  contour  of  the 
magnitude  itself,  — that  is,  its  boundary  line  of 
definition.  Moreover,  from  this  point  of  view 
the  separate  identity  of  each  part  is  lost  because 
merged  in  the  whole,  which  is  one  and  not 
many,  and  all  included  within  one  and  the  same 
limit  of  circumscription.  But  if  the  magnitude 
is  regarded  as  discrete,  then  any  one  of  the 
distinct  parts  by  its  position  may  mark  a defi- 
nite limit.  Thus,  when  we  take  the  temperature 
of  any  body,  it  is  the  limiting  degree  which  is 
read  off  as  significant.  The  quantity  of  heat 
which  is  thus  measured  is  given  in  terms  of 
intensity  or  degree  ( der  Crrad). 

In  reference  to  the  intensity  of  quantitative 
determination,  the  various  discrete  units  may  be 
regarded  as  arranged  in  order  so  as  to  form  a 


QUANTITY 


113 


series;  they  therefore  do  not  all  count  alike. 
There  will  always  be  one  which,  by  its  position 
in  the  series,  will  mark  the  limit,  and  therefore 
have  a particular  significance  attaching  to  it. 
And  as  such  a series  rises  or  falls,  proceeds  for- 
wards or  backwards,  as  the  case  may  be,  the 
different  units  marking  the  varying  limit  in 
every  case  will  indicate  corresponding  grades  of 
intensity. 

As  a continuous  quantity  may  be  regarded  as 
discrete,  so  also  an  extensive  magnitude  may  be 
conceived  as  intensive,  and  an  intensive  magni- 
tude as  extensive.  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
intensity  of  heat  may  have  an  extensive  signifi- 
cance as  interpreted  by  the  height  of  the  column 
of  mercury.  This  marks  the  extent  which  the 
mercury,  as  a whole,  has  risen  in  the  tube. 
Hegel  illustrates  this  feature  of  a change  from 
an  intensive  to  an  extensive  point  of  view  as 
seen  in  the  sphere  of  mind.  He  draws  attention 
to  the  fact  that  a man  who  has  accumulated  a 
certain  intensity  of  mental  power  is,  at  the  same 
time,  the  man  who  touches  life  on  many  sides, 
so  that  his  capacities  have  evidently  an  exten- 
sive manifestation  as  well.  This  application  is 
somewhat  fanciful,  it  would  seem,  and  should 
be  taken  in  a figurative  rather  than  in  a literal 


114 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


sense,  which,  however,  Hegel  himself  evidently 
does  not  do. 

Hegel  again  enters  a protest  against  those 
who  would  subordinate  the  idea  of  intensive 
magnitude  to  a mere  form  of  extensive  mag- 
nitude. He  insists  that  while  they  are  most 
intimately  correlated  in  thought,  nevertheless 
there  is  a real  distinction  between  the  two  that 
should  not  be  overlooked.  The  idea  of  intensity 
contains  an  element  which  is  wholly  lacking  in 
the  bare  idea  of  extension.  This,  however,  must 
not  be  interpreted  as  signifying  that  the  idea  of 
an  intensive  magnitude  is  wholly  independent  of 
that  of  extensive  magnitude.  The  one,  how- 
ever, must  not  be  so  merged  in  the  other  as  to 
lose  its  individual  characteristics  completely. 

The  very  concept  of  quantity  itself  is  such 
that  the  limit  which  is  set  to  it  so  as  to  render 
its  quantity  a definite  amount,  or  a definite 
degree  of  intensity  according  to  the  point  of 
view,  must  be  conceived  as  varying  indefinitely 
without  affecting  the  nature  or  quality  of  the 
magnitude  in  question.  The  limit  which  de- 
termines the  amount  or  degree  is  purely  an 
external  determination,  and  the  concept  of  quan- 
tity carries  with  it  the  idea  of  the  possibility 
of  pushing  out  and  beyond  itself  indefinitely. 


QUANTITY 


115 


There  is  no  natural  or  necessary  restriction 
upon  a quantitative  limit,  and  therefore  the 
continuous  breaking  down  in  our  thought  of 
any  assigned  limit  necessitates  the  conception 
of  an  infinite  quantitative  progression.  In  this 
connection  Hegel  quotes  Zeno,  who  has  put  this 
idea  in  an  enigmatical  form : “ It  is  the  same 
to  say  a thing  once,  and  to  say  it  forever.” 

Such  an  infinite  series  gives,  however,  a false 
idea  of  the  true  significance  of  infinity.  It  is 
false  for  the  same  reason  that  the  qualitatively 
infinite  progression  is  false,  as  we  have  already 
seen.  It  is  what  Spinoza  calls  the  imaginary 
infinity.  As  an  instance  of  this  conception, 
Hegel  quotes  the  lines  of  Haller 1 : — 

“ Ich  haufe  ungeheure  Zahlen 
Gebirge  Millionen  auf, 

Ich  setze  Zeit  auf  Zeit 
Und  Welt  auf  "Welt  zu  Hauf, 

Und  wenn  ich  von  der  grausen  Hoh’ 

Mit  Schwindel  vie  der  nach  Dir  seh’, 

1st  alle  Macht  der  Zahl 
Yermehrt  zu  Tausendmal, 

Noch  nicht  ein  Theil  von  Dir.” 2 

1 Hegel’s  Werlce , VI,  § 104. 

2 I pile  up  numbers  immense,  mountains  of  millions.  I 
add  time  to  time,  and  world  to  world.  And  when  I turn 
from  the  awful  height  with  reeling  brain  and  look  towards 
Thee,  all  the  power  of  number  increased  a thousand  fold  is 
not  yet  one  part  of  Thee. 


116 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


In  commenting  upon  this  passage,  Hegel 
remarks : “ The  same  poet,  however,  well  adds 
to  that  description  of  the  false  infinity  the 
closing  line 

‘ Ich  zieh  sie  ab,  und  du  liegest  ganz  vor  mir.’ 1 
This  means  that  the  true  infinite  is  not  to  be 
regarded  merely  as  another  world  which  tran- 
scends the  finite ; and  if  we  are  ever  to  appreci- 
ate its  significance,  we  must  disabuse  our  minds 
of  all  notions  of  a progressus  in  infinitum .2 

The  doctrine  of  number,  as  is  well  known, 
was  magnified  by  the  ancient  Pythagoreans  into 
a complete  system  of  philosophy.  While  in 
that  school  there  was  an  undue  exaggeration  of 
the  concept  of  number  as  expressing  the  essence 
of  being,  it  must  not  be  overlooked,  however, 
that  Pythagoras  touched  upon  an  important 
truth  in  his  teaching  when  he  insisted  that 
there  are  certain  states  of  things,  certain  phe- 
nomena of  nature,  the  character  of  which  seem 
to  vary  according  to  a scale  of  number  relations. 
This  may  be  illustrated  in  the  variations  in 
tone  and  harmony  which,  according  to  common 
tradition,  first  suggested  to  Pythagoras  the  con- 
ception of  the  essence  of  all  things  as  number. 

1 These  I sweep  away,  and  Thou  best  fully  revealed  be- 
fore me.  2 § 104. 


QUANTITY 


117 


Hegel,  according  to  his  general  method,  adopts 
the  teachings  of  this  school  not  in  the  light  of  a 
complete  system  of  philosophy,  but  merely  as 
one  phase  among  many  in  the  development  of 
the  universal  reason.  The  Pythagorean  doc- 
trine corresponds  roughly,  at  least,  with  Hegel’s 
conception  of  quantitative  relation,  which  idea 
marks  a natural  transition  to  the  third  division 
of  quantity,  known  as  measure. 

Quantitative  relation  ( das  quantitative  Ver- 
haltniss ) may  be  defined  as  that  relation  which 
obtains  between  numbers  of  such  a nature  that 
the  numbers  themselves  may  vary  indefinitely, 
provided  only  the  relation  itself  remains  con- 
stant. Thus  the  relation  of  2 : 4 is  the  same  as 
that  of  3:6.  In  the  midst,  therefore,  of  vary- 
ing quantities,  there  is  a constant  which  retains 
its  own  specific  character  through  a process  that 
may  be  indefinitely  continued  without  limit. 
This  idea  of  certain  constant  features  in  the 
midst  of  quantitative  variation  would  seem  to 
indicate  that  this  constant  value  has  the  force 
of  a qualitative  character ; for,  as  we  have 
found,  it  is  the  quality  which  remains  un- 
changed in  the  midst  of  quantitative  altera- 
tion. Thus  in  pushing  forward  the  concept  of 
quantity  in  the  development  of  all  its  possible 


118 


THE  DOCTRINE  OE  BEING 


implications,  we  find  between  coincident  altera- 
tions in  magnitudes  which  form  a ratio  a con- 
stant relation  obtaining  of  such  a nature  that 
the  concept  of  quantity  will  not  explain  it  sat- 
isfactorily, and  we  fall  back  again  upon  the  idea 
of  quality  in  order  to  account  for  it.  Thus  the 
idea  of  quality  was  found  to  be  partial,  and  when 
developed  to  its  utmost  limit,  carried  our  thought 
over  into  the  sphere  of  quantity.  Then  the  idea 
of  quantity  when  fully  developed  brought  us 
back  again  to  that  of  quality.  Is  the  move- 
ment of  thought  only  a circle  that  merely  brings 
us  back  to  the  starting-point  ? According  to 
Hegel’s  method,  the  incompleteness  of  thought 
at  this  stage  is  overcome  by  the  dialectic  process 
which  combines  these  two  ideas  of  quality  and 
of  quantity  into  one  complete  relation  repre- 
senting an  advanced  and  higher  point  of  view. 
This  relation  Hegel  calls  that  of  qualitative 
quantity,  or  of  measure  (das  Maass ).  This  is 
the  third  and  last  stage  in  the  development  of 
the  idea  of  quantity,  and  represents,  as  Hegel 
insists,  both  the  unity  and  the  truth  of  quality 
and  of  quantity  combined. 


CHAPTER  IX 


MEASURE 


E have  seen  how  the  category  of  being, 


when  allowed  to  develop  fully  its  own 
inherent  nature,  discloses  the  phases  of  quan- 
tity and  of  quality.  There  now  remains  to  be 
considered  the  relation  which  obtains  between 
quantity  and  quality,  and  which  in  itself  con- 
stitutes a distinct  category.  It  is  an  extremely 
abstract  view  of  quantity  which  regards  it  as 
having  no  qualitative  significance  whatsoever. 
In  the  concrete  which  embraces  the  totality  of 
elements  which  constitute  the  significance  of  a 
concept,  there  are  some  quantitative  differences 
at  least  which  must  be  regarded  as  having 
marked  qualitative  equivalents.  For  instance, 
the  general  size  of  any  given  species  of  animals 
is  intimately  associated  with  the  complex  of 
properties  which  form  its  qualitative  determi- 
nants. This  is  true  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
element  of  magnitude  ranks  in  itself  as  a quali- 
tative characteristic.  For  instance,  the  size  of 


119 


120 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


an  elephant  is  regarded  as  one  of  its  determin- 
ing qualitative  marks;  so  also  the  size  of  a 
mouse  is  regarded  as  one  of  its  essential  prop- 
erties. The  idea  of  an  elephant  having  the 
dimensions  of  a mouse,  or  a mouse  bulking 
large  as  an  elephant,  would  do  violence  to  the 
essential  features  which  constitute  the  concepts 
of  these  animals. 

There  is,  of  course,  a margin  of  variation 
which  is  allowable,  so  that  the  difference  in 
size  within  certain  limits  is  to  be  regarded  as  an 
accidental  property  of  an  animal,  having  no  spe- 
cific significance  whatsoever.  Beyond  certain 
well-defined  limits,  however,  this  is  not  the  case. 

This  relation  of  quantity  to  quality,  which 
indicates  for  every  quantitative  change  a corre- 
sponding qualitative  value,  Hegel  calls  measure 
(das  Maass ).  The  term  is  used  in  almost  the 
same  sense  as  the  word  standard,  or  type. 
To  translate  das  Maass  literally  as  measure  does 
not  convey  the  full  significance  of  the  term  as  it 
is  used  by  Hegel.  It  would  be  better  to  translate 
it  as  the  standard  measure,  or  type.  Illustra- 
tions of  its  meaning  in  the  Hegelian  sense  are 
found  throughout  the  organic  world  where  a 
definite  species  is  associated  with  a typical  or 
a standard  size.  It  finds  abundant  illustration 


MEASURE 


121 


also  in  the  inorganic  world  wherein  each  ele- 
ment possesses  its  own  definite  specific  gravity, 
so  that  the  quantitative  coefficient  becomes  in 
each  case  a distinctive  mark  of  a definite  group 
of  correlated  qualities  which  are  constantly 
present  with  it.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  specific 
gravity  of  gold  is  inseparably. associated  with  all 
the  essential  properties  of  gold  which  give  it 
the  specific  quality  by  virtue  of  which  it  is 
constituted  as  it  is.  The  illustration  which  is 
the  most  perfect  is  found  in  the  scale  of  rela- 
tive differences  in  the  two  corresponding  series, 
— on  the  one  hand  the  variation  in  lengths  of 
the  chords  in  a musical  instrument,  and  on  the 
other  the  accompanying  variation  in  differences 
of  tone.  The  former  represent  purely  quanti- 
tative differences,  and  the  latter,  qualitative. 
Between  them  there  exists  an  exact  correspond- 
ence. This  may  be  further  illustrated  by  the 
correlation  which  obtains  between  the  wave- 
lengths of  light,  and  the  corresponding  differ- 
ences in  color.  All  these  illustrations  emphasize 
the  essential  relation  which  exists  between  a vari- 
ation in  quantity  and  the  corresponding  varia- 
tion in  quality. 

In  accordance  with  Hegel’s  general  method 
of  procedure,  it  will  be  remembered,  every 


122  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 

phase  in  the  progressive  development  of  being 
is  to  be  regarded  as  a manifestation  of  one  of 
the  various  attributes  of  the  Absolute.  In  this 
connection,  therefore,  the  Absolute,  or  God,  may 
be  defined  as  das  Maass , — that  is,  He  is  the  abso- 
lute standard  of  measure,  the  ideal,  or  type,  of  all 
creation.  This  signifies  that  God  must  contain 
within  His  own  nature  the  norm  or  standard  of 
all  things.  This  is  essentially  in  accord  with 
the  Hebrew  conception  of  God  as  One  who 
has  appointed  to  everything  its  proper  bound 
and  typical  form,  — to  the  sea,  and  land,  to  the 
rivers  and  mountains,  to  plants  and  animals,  and 
also  to  man  himself.  In  his  description  of 
wisdom,  Job  exclaims:  — 

“God  understandeth  the  way  thereof,  and  he  knoweth 
the  place  thereof. 

For  he  looketh  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  seeth  under 
the  whole  heaven ; 

To  make  the  weight  for  the  winds ; and  he  weigheth 
the  waters  by  measure. 

When  he  made  a decree  for  the  rain,  and  a way  for  the 
lightning  of  the  thunder  : 

Then  did  he  see  it,  and  declare  it ; he  prepared  it,  yea, 
and  searched  it  out.”  f1) 

Moreover,  in  the  religion  of  tbe  Greeks  this 
idea  is  frequently  expressed,  especially  in  the 


1 Chapter  xxviii.  vv.  23  ff. 


MEASURE 


128 


doctrine  of  Nemesis,  as  Hegel  points  out. 
According  to  this  conception  there  is  a natural 
bound  to  all  things,  to  riches  and  honor,  to 
power  and  pleasure,  even  to  pain  ; and  when  the 
definite  measure  allotted  to  each  is  exceeded, 
there  must  inevitably  follow  its  corresponding 
opposite.  It  is  characteristic  of  Hegel’s  general 
method  in  this  connection  to  gather  from  the 
ancient  forms  of  religion,  both  an  illustration 
and  at  the  same  time  a justification  of  his  own 
point  of  view.  The  religious  and  philosophical 
teachers  of  all  ages  have  in  Hegel’s  opinion 
touched  upon  important  truths  which  it  is  his 
peculiar  task  to  gather  together  in  the  unity  of  a 
philosophical  system  that  will  embrace  them  all. 

Moreover,  since  there  is  some  form  and  size 
which  may  be  regarded  as  the  standard  or  type 
for  any  given  species,  to  take  an  illustration 
from  the  organic  world,  then  this  type  may  be 
departed  from  within  certain  limits  without 
affecting  the  integrity  of  the  species,  as  has 
already  been  pointed  out.  Variations  from  the 
type  within  such  limits  are  to  be  regarded  merely 
as  natural  departures  from  what  Hegel  calls  the 
rule.  The  term  “ rule  ” ( die  Regel)  is  used  to 
denote  the  standard  form  or  size  in  reference  to 
any  given  class.  It  has  the  same  significance,  in 


124 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  BEING 


the  Hegelian  usage,  as  the  term  “ mode,”  which 
is  employed  to  signify  the  prevailing  type  in 
curves  showing  the  relative  distribution  of  varia- 
tions, the  curve  itself  indicating  the  manner  in 
which  the  variations  in  question  are  distributed 
about  the  type  itself.  In  these  curves  the  mode 
is  represented  by  the  maximum  ordinate,  the 
varying  lengths  of  the  other  ordinates  indicat- 
ing the  relative  number  of  cases  corresponding 
to  the  different  variations. 

It  is  a significant  fact,  however,  that  the  range 
of  possible  deviation  from  the  prevailing  type  is 
necessarily  limited,  so  that  if  it  is  departed  from 
in  any  way  the  type  itself  is  so  far  changed 
as  to  constitute  an  essentially  new  type,  or  a 
distinct  species.  It  appears,  therefore,  that 
there  may  be  a continued  alteration  of  quantity 
by  increasing  or  decreasing  the  given  magnitude 
up  to  a certain  definite  limit,  and  the  various 
changes  will  have  no  appreciable  effect  upon  the 
corresponding  quality.  Thus,  while  the  quantity 
may  be  regarded  as  a variable,  the  quality  never- 
theless remains  a constant.  But  in  this  process 
of  variation  some  point  must  always  be  reached 
at  which  a quantitative  change  begins  to  pro- 
duce a qualitative  change  as  well.  Hegel 
illustrates  this  by  calling  attention  to  the  fact 


MEASURE 


125 


that  the  temperature  of  water  seems  to  be  quite 
independent  of  its  qualitative  state  of  liquidity, 
but  as  we  increase  the  temperature  through  a 
wide  range  of  variation  there  nevertheless  is 
reached  finally  a degree  of  heat  which  marks  a 
decided  qualitative  change  as  the  liquid  becomes 
transformed  into  vapor ; and  at  the  other  limit, 
where  the  freezing-point  is  reached,  the  liquid 
of  course  changes  into  the  solid  state.  Between 
these  limits  the  various  changes  of  temperature 
seem  to  have  no  qualitative  significance  whatso- 
ever; and,  as  Hegel  remarks,  in  the  approach 
toward  either  limit,  the  advance  is  made  with- 
out any  accompanying  circumstances  to  antici- 
pate it  as  far  as  our  observation  goes,  so  that  the 
point  which  marks  the  beginnings  of  a corre- 
sponding qualitative  change  is  reached,  as  it 
were,  by  stealth.  The  illustration  of  Hegel’s  in 
reference  to  the  variations  in  the  temperature  of 
water  may  be  further  supplemented  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner,  which  may  possibly  shed  some 
additional  light  upon  Hegel’s  exposition.  It 
is  a well-known  phenomenon  of  physics  that 
before  reaching  the  freezing-point,  at  32°  F,  the 
decreasing  temperature  causes  a proportional 
decrease  of  bulk  in  the  water.  This  decrease 
in  bulk  is  continuous  to  about  39°.  At  this 


126 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BEING 


point,  however,  a decided  change  is  noticeable,  for 
the  bulk  of  water  now  begins  to  expand  instead 
of  contracting  as  before,  and  so  continues  until 
the  fluid  passes  into  the  solid  state  at  the  freez- 
ing-point.  This  change  seems  to  be  a warning 
note  which  is  sounded  to  indicate  that  even  a 
more  radical  change  may  be  anticipated. 

The  points  which  mark  in  a series  of  con- 
tinuous changes  the  beginnings  of  a qualitative 
corresponding  to  a quantitative  difference,  Hegel 
calls  the  “nodes,”  or  “nodal  points,” — a term 
which  he  has  borrowed  from  astronomy.  The 
line  which  may  be  conceived  as  indicating  the 
continuous  changes  which  may  occur  between 
these  points  without  effecting  any  qualitative 
difference  he  calls,  “ the  line  of  nodes.”  To 
understand  this  reference,  it  may  be  well  to 
give  the  technical  definition  of  a node,  which 
Hegel,  of  course,  has  adapted  to  his  purposes. 
The  node  as  used  in  astronomy  is  one  of  the 
points  at  which  any  celestial  orbit  cuts  the  plane 
of  the  ecliptic,  the  latter  being  a great  circle  of  the 
heavens  in  the  plane  of  the  earth’s  orbit.  The 
node,  therefore,  is  a point  having  a double  signifi- 
cance by  virtue  of  its  being  the  intersecting 
point  of  two  circles,  and  therefore  it  may  be 
conceived  first  as  belonging  to  one  and  then 


MEASURE 


127 


to  the  other.  This  idea  of  a point  having  a 
twofold  significance,  Hegel  has  seized  in 
order  to  indicate  that  particular  point  in 
quantitative  variation  which  has  at  the  same 
time  a qualitative  significance  as  well.  Such 
a point  possesses  the  combined  characteristics 
which  constitute  both  its  qualitative  and 
its  quantitative  features,  just  as  a point  which 
is  common  to  two  circles  possesses  the  charac- 
teristic features  of  each.  Between  these  nodes, 
however,  or  beyond  them  in  either  direction,  the 
various  quantitative  differences  seem  to  have  no 
significance  whatsoever  as  far  as  producing  any 
change  of  definite  qualitative  nature.  When- 
ever, therefore,  quantitative  changes  possess  no 
qualitative  significance,  they  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  constituting  any  standard  or  type  of 
measure,  for  the  magnitude  which  they  repre- 
sent has  no  quality  or  complex  of  qualities 
corresponding  to  it.  Such  magnitudes  Hegel 
designates  as  measureless  (Maas Bios'),  — that 
is,  lacking  the  essential  characteristics  of  a 
standard  or  a type.  Thus  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  concept  of  quantity  in  itself  does  not 
determine  qualitative  differences,  inasmuch  as 
some  magnitudes  have  no  corresponding  quali- 
tative characteristics  at  all.  The  category  of 


128 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  BEING 


quantity,  therefore,  proves  unsatisfactory  as  an 
ultimate  explanation  of  qualitative  differences. 
Inasmuch  as  it  falls,  as  it  were,  of  its  own 
weight,  it  seems  to  necessitate  by  its  very 
inefficiency  some  additional  category  which 
can  satisfactorily  explain  the  relation  between 
quantitative  and  qualitative  variations. 

A similar  situation  has  developed  at  every 
stage  of  progress  in  the  evolution  of  the 
thought  processes  from  the  simplest  beginnings 
in  mere  being  to  the  present  condition  under 
discussion.  Throughout,  each  category  that 
has  been  reached  in  the  progress  of  thought 
has  proved  insufficient  to  explain  itself  and 
all  which  have  gone  before,  and  has  laid  upon 
thought  the  necessity  of  proceeding  to  some 
further  stage  of  development  in  order  to  supply 
its  defects  and  complete  its  meaning.  This  is 
essentially  the  Hegelian  dialectic  movement 
of  thought. 

We  have  seen  that  the  idea  of  mere  being 
carried  with  it  the  necessary  implication  of  a 
complex  system  of  attributes  designated  as  the 
quality  of  determinate  being. 

This  concept  in  turn  has  been  found  to 
necessitate  the  idea  of  oneness  of  being,  — that 
is,  being-for-self,  an  individual  separate  in  a 


MEASUEB 


129 


sense  from  all  others.  This  idea  of  the  one, 
the  individual,  was  then  found  to  suggest  by 
necessary  implication  the  idea  of  the  many, — 
a purely  quantitative  concept. 

Starting  then,  with  the  idea  of  quantity,  its 
highest  expression  was  reached  when  it  was 
regarded  as  correlated  with  the  idea  of  quality. 
Thus  the  quantity-quality  relation  which  Hegel 
calls  measure,  or  better  the  standard  measure, 
would  seem  to  be  the  consummation  of  the 
entire  process. 

The  relation  however  being  unstable,  — that  is, 
existing  for  certain  quantitative  values  and  not 
existing  for  others,  — the  thought  is  consequently 
constrained  by  the  very  nature  of  its  own  proc- 
esses and  its  own  demands  to  press  onward  to 
a further  stage  of  development,  and  to  ask  the 
question,  What  is  it  which  underlies  these 
various  relations  of  quantity  to  quality,  render- 
ing them  significant  at  certain  coincidental 
points,  the  ‘ nodes  ’ according  to  Hegel,  and 
at  others  attaching  to  them  no  significance 
whatsoever?  This  category  of  a standard  meas- 
ure is  by  its  very  limitations  a challenge  to 
thought,  that  it  produce  something  of  a more 
ultimate  nature  as  its  underlying  ground.  That 
which  is  demanded  is  some  satisfactory  explana- 


K 


130 


THE  DOCTRINE  OE  BEING 


tion  of  the  various  distinct  types  which  are  found 
in  nature,  each  determined  according  to  its  own 
definite  standard  of  measure. 

The  most  complete  expression  of  the  category 
of  being,  and  the  final  term  in  the  development 
of  that  idea,  the  concept  of  standard  measure, 
has  been  found  wholly  insufficient  to  rank  as 
a self-contained  and  self-explaining  category. 
This  last  term,  therefore,  can  no  longer  be  re- 
garded as  a last  term ; it  suggests  rather  addi- 
tional terms  in  the  process  of  development 
which  will  form  its  natural  complement  and 
explanation. 

The  immediately  complementary  term  in  the 
line  of  the  logical  unfolding  of  the  universal 
reason  is  that  of  essence  ( das  Wesen ),  which 
forms  the  second  main  division  of  the  Logic. 
The  category  of  essence  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  ground  which  underlies  the  various  changes 
which  characterize  the  progressive  development 
of  the  idea  of  being.  What  being  is  in  its 
essence  determines  its  qualitative  characteristics 
and  correlates  them  with  certain  definite  quan- 
titative changes  by  the  fundamental  law  of  its 
own  nature.  The  magnitude  does  not  deter- 
mine the  quality,  nor  does  the  quality  determine 
the  magnitude,  but  the  roots,  both  of  the  quan- 


MEASURE 


131 


titative  and  qualitative  elements  in  being,  lie 
deeply  concealed  in  tlie  fundamental  essence. 
Hegel  expresses  this  in  bis  epigrammatic  man- 
ner, “ Essence  is  the  truth  of  being.” 


PART  II 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


Diess  ist  also  iiberhaupt  der  Unterschied  der  For- 
men  des  Seyns  und  des  Wesens.  Im  Seyn  ist  Alles 
unmittelbar,  im  Wesen  dagegen  ist  Alles  relativ. 
Der  Standpunkt  des  Wesens  ist  iiberhaupt  der  Stand- 
punkt  der  Reflexion.  — Hegel. 


PART  II 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE  IN  ITS  GENERAL 
FEATURES 

HE  doctrine  of  essence  ( Die  Lehre  vom 


Wesen ) forms  the  second  part  of  the  Logic. 
The  transition  from  the  concept  of  being  to 
that  of  essence  marks  a decided  advance  in 
thought,  and  involves  the  introduction  of  sev- 
eral new  ideas.  Although  these  ideas  have  not 
been  explicitly  manifest  in  the  category  of  simple 
being,  they  have  been,  nevertheless,  implicitly 
present,  so  that  their  appearance  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  exposition  as  to  the  nature  of 
essence  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  developed  ex- 
pression of  a potential  factor  already  present  in 
the  preceding  stage  of  being. 

The  concepts  which  form  the  constituent 
elements  in  the  category  of  essence  are  as 
follows : — 


135 


136 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


(1)  Mediation ; (2)  Negation ; (3)  Reflec- 
tion ; (4)  Permanence  ; (5)  Systemic  inte- 
gration. 

We  will  discuss  these  in  their  order.  First 
as  to  the  idea  of  mediation,  which  we  have 
already  referred  to  in  a previous  chapter.  We 
found  that  Hegel  regards  mere  being  as  imme- 
diate ( unmittelbar ), — that  is,  as  something  which 
is  unaccounted  for,  that  which  is  to  be  accepted 
as  a fact,  but  no  reason  assigned  to  it,  and  not 
referred  to  any  other  thing  as  its  explanation, 
or  by  which  it  might  be  conceived  as  being 
brought  about  by  any  process  whatsoever. 

If,  however,  a raison  d'etre  is  given  for  any 
determinate  being,  this  at  once  connects  the 
being  in  question  with  its  underlying  ground, 
and  this  is  in  itself  a process  of  mediation.  It 
is  that  by  which  something  comes  to  be  what  it 
is  ( yermittelt ).  Being  cannot  explain  itself, 
and  although  we  come  to  accept  as  a matter 
of  course  the  various  attributes  of  being,  as 
quantity,  quality,  degree,  measure,  etc.,  never- 
theless they  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  or 
justify  themselves.  Being,  pure  and  simple, 
bears  upon  its  face  the  stamp  of  derivation.  It 
comes  from  something  more  fundamental  than 
itself.  It  has  had  an  origin,  a life  history,  a 


IN  ITS  GENERAL  FEATURES 


137 


destiny,  all  of  which  lie  concealed.  To  disclose 
these  sources  and  the  processes  depending  upon 
them  is  the  office  of  mediation  ; and  when  medi- 
ation has  completely  fulfilled  its  offices,  the 
true  essence  of  being  will  stand  revealed. 
The  difference  between  mediate  and  immediate 
knowledge  may  be  more  explicitly  exhibited  by 
noting  the  different  adjectives  which  Hegel 
employs  in  describing  the  two  concepts. 

While  the  immediate  knowledge  is  unrelated, 
mediate  knowledge  is  related. 

The  immediate  is  simply  given ; the  mediate 
is  explained. 

The  immediate  is  elementary ; the  mediate  is 
developed. 

The  immediate  marks  the  beginning  of  knowl- 
edge; the  mediate  its  development  and  resulting 
product. 

In  the  next  place,  the  idea  of  essence  implies 
the  negation  of  being.  Hegel,  in  the  opening 
paragraph  upon  the  doctrine  of  essence,  defines 
his  conception  of  essence  as  “ being  coming  into 
mediation  with  itself  through  the  negation  of 
itself.”  1 The  technical  terms  which  this  defini- 
tion contains  may  be  elucidated  by  the  following 
considerations.  While  the  idea  of  being  may  at 
1 § 112. 


138 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


first  seem  to  be  quite  independent  and  imme- 
diate, yet  as  we  have  seen  in  the  examination 
of  the  necessary  relations  and  connections  which 
such  an  idea  involves,  it  is  found  to  be  depen- 
dent upon  something  else  out  of  which  it  has 
arisen,  and  by  which  the  integrity  of  its  com- 
position is  conserved.  This  is  in  itself  a proc- 
ess of  mediation,  and  this  is  what  Hegel  means 
by  the  phrase  that  “ being  comes  into  mediation 
with  itself.”  The  category  of  being,  therefore, 
regarded  as  self-constituted  and  self-sufficient 
falls  to  the  ground.  It  cannot  bear  its  own 
weight,  and  thus  undermines  itself.  This  is  the 
meaning  of  the  phrase  that  the  idea  of  being 
contains  the  “negation  of  itself.”  Nevertheless, 
while  dying  as  an  independent,  immediate,  self- 
contained  form,  it  regains  another  life  in  the 
underlying  ground  to  which  it  is  necessarily 
referred  and  by  which  it  becomes  specifically 
determined.  In  its  essence,  being  — that  is,  mere 
being,  as  such  as  Hegel  puts  it  — is  aufgehoben. 
This  is  a very  significant  word  in  the  Hegelian 
terminology  and  cannot  be  adequately  trans- 
lated by  any  one  English  word,  for  it  conveys 
three  distinct  ideas  which  must  be  taken  to- 
gether in  order  to  express  its  full  significance. 
The  verb  aufheben  possesses  the  threefold  mean- 


IN  ITS  GENERAL  FEATURES 


139 


ing  with  Hegel,  — to  destroy,  to  re-create  in  a 
new  form,  and  at  the  same  time  to  elevate. 
To  speak  of  anything  as  aufgelioben  means 
that  it  disappears  in  its  given  form,  but  that  it 
reappears  in  a new  form,  and  that  the  new  form 
always  represents  a higher  point  of  view  and  a 
substantial  progress  in  thought.  The  one  single 
English  word  which  comes  nearest  to  express- 
ing this  meaning  is  the  word  transmute.  When 
Hegel  affirms  that  in  essence  being  is  aufgelioben , 
he  means  that  it  has  lost  its  independence  only 
to  find  it  again  in  a dependence  which  has  this 
peculiar  characteristic,  that  it  is  not  subordi- 
nated to  anything  which  is  foreign  to  its  own 
notion  or  idea,  but  which  is  at  the  last  analysis 
one  with  the  initial  being  itself.  That  which 
being  rests  upon  as  its  basis  must  be  a part  of 
being  itself;  otherwise  the  relation  would  be 
external  and  valueless.  While,  therefore,  the 
independence  of  being  is  in  a sense  denied,  it 
is  in  another  and  a higher  sense  reaffirmed. 
The  primary  denial  is  a negation : the  reaffirma- 
tion is  brought  about  by  the  negation  of  the 
former  negation.  This  last  is  the  absolute 
negation,  as  Hegel  calls  it,  which  is  equivalent 
always  to  an  affirmation.  The  independence 
of  being  which  is  first  denied  gives  way  to  a 


140 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


dependence,  but  this  in  turn  is  denied,  because 
when  it  is  analyzed  it  is  found  to  be  in  reality 
a dependence  of  being  upon  its  own  ground, 
which  is  equivalent  to  a self-dependence ; and 
a self-dependence  is  the  same  as  independence. 
Thus  this  second  negation  is  a reassertion  of  the 
original  independence ; but,  in  the  process  of 
thought  through  which  it  has  passed,  it  has 
acquired  a richer  and  fuller  significance  ; for  it 
is  an  independence  which  has  been  fully  justified. 

The  process  of  negation  with  Hegel,  it  must 
be  remembered,  is  never  extinction  or  annihila- 
tion : it  is  only  a sublimation  into  a higher  form  ; 
and  the  absorption  of  being  in  essence  is  one 
of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  process  of  nega- 
tion, which  plays  such  an  important  and  con- 
spicuous rfile  in  the  Hegelian  dialectic.  It  is 
in  this  way  that  negation  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
means  of  more  precise  characterization  and 
determination  in  the  progressive  development 
of  thought.  The  nature  of  negation  as  a proc- 
ess may  be  summed  up  most  completely  in  the 
term  aufheben , — the  overthrowing,  and  the 
restoring  upon  a higher  plane,  as  has  already 
been  described. 

The  category  of  reflection  presents  a point  of 
view  from  which  the  doctrine  of  essence  may 


IN  ITS  GENERAL  FEATURES 


141 


be  best  understood  and  appreciated.  This  has 
been  referred  to  in  a previous  chapter,  but  is  so 
important  an  idea  in  the  general  scheme  of 
Hegel  that  an  additional  reference  may  not 
be  out  of  place  at  this  stage  of  the  exposition. 
Being  is  regarded  by  Hegel  as  a category  which 
is  not  self-illuminating.  It  receives  its  light 
from  something  else  which  is  its  ground.  The 
idea  of  expressing  this  thought  by  the  term 
reflection  was  suggested  to  Hegel  through  an 
analogy  with  the  well-known  physical  phenome- 
non of  reflection.  As  a substantial  form  before 
a glass  is  seen  through  reflection  as  an  image 
of  itself,  so  being  may  be  regarded  as  the  reflec- 
tion of  that  which  is  its  ground.  The  image  in 
the  glass  has  an  immediate  reality  in  a certain 
sense,  but  as  regards  its  self-determination  it 
is  illusory.  Its  reality  is  due  to  its  reflection 
of  the  object  to  which  it  stands  related,  and  to 
which  it  must  be  referred  in  order  to  explain 
and  to  justify  its  own  being.  Thus  the  ground 
of  being,  and  the  being  as  manifested,  are 
related  to  each  other  as  substance  and  show, 
— the  underlying  essence  and  the  reflected 
appearance.  There  are  two  phrases  which 
are  used  frequently  by  Hegel  in  this  connec- 
tion, and  their  meaning  should  be  precisely 


142 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


determined.  They  are  the  phrases  Reflexion-in- 
sich  and  Rejlexion-in-Anderes.  The  signifi- 
cance of  these  phrases  will  always  be  brought 
out  clearly  in  their  Hegelian  usage,  if  we 
translate  the  former  as  that  which  shines  in 
its  own  light,  the  latter  as  that  which  shines 
in  the  light  of  another. 

We  may  say,  therefore,  that  the  various 
attributes  of  being  do  not  shine  in  their  own 
light,  but  in  the  light  of  some  other,  which 
forms  their  necessary  complement,  and  consti- 
tutes their  essence  or  substantial  ground. 

Essence  is,  moreover,  to  be  distinguished 
from  mere  being,  in  that  it  is  the  permanent 
basis  ( das  Bleibende~),  which  underlies  that  which 
is  only  the  transient  manifestation.  The  sev- 
eral changes  which  the  dialectic  movement  has 
been  seen  to  produce  among  the  attributes  of 
being  allow  no  resting-place  for  our  thought. 
We  pass  from  quality  to  quantity,  and  from 
quantity  back  again  to  a quality  which  pos- 
sesses at  this  stage  of  development  the  addi- 
tional characteristic  of  being  quantitatively 
determined ; and  thence  on  to  a quantitative 
determination  which  has  no  qualitative  signifi- 
cance whatsoever,  and  through  it  all  the  idea 
of  being  is  not  able  to  show  any  basis  of  a per- 


IN  ITS  GENERAL  FEATURES 


143 


manent  nature  which  it  can  call  its  own. 
Nevertheless,  the  nature  of  thought  is  such  that 
we  are  constrained  to  demand  some  permanent 
underlying  ground  to  which  these  various 
changes  may  be  referred.  It  is  in  the  idea  of 
essence,  the  necessary  complement  of  being,  that 
we  find  the  solid  foundation  which  underlies 
and  supports  all  the  changing  manifestations 
of  being.  While  everything  may  be  regarded, 
according  to  Heraclitus,  as  ceaselessly  chang- 
ing, yet  nevertheless  something  remains.  That 
which  remains,  regarded  as  a constant,  is  in 
itself  the  explanation  of  all  change,  and 
through  which  all  variation  may  be  reduced  to 
law  and  uniformity.  The  significance  of  the  vari- 
able lies  in  the  fact  that  it  may  be  referred  to 
some  underlying  constant.  Where  there  is  no 
constant,  variables  possess  no  significance. 

The  idea  of  permanency  which  thus  char- 
acterizes essence  is  regarded  by  Hegel  as  having 
an  etymological  warrant.  Being  is  the  German 
Seyn,  and  essence,  or  its  German  equivalent 
Wesen,  is  the  same  as  past  being,  that  is  vergan- 
genes  Seyn , as  seen  in  the  past  participle  gewe- 
sen.  This  signifies  that  whatever  has  being, 
is  thus  declared  to  be  by  virtue  of  that  which 
has  been  before,  and  which  is  therefore  related 


144 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


to  it  as  its  Wesen,  or  ground.  The  priority 
which  seems  to  be  expressed  in  the  Wesen  is, 
however,  not  asserted  as  a priority  in  time  nec- 
essarily ; it  is  merely  a logical  priority.  The 
past,  that  which  has  been  before,  and  which  is 
to  be  regarded  as  the  ground  or  essence  of  that 
which  is,  of  being,  is  not  past  in  the  sense  of 
having  been  set  aside,  or  of  disappearing ; it  is 
rather  to  be  regarded  as  conserved,  and  living 
again  in  the  present  being.  The  past  as  the 
logical  prius  of  being  is  therefore  merely  auf- 
gehoben,  as  Hegel  would  express  it,  — past  and 
yet  perduring. 

Hegel’s  derivation  of  the  word  Wesen,  and  by 
this  means  establishing  its  significance,  fur- 
nishes a characteristic  illustration  of  his  general 
habit  of  thought,  and  his  conviction  that  the 
most  valuable  thoughts  of  mankind  are  often 
found  crystallized  in  language.  As  to  the  sug- 
gestiveness of  language  in  this  particular,  Hegel 
says : “ Language  has  compressed  within  it 

what  man  has  made  his  own ; and  what  he  has 
fashioned  and  expressed  in  speech  contains, 
either  embedded  or  elaborated,  a category  : so 
natural  does  logic  come  to  him,  or  rather  it  is 
his  own  very  nature.”  1 

i Werke,  I,  10  f . 


IN  ITS  GENERAL  FEATURES 


145 


Essence  is  to  be  regarded,  moreover,  as  a con- 
stituted system  of  relations.  It  is  a complex 
consisting  of  a manifold  of  various  elements 
which  are  throughout  interrelated,  and  coordi- 
nated. This  conception  of  essence  also  appears 
in  the  German,  as  seen  in  such  words  as  das 
Zeitungswesen , the  newspaper  system;  das  Post- 
wesen,  the  postal  system ; das  Steuerwesen,  the 
revenue  system.  We  have  a similar  usage  in 
our  phrase,  the  railway  system.  In  such  a con- 
nection the  word  Wesen,  or  essence,  emphasizes 
the  truth  that  everything  which  is,  which  has 
being,  must  be  referred  to  its  appropriate  place 
in  the  particular  system  to  which  it  belongs  and 
in  which  is  to  be  found  its  true  ground  and  proper 
explanation,  and  that,  moreover,  there  is  no  kind 
of  being  in  the  universe  which  is  unrelated  to 
others,  or  which  can  remain  apart  and  by  itself. 

This  idea  of  the  ground  of  being  conceived 
as  a system  of  coordinated  and  necessarily  re- 
lated elements  is  in  complete  accord  with  the 
modern  theory  of  logic,  which  lays  special  em- 
phasis upon  the  order  and  uniformity  which 
characterizes  the  world  of  knowledge  and  the 
systematic  relation  which  every  element  must 
sustain  to  every  other  and  to  the  whole.1  These, 
1 Hibben’s  Inductive  Logic , p.  7 f. 


146 


THE  DOCTRINE  OE  ESSENCE 


then,  are  the  chief  factors,  or,  as  Hegel  would 
call  them,  moments  which  constitute  the  con- 
cept of  essence,  — the  ideas  of  mediation,  ne- 
gation, reflection,  permanency,  and  systemic 
integration. 

It  is  in  keeping  with  Hegel’s  general  point 
of  view  that  he  should  define  the  Absolute  as 
essence.  Although  we  speak  of  finite  essences 
such  as  man,  nevertheless  the  term  itself  in 
the  Hegelian  system  implies  that  we  have  passed 
beyond  finitude,  and  that  there  is  at  the  last 
analysis  one  supreme  essence  which  is  the  true 
infinite  and  which  embraces  all  other  so-called 
essences  within  itself.  Therefore,  according  to 
this  conception,  all  else  outside  of  the  Absolute, 
outside  of  God,  would  possess  no  essentiality. 
God  is  not  to  be  regarded  merely  as  a being 
among  many  others,  or  as  an  essence,  even  the 
highest.  He  is  preeminently  the  being  and  the 
essence  underlying  all  others.  Hegel  draws 
special  attention,  however,  to  the  truth  that 
the  nature  of  God  is  by  no  means  exhausted 
in  the  ascription  to  Him  of  essence.  If  God  is 
regarded  as  essence  only,  His  universal  and 
irresistible  power  is  thereby  assured,  but  His 
other  attributes  are  overlooked.  He  is  merely 
the  Lord,  God  Almighty,  and  his  more  personal 


IN  ITS  GENERAL  FEATURES 


147 


relations  to  the  world  in  general,  and  to  man 
in  particular,  are  not  recognized  in  such  a 
definition.  This  may  be  said  to  be  the  com- 
mon defect  in  the  Mohammedan  and  Jewish 
religions  alike,  in  which  the  creator  is  removed 
by  an  impassable  gulf  from  the  creature.1 

In  the  subsequent  development  of  the  dialec- 
tic movement  it  will  be  seen  that  the  category 
of  essence  will,  by  its  limitations,  necessitate  the 
complementary  and  final  category  of  the  notion, 
or  universal  reason.  The  conception  of  God, 
therefore,  as  essence  merely,  must  also  be  com- 
pleted by  the  addition  of  those  attributes  which 
are  involved  in  the  category  of  the  notion. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  category  of  essence 
Hegel  divides  the  subject  into  three  parts  which 
will  be  treated  in  the  three  following  chapters. 
They  are : — 

1.  Essence  as  ground  of  existence  (Das 
Wesen  als  Grrund  der  Existenz) . 

2.  Appearance  (Die  Erscheinung). 

3.  Actuality  (Die  Wirklichkeit). 

1 Caird’s  Evolution  of  Beligion. 


CHAPTER  XI 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE 

THE  first  aspect  under  which  Hegel  treats 
the  category  of  essence  is  that  of  the  ground 
of  existence.  The  conception  of  the  ground  of 
existence  implies  the  idea  of  something  which  is 
fundamental  and  permanent.  We  find  ourselves 
in  a world  of  changing  phenomena.  The  ele- 
ments which  form  their  constituent  parts  are 
indefinitely  various,  and  it  is  a natural  impulse 
to  seek  for  some  constant  factor  that  will  give 
determinateness  to  the  great  world  problem. 
Hegel’s  view  is  that  every  phenomenon  in  the 
universe  is  the  manifestation  of  its  own  underly- 
ing ground,  and  that  on  this  account  it  preserves 
always  its  identity  with  itself;  also  that  the 
phenomenal  appearance  must  be  regarded  merely 
as  a reflection  of  the  underlying  essence,  and 
that  the  fundamental  law  of  identity  connects 
essence  and  appearance  as  one  and  the  same. 
The  concept  of  identity  is  one  of  the  so-called 
categories  of  reflection  ( die  Reflexionsbestim- 
148 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE  149 

mungeni).  As  illustrations  of  his  conception  of 
identity,  Hegel  cites  that  central  integrity  of 
being  which  characterizes  the  Ego,  the  logical 
notion,  and  God.  God  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
self-identity,  inasmuch  as  He  is  the  all-embrac- 
ing constant,  the  underlying  essence,  of  whose 
eternal  attributes  all  the  glory  and  splendor  of 
the  world  are  reflections.  Man  in  his  conscious 
life  as  a personality,  as  an  Ego,  also  represents  a 
self-identity,  inasmuch  as  his  self-consciousness 
forms  a centre  to  which  all  the  variety  of  his  ex- 
periences may  be  referred,  and  which  forms  the 
one  constant  factor  in  the  equation  of  life. 
Man’s  activities  are  thus  a reflection  of  his  inner 
personality.  This  self-identity  alone  serves  to 
differentiate  man  from  the  brute  which  possesses 
no  such  underlying  ground  of  continuity,  and 
lives  in  each  present  experience  with  no  thought 
before  or  after.  There  is,  moreover,  in  every 
logical  notion,  also  a constant  element,  the  uni- 
versal, which  maintains  its  identity  in  the  midst 
of  the  indefinite  variety  of  its  particular  mani- 
festations. It  is  this  constant  element  which 
forms  the  underlying  ground  of  our  thought 
processes  and  gives  them  definiteness  and  sta- 
bility, and  of  which  they  are  essentially  the 
reflection. 


150 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


The  laws  of  formal  logic  which  refer  to  the 
principle  of  identity,  Hegel  interprets  in  a 
manner  quite  in  accord  with  his  general  method. 
These  laws  are  commonly  enunciated  as  fol- 
lows : — 

The  law  of  identity  proper  states  that  every- 
thing must  be  identical  with  itself,  or  briefly  ex- 
pressed, A = A.  The  law  of  contradiction  which 
is  merely  the  negative  expression  of  the  law  of 
identity  is  that  A cannot  be  at  the  same  time 
both  A and  not  A. 

As  thus  expressed,  Hegel  insists,  these  laws  are 
merely  products  of  the  abstract  understanding, 
— that  is,  a partial  and  one-sided  view  of  things. 
As  formulated  above,  these  laws  allow  for  no 
progress  of  thought  whatsoever.  They  form 
hard  and  fast  concepts  corresponding  to  a world 
in  which  there  can  be  no  change,  no  interrelation 
of  parts,  no  variety,  and  above  all  no  life  and 
thought.  Instead  of  an  abstract  identity,  Hegel 
insists  upon  a concrete  identity,  — that  is,  an 
identity  which  exists  in  the  midst  of  a diversity 
and  whose  significance  is  due  to  the  very  diver- 
sity with  which  it  is  brought  into  contrast.  The 
formula  which  expresses  the  law  of  identity  is 
not  A = A.  It  should  be  A = A',  that  is,  A 
differs  from  A',  and  yet  in  spite  of  the  difference 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE  151 


is  one  with  it.  The  former  equation,  A — A, 
expresses  merely  an  absolute  identity  which  is 
wholly  stripped  of  all  differences,  and  as  such  is 
without  significance  and  value. 

Hegel  defines  identity,  therefore,  as  an  iden- 
tity which  reflects  its  own  self  in  every  changing 
variety  of  manifestation,  and  in  such  a manner 
that  the  reflection  of  self  is  different  from  it, 
and  yet  so  intimately  connected  with  it  as  to 
be  the  same.  It  is  a paradox,  as  thus  expressed ; 
but  with  Hegel,  truth  lies  in  paradoxes.  The 
idea  of  identity,  if  it  is  to  possess  any  true  sig- 
nificance, implies  the  correlated  idea  of  differ- 
ence ; and  in  the  progress  of  thought  Hegel 
proceeds  to  discuss  the  concept  of  difference 
(der  Unterschied ) as  the  second  category  of  re- 
flection. The  concept  of  difference  appears  in 
its  most  elemental  form  as  immediate  difference, 
for  so  Hegel  characterizes  it.  By  immediate 
difference  he  means  mere  diversity  or  variety 
(die  Verschiedenheit').  By  diversity  is  meant 
that  the  various  objects  are  each  individually 
what  they  are,  and  that  the  only  connection 
between  them  is  an  external  one.  When  ob- 
jects which  are  thus  externally  related  are 
compared,  they  are  identified  to  the  extent  of 
affirming  their  likeness,  and  failure  to  identify 


152 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


signifies  that  their  likeness  is  denied.  At  this 
point  Hegel’s  conception  of  the  relation  be- 
tween identity  and  difference  is  brought  out 
most  clearly,  and  considerable  emphasis  placed 
upon  it.  He  asserts  in  his  characteristically 
paradoxical  manner  that  objects  which  are 
judged  to  be  alike  are  such  only  by  virtue  of 
an  underlying  difference,  and  that  objects  which 
are  judged  to  be  unlike  are  such  only  by  virtue 
of  an  underlying  identity.  The  one  idea  reflects 
its  light  upon  the  other.  Thus,  if  we  say  that 
a triangle  differs  from  a tree,  the  assertion  has 
no  point,  because  the  two  objects  compared 
have  nothing  in  common  by  which  they  may 
be  brought  together  in  thought;  their  differ- 
ences are  not  illuminated  by  the  light  of  any 
identity.  Or,  if  we  should  say  a man  is  a man, 
the  assertion  would  have  no  significance,  for 
the  identity  which  is  stated  is  not  illuminated 
by  the  light  of  any  difference.  But  in  this 
case  suppose  that  the  difference  is  suggested, 
as  in  the  lines  of  Burns,  — 

“ A man’s  a man  for  a’  that.” 

The  thought  has  become  significant,  for  the 
phrase  “ for  a’  that  ” introduces  an  implied  dif- 
ference, and  this  at  once  reflects  its  meaning 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OP  EXISTENCE  153 


upon  the  original  assertion,  which  without  this 
contrast  of  thought  would  remain  a meaning- 
less repetition.  Again,  if  we  compare  a beech 
and  an  oak,  or  electrical  and  steam  power,  the 
elements  of  likeness  and  unlikeness  appear  as 
significant  because  these  objects  represent  con- 
cepts which  are  fundamentally  connected  as 
species  of  one  and  the  same  genus,  so  that  the 
significance  of  the  one  is  reflected  in  the  light 
of  the  other.  The  difference  in  such  a case 
which  appears  upon  a background  of  an  iden- 
tity underlying  all  species  of  the  same  genus 
may  be  appropriately  called  specific  difference, 
or  difference  of  reflection  ( Unterschied  der  Re- 
flexion oder  Unterschied  an  sich  selbst,  hestimm- 
ter  Unterschied).  These  differences  occurring 
within  the  area  of  a common  ground  serve  to 
separate  and  distinguish  one  species  from  all 
others.  Cognate  species  admit  of  comparison, 
and  their  differences  are  always  significant  for 
this  very  reason,  that  however  various  the  spe- 
cies may  appear,  they  all  belong  to  one  common 
genus.  Thus,  the  idea  of  mere  diversity  or  vari- 
ety has  been  found  to  develop  into  a difference 
which  is  significant  only  in  the  sphere  of  cog- 
nate species,  — that  is,  determinate  or  specific 
difference. 


154 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


There  is  still  another  aspect  of  the  idea  of 
difference,  which  is  that  of  opposition  (der 
Gregensatz).  Here  the  kindred  elements  which 
enter  into  the  same  area  of  being  are  arrayed 
over  against  each  other  as  positive  and  negative, 
and  yet  in  the  characteristically  Hegelian  man- 
ner of  viewing  such  opposites,  they  are  to  be 
regarded  as  constituent  elements  in  one  and  the 
same  essence.  Their  opposition  is  stated  only 
to  be  resolved  in  a higher  unity  according  to 
the  logical  demands  of  the  dialectic  movement. 
The  traditional  law  of  logic  known  as  that  of 
the  excluded  middle  (namely,  that,  of  two  oppo- 
site predicates,  one,  and  one  only,  can  be  assigned 
to  one  and  the  same  subject)  must  be  regarded 
as  true  merely  of  the  abstract  understanding, 
but  not  of  the  reflective  reason  which  regards 
all  things  in  the  concrete,  — that  is,  in  the  full 
light  of  all  that  they  are  and  of  all  that  they 
imply.  The  truth  of  the  idea  of  essence,  accord- 
ing to  Hegel,  lies  in  the  very  opposition  of  the 
ideas  of  positive  and  negative  which  finds 
universal  expression  in  the  fact  that  everything 
in  the  universe  has  its  significance  only  in  its 
connection  with  that  which  confronts  it  as 
its  other.  For  every  positive  there  is  a corre- 
sponding other  which  may  be  regarded  as  its 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE  155 


negative.  The  terms  positive  and  negative  do 
not  express  an  absolute  difference.  The  two  at 
the  last  analysis  are  found  to  spring  from  the 
same  root.  The  terms  positive  and  negative 
may,  under  all  circumstances,  be  transposed,  and 
the  meaning  of  the  terms  not  in  any  sense 
altered.  If  we  agree  to  designate  distance  east 
as  +,  then  distance  west  would  be  designated 
as  — ; but  we  might  as  well  have  called  dis- 
tance west  +,  and  distance  east  — . The  sig- 
nificance of  the  terms  employed  lies  wholly  in 
their  relation  one  to  the  other. 

In  the  concept  of  opposition  it  must  be  dis- 
tinctly understood  that  the  term  which  is 
regarded  as  positive  must  not  be  conceived  as 
opposed  to  any  other  whatsoever,  but  only  by 
that  which  is  peculiarly  its  other  by  virtue  of 
some  common  basis  underlying  them  both. 
According  to  a crude  conception  of  the  world, 
it  would  seem  to  be  composed  of  a multitude  of 
different  objects,  and  each  one  wholly  indepen- 
dent of  every  other.  This  is,  however,  a most 
erroneous  conception.  All  elements  in  the  great 
cosmic  process  must  be  regarded  as  parts  of  a 
systematized  whole,  so  that  each  one  is  related 
to  that  which  is  peculiarly  its  other  in  one  and 
the  same  underlying  system.  Thus  the  north 


156 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


pole  of  the  magnet  is  opposed  to  and  yet  con- 
nected with  its  south  pole  ; so  also  positive  and 
negative  electricity  are  essentially  related  ; every 
acid,  moreover,  is  related  to  its  corresponding 
base.  The  opposite  may  be  defined,  therefore, 
in  general,  as  that  which  embraces  both  itself 
and  its  corresponding  other  within  one  and  the 
same  area  of  determination.  If  it  is  asked  what 
this  one  and  self-same  area  of  determination 
may  be,  it  would  be  characterized  in  the  Hegel- 
ian terminology  as  the  ground  ( der  Grrund). 
This  is  the  third  of  the  categories  of  reflection, 
and  forms  the  basis  of  the  other  two.  Ground 
is  defined  by  Hegel  as  the  unity  of  identity  and 
difference.  It  is  the  determining  factor  which 
renders  objects  sufficiently  alike  so  that  we  can 
observe  their  differences,  or  sufficiently  unlike 
so  that  we  can  note  their  resemblances.  Thus, 
the  idea  of  ground  contains  the  truth  of  all 
that  attaches  to  the  complementary  ideas  of 
identity  and  difference.  It  is  the  unity  under- 
lying diversity ; it  is  the  essence  underlying 
specific  difference ; it  is  the  connecting  bond 
which  unites  in  one  every  element  of  being 
with  its  corresponding  opposite,  or  other,  within 
the  area  of  a common  system. 

The  logical  maxim  in  reference  to  the  con- 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE  157 


cept  of  ground  is  expressed  in  the  fourth  law  of 
thought,  which  is  associated  with  the  name  of 
Leibniz  and  is  known  as  the  law  of  sufficient 
reason,  viz. : “ Everything  must  have  its  suffi- 
cient ground.”  This  means  that  the  true  and 
essential  being  of  any  definite  object  of  thought 
is  not  to  be  conceived  merely  as  a constant 
underlying  element  which  always  preserves  its 
strict  identity,  nor  is  it  to  be  conceived  solely 
as  the  underlying  source  of  variability  which 
produces  manifest  differences  ; it  is  not  merely 
positive,  nor  is  it  merely  negative ; it  must  be 
conceived  as  the  synthesis  of  both  these  ideas, 
so  that  it  has  its  being  in  its  other,  which,  how- 
ever, falls  within  the  area  of  its  own  essence, 
and  the  two  opposite  thus  become  one.  The 
relation  may  be  illustrated  by  the  analogy  of 
two  circles  which  lie  wholly  outside  of  each 
other  and  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  oppo- 
sites ; but  then  we  can  conceive  the  two  circles 
also  as  lying  wholly  within  a third,  and  as  such 
may  be  regarded  as  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
surrounding  area. 

From  another  point  of  view,  to  use  the  Hegel- 
ian figure,  essence  as  ground  is  not  to  be  con- 
ceived as  merely  the  abstract  reflection-in-self 
(that  is,  as  shining  merely  in  its  own  light),  but 


158 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


as  a reflection-in-its-other  (that  is,  as  receiving 
illumination  from  that  which  by  the  very  nature 
of  things  stands  over  against  it,  and  yet  at  the 
same  time  is  essentially  connected  with  it  as 
its  necessary  complement).  Every  truth  has  its 
obverse  side ; and  this  must  always  be  recog- 
nized if  we  are  to  attain  knowledge  in  its  ful- 
ness. The  ground  and  whatever  depends  upon 
the  ground  must  be  regarded,  therefore,  as  one 
and  the  same  content,  that  is,  the  same  matter 
of  fact.  The  ground  is  a simple  reference  to 
itself ; and  what  is  grounded  combines  a refer- 
ence to  self  with  a reference  to  its  other  as  well. 
Such  a reference  involves  the  idea  of  mediation, 
or  relativity,  that  is,  the  process  of  explaining 
a given  thing  by  a reference  to  something  else 
with  which  it  is  essentially  related. 

The  law  of  sufficient  reason,  therefore,  asserts 
that  all  phenomena  are  so  related  in  an  all-em- 
bracing system  that  every  phenomenon  must  be 
referred  to  some  other  as  its  sufficient  ground. 
There  is  throughout  a complete  interrelation 
and  interdependence.  The  essence  of  anything, 
from  this  point  of  view,  cannot  be  revealed  by 
showing  merely  what  it  is  in  itself,  or,  as  Hegel 
would  put  it,  in  a purely  abstract  sense  ; but  it 
must  be  shown  what  it  is  in  reference  to  some- 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OP  EXISTENCE  159 

thing  else  which  is  related  to  it  as  its  other. 
To  know  a thing,  therefore,  we  must  know  it 
in  reference  to  all  of  the  possible  relations 
which  it  may  sustain  to  all  other  things  by 
which  its  own  essential  being  is  mediated. 
The  most  perfect  example  of  what  is  meant 
by  ground  is  found  in  the  third  part  of  the 
Hegelian  system,  the  doctrine  of  the  notion, 
or  the  active  and  universal  reason.  In  such  a 
conception,  the  idea  of  ground  attains  its  com- 
plete expression  inasmuch  as  it  presents  a con- 
tent which  is  determined  in  itself  and  for  itself, 
and  hence  may  be  regarded  as  self-originating 
and  self-constructive.  Such  must  be  the  essen- 
tial ground  of  all  things,  some  form  of  super- 
intending reason  which  is  freely  working  out 
its  own  purposes.  This  is  the  interpretation  of 
Leibniz  in  reference  to  the  meaning  of  sufficient 
ground.  His  conception  especially  emphasizes 
the  function  of  final  cause  in  reference  to  the 
connection  of  phenomena  with  their  ground, 
and  it  is  in  the  self-activity  of  the  universal 
reason  that  the  fullest  scope  is  allowed  to  the 
play  of  final  causes.  But  at  the  present  stage 
in  the  development  of  the  concept  of  ground  it 
cannot  be  regarded  as  having  as  yet  attained 
this  capacity  of  determining  itself.  It  is  only 


160 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


when  we  reach  the  third  and  final  stage  of  the 
Hegelian  system  that  the  conception  of  a self- 
directing and  self-determining  ground  emerges 
in  its  complete  form.  The  idea  of  ground, 
therefore,  at  this  stage  of  its  development  must 
not  be  regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  final  cause. 
It  is  not  as  yet  consciously  active,  nor  does  it 
produce  anything,  working  purposefully  towards 
some  definitely  conceived  end.  Being,  there- 
fore, regarded  as  existence,  is  said  by  Hegel  to 
issue  or  proceed  from  the  ground.  Hegel’s  con- 
ception of  the  term  “ existence  ” (die  Existenz ) 
he  derives  etymologically  from  the  verb  existere, 
the  literal  meaning  of  which  is,  to  go  forth,  or 
to  proceed.  It  would  follow,  therefore,  that  ex- 
istence is  merely  that  which  proceeds  from  the 
ground.  As  such  it  may  be  regarded  as  hav- 
ing left  the  ground  behind,  just  as  the  product 
as  determinate  being  was  said  to  leave  behind 
the  process  of  becoming  which  preceded  it. 
The  difference,  however,  between  determinate 
being  and  existence  is  that  the  latter  represents 
a far  deeper  insight  and  an  advanced  stage  of 
development.  Determinate  being  is  accepted 
as  immediately  given,  no  inquiry  being  started 
as  to  its  explanation  or  justification.  Existence, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  regarded  as  mediated,  — ■ 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE  161 


that  is,  as  referred  to  its  appropriate  ground, 
and  thus  accounted  for  and  duly  explained.  But 
although  having  issued  from  the  ground,  ex- 
istence nevertheless  contains  its  own  ground 
within  itself,  so  that  the  ground  is  not  merely 
a phase  in  the  process  of  mediation  which  has 
been  passed  through  and  completely  left  behind. 
The  ground  may  properly  be  characterized  as 
aufgehoben,  — that  is,  suspended,  and  yet  trans- 
muted into  the  more  developed  form  of  existence. 
This  relation  may  be  illustrated  in  our  modern 
conception  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  wherein 
any  given  energy  seems  to  be  destroyed  only 
to  reappear  in  some  changed  form,  and  although 
the  ground  of  the  result,  nevertheless  it  pre- 
serves its  own  identity  in  the  result  itself.  It  is 
a false  view  of  existence  which  regards  it  as 
related  to  its  ground  in  an  external  manner, 
so  that  the  world  comes  to  be  regarded  as  a 
collection  of  different  objects,  having  each 
a separate  existence,  and  related  to  each  other 
as  ground  and  consequence,  wherein  everything 
bears  an  aspect  of  relativity,  conditioned  by  and 
conditioning  something  else.  In  such  a world 
there  would  be  nothing  fundamental  and  final. 
Such  a conception  must  be  supplemented  by 
the  doctrine  of  the  notion  which,  as  will  be 


M 


162 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


seen,  supplies  an  unconditioned  basis  of  ration- 
ality and  purposiveness  for  all  that  is  contin- 
gent and  relative. 

The  existent  conceived  as  having  absorbed 
its  ground  within  itself  is  in  a sense  relieved 
of  all  dependence  upon  anything  outside  of 
itself ; for  whatever  seems  to  lie  outside  of  itself, 
and  yet  is  at  the  same  time  related  to  it,  must 
be  regarded  as  falling  within  the  area  of  its 
own  being.  In  other  words,  the  circle  which  is 
drawn  about  any  object  which  has  existence,  to 
mark  the  bounds  of  its  being,  is  to  be  drawn 
with  so  generous  a sweep  as  to  embrace  every- 
thing by  which  the  being  in  question  is  itself 
mediated,  or  to  which  it  is  essentially  related. 
Whatever  exists  in  this  sense,  Hegel  calls  a thing 
(das  Ding).  He  very  stoutly  disclaims,  however, 
any  reference  in  this  connection  to  the  Kantian 
tliing-in-itself  ( das  Ding  an  sicK).  He  con- 
siders this  phrase  an  empty  and  meaningless 
abstraction ; for  if  we  in  imagination  take  away 
from  a thing  its  specific  characteristics  and  its 
relations  to  all  other  things,  absolute  emptiness 
remains.  Hegel’s  interpretation  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  phrase,  the  thing-in-itself,  is 
quite  characteristic.  He  maintains  that  the 
thing-in-itself,  if  it  is  to  have  any  meaning  at 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OF  EXISTENCE  163 


all,  signifies  the  thing,  whatever  it  is,  in  its 
potential  state,  — its  specific  characteristics  as 
yet  undeveloped  and  unrealized.  Thus,  the 
child  may  be  considered  as  the  man-in-himself, 
in  the  sense  that  the  child  is  indeed  the  father 
of  the  man.  So  also  the  patriarchal  state  takes 
rank  as  the  state-in-itself.  The  germ  of  the 
seed  is  the  plant-in-itself.  In  the  developed 
form  the  thing  is  not  merely  the  thing-in-itself, 
it  is  also  the  thing-for-itself  (das  Ding  fur  sicK), 
— that  is,  the  thing  whose  specific  qualities  are 
no  longer  implicit,  but  have  become  explicit  and 
fully  developed. 

The  thing  is  variously  characterized  by  Hegel : 

(1)  As  possessing  properties. 

(2)  As  composed  of  material  elements. 

(3)  As  a synthesis  of  matter  and  of  form. 

That  which  we  call  a thing  is  said  to  possess 

properties  (die  Eigenschaften').  These  proper- 
ties have  an  internal  connection.  The  various 
properties  do  not  constitute  a diversity  among 
themselves  such  as  that  which  has  already  been 
described,  wherein  the  different  terms  have  no 
connection  with  each  other  except  that  which  is 
given  by  a comparison  whose  basis  is  external 
to  them.  The  properties,  however,  which  in- 
here in  one  and  the  same  thing  are  brought 


164 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


together  by  a bond  which  forms  an  internal 
connection  and  a stable  centre  of  reference. 

Again,  a thing  is  composed  of  material  ele- 
ments (die  Materien ).  The  several  properties 
of  a thing  may  be  regarded  from  one  point  of 
view  as  each  inhering  in  its  own  material  stuff 
and  as  therefore  possessing  a quasi  independence 
of  the  thing  itself.  From  such  a point  of  view 
the  thing  is  conceived  as  only  the  sum  total  of 
these  various  qualitative  stuffs  ; so  that  we  might 
describe  a given  thing  as  composed  of  so  much 
color  stuff,  of  so  much  saccharine  stuff,  vege- 
table stuff,  etc.  This  seems  to  be  a sufficiently 
correct  account  of  certain  inorganic  things, 
especially  chemical  compounds.  Common  salt 
may  be  reduced  to  its  constituent  material  ele- 
ments, muriatic  acid  and  soda.  Gypsum  may 
be  reduced  to  sulphuric  acid  and  calcium.  Sul- 
phuric acid  may  be  reduced  to  sulphur,  hydro- 
gen, and  oxygen.  Such  are  the  illustrations 
which  Hegel  cites  in  this  connection. 

But  when  we  come  to  organic  nature  and 
the  more  complex  forms  of  being,  an  analysis 
into  the  elemental  parts  falls  far  short  of  a 
true  and  adequate  account  of  what  a living 
organism  essentially  consists.  All  parts  may 
be  revealed ; but  the  vital  bond  is  lacking,  — 


ESSENCE  AS  THE  GROUND  OP  EXISTENCE  165 


that  which  gives  form  and  specific  characteris- 
tics to  the  material  substratum,  whatever  it  may 
be.  It  is  the  form  as  distinct  from  the  matter 
of  being.  It  would  be  well  in  this  connection 
to  remark  in  passing  that  the  term  form,  as 
Hegel  uses  it,  signifies  not  the  completed  form 
which  might  be  conceived  as  imposed  upon 
the  thing,  but  rather  the  active  formative 
principle  which,  like  the  architectonic  princi- 
ple of  the  plant,  operates  from  within,  pro- 
ducing out  of  its  own  material  its  particular 
form  and  qualities.  To  arrive  at  the  true 
conception  of  the  term  thing,  we  must  regard 
it  as  the  synthesis  of  matter  and  of  form. 
The  thing  is  not  a meeting-point  merely  of  a 
number  of  related  material  elements,  each  of 
an  ultimate  nature ; for  the  fundamental  mate- 
rial elements  out  of  which  the  various  things 
in  the  universe  are  constituted  Hegel  con- 
ceives as  reducible  at  the  last  analysis  to  one 
and  the  same  kind  of  matter,  and  he  insists 
that  the  specific  differences  of  the  various 
kinds  of  things  arise  from  the  variety  of  the 
formative  principles  or  agencies  at  work  upon 
and  within  this  fundamental  matter.  To  go 
so  far,  however,  as  to  say  that  the  form,  or 
constructive  principle,  operates  externally  upon 


166 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  ESSENCE 


the  matter,  or  that  the  matter  is  independent 
of  the  form  in  any  sense,  would  do  violence 
to  the  Hegelian  conception.  Form  and  matter 
must  not  be  separated  in  thought ; it  is  in 
their  unity  that  the  thing  has  its  essential 
being. 

Form,  or  formative  principle,  operating  there- 
fore within  matter,  produces  many  varied  re- 
sults which  appear  as  the  essential  properties 
of  the  thing.  The  totality  of  these  properties 
represents  the  outshining  of  that  which  is  the 
essence  of  the  existing  thing  itself.  This  out- 
shining of  the  characteristic  features  of  a thing 
constitutes  its  so-called  appearance,  or  its 
phenomenal  manifestation  (die  Erscheinung') . 


CHAPTER  XII 


APPEARANCE,  OR  THE  PHENOMENAL  WORLD 

HEGEL’S  doctrine  of  the  thing  unites  two 
seemingly  contradictory  points  of  view. 
On  the  one  hand,  a thing  may  be  regarded  as 
that  which  is  one  and  individual,  as  we  would  say, 
a single  thing.  On  the  other,  however,  a thing 
may  be  regarded  equally  well  as  the  summation 
of  its  many  parts  and  properties,  coexisting  and 
correlated  in  one  and  the  same  unified  system. 
The  thing  is  thus  both  the  one  and  the  many, 
the  unitary  ground  and  the  varied  manifesta- 
tion. Thus  a plant  is  a single  thing,  but  at  the 
same  time  it  is  a complex  of  manifold  elements, 
for  into  its  composition  are  brought  together 
light,  heat,  water,  ammonia,  potash,  starch,  and 
an  indefinite  number  of  material  elements  which 
are  completely  coordinated  in  the  single  system 
which  constitutes  the  essential  being  and  life  of 
the  plant.  Such  an  assemblage  of  these  various 
elements  which  compose  the  properties  of  the 
plant  in  their  concrete  manifestation,  is  the 
167 


168 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


shining  forth  of  the  inner  essence  which  is  cen- 
tred in  the  one  ground  which  forms  their  under- 
lying unity.  This  shining  forth  of  the  inner 
nature  in  its  outer  manifestation  Hegel  calls 
die  Urscheinung . It  is  the  actual  revelation  of 
the  essence  of  a thing.  The  sum  of  such  mani- 
festations gives  us  the  world  of  phenomena.  It 
is  the  world  of  scientific  description  and  inter- 
pretation ; it  is  the  world  of  inductive  investi- 
gation, of  observation  and  experiment ; it  is  the 
world  of  exact  measurement  and  of  computa- 
tion, the  world  of  relations  and  coordinations, 
the  world  of  uniformity  and  of  law. 

The  essence,  according  to  Hegel,  is  constituted 
by  its  two  principal  moments  or  factors.  The 
one  is  a reflection  in  itself  ( Reflexion  in  sich ), 
and  the  other  is  a reflection  in  something  else 
(. Reflexion  in  Anderes).  The  one  represents  the 
central  core  and  organizing  principle  of  being ; 
the  other,  all  the  correlated  elements  associated 
essentially  with  it.  The  reflection  in  itself 
refers,  therefore,  to  that  which  constitutes  the 
essence  of  a thing ; for  example,  in  the  case  of 
a plant,  it  is  that  which  constitutes  the  plant  a 
single  thing,  its  central,  unifying  ground  and 
architectonic  principle.  The  reflection  in  some- 
thing else  refers  to  all  the  elements  which  con- 


APPEARANCE 


169 


tribute  to  the  being  and  life  of  the  plant,  and 
to  all  its  several  parts  and  its  distinctive  prop- 
erties. It  is  this  second  moment  of  essence,  the 
reflection  or  shining  forth  in  something  else, 
which  constitutes  its  phenomenal  manifesta- 
tion. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  there  can  be 
no  real  separation  between  the  essence  and  ex- 
ternal appearance,  between  the  ground  and  the 
manifestation,  between  the  noumenon  and  the 
phenomenon.  Hegel  defines  the  Erscheinung, 
therefore,  as  the  essential  manifestation.  It 
is  not  the  mere  show  ( der  Schein ),  as  distin- 
guished from  the  substance ; it  is  not  an  un- 
reality as  distinguished  from  reality ; but  it  is 
the  complete  revelation  of  all  that  is  essentially 
immanent  within.  It  is  wholly  misleading, 
therefore,  to  speak  of  mere  phenomena  as  though 
phenomena  were  only  the  passing  shadow  with 
no  corresponding  substance  underlying  them. 
It  will  be  seen  in  the  subsequent  development 
of  the  dialectic  that  every  phenomenon  in  the 
universe  represents  an  underlying  reality,  and 
so  the  category  of  phenomenal  appearance  (die 
Erscheinung ),  as  will  be  seen,  must  lead  of 
necessity  to  that  of  actuality  (die  WirklicTikeit ), 
which  forms  the  third  stage  in  the  development 


170 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


of  the  category  of  essence ; they  are  treated 
separately  for  convenience  of  exposition,  but 
not  in  reality  or  in  thought.  Hegel’s  position 
in  this  connection  is  directly  opposed  to  that  of 
Kant.  The  latter  insists  that  the  phenomenal 
has  a subjective  significance  merely,  and  he 
postulates  an  abstract  something  lying  behind 
phenomena  and  beyond  the  range  of  our  cogni- 
tion, the  indefinite  Ding  an  sick.  Hegel,  on  the 
contrary,  maintains  most  stoutly  that  all  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe  are  so  bound  up  with 
their  immanent  essences,  that  in  knowing  the 
outer  manifestation  we  must  know  also  the 
essential  ground.  We  cannot  separate  one 
from  the  other,  and  therefore  to  state  that  we 
know  only  phenomena  does  violence  to  the 
essential  nature  of  the  phenomena  themselves. 

The  doctrine  of  the  phenomenal  as  developed 
by  Hegel  may  be  presented  in  several  pairs  of 
correlative  terms.  It  is  due  to  the  fundamental 
principle  of  reflection  which  lies  at  the  base  of 
the  category  of  essence,  that  its  phenomenal 
manifestations  should  fall  together  in  pairs, 
representing  each  characteristic  in  its  own  light 
and  also  in  the  light  reflected  upon  it  by  that 
with  which  it  stands  in  essential  relation  as 
its  other. 


APPEARANCE 


171 


These  pairs  of  correlatives  are  as  follows : — 

(1)  Form  and  Content.  (Inhalt  und  Form.') 

(2)  The  Whole  and  its  Parts.  (Das  Game 
und  die  Theile.) 

(3)  Force  and  its  Phenomenal  Manifestation 
(Die  Kraft  und  die  Aeusserung.) 

(4)  Inner  and  Outer.  (Das  Innerliche  und 
das  Aeusserliche.) 

As  to  the  relation  of  form  to  content,  while 
we  may  refer  all  phenomena  to  the  underlying 
material  elements  as  the  ground  of  their  subsist- 
ence, yet  a deeper  insight  recognizes  a forma- 
tive principle  immanent  in  the  matter,  so  that 
at  the  last  analysis  the  phenomena  of  the  world 
must  be  referred  to  the  activity  of  the  inner 
constructive  principle  resident  within  the  ma- 
terial substratum  of  the  phenomena  themselves. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  while  this  inner 
principle  may  be  called  simply  the  form  of 
phenomena,  it  means  that  which  produces  the 
form  rather  than  merely  the  form  which  is  pro- 
duced. We  must  not  lose  sight  of  Hegel’s 
conception  of  the  essence  of  phenomena,  — that 
is,  an  active  principle  fundamentally  dynamic 
in  its  nature.  There  are  two  senses,  however, 
in  which  form  is  used  according  to  Hegel,  and 
which  it  is  necessary  to  keep  distinct  in  our 


172 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  ESSENCE 


minds.  It  is  used  in  the  sense  already  noted 
as  an  immanent  constructive  principle  such  as 
the  architectonic  principle  which  fashions  the 
plant  after  its  kind.  Form  in  this  sense  is 
synonymous  with  the  phrase  “ the  law  of  phe- 
nomena.” It  is  used  also  in  a different  sense, 
however,  as  signifying  that  which  in  a negative 
manner  determines  from  without  the  bounds  of 
phenomenal  manifestation,  by  assigning  to  them 
definite  limits,  such  as  the  form,  for  instance, 
which  is  given  to  a casting  by  its  enveloping 
mould. 

It  is  in  the  former  of  these  two  senses,  that 
of  a dynamic  constructive  principle,  that  the 
term  form  must  be  conceived  if  it  is  to  be 
regarded  as  one  with  the  content.  For  in- 
stance, that  which  makes  the  plant  what  it  is, 
the  sum  of  its  elements  and  its  properties,  its 
content  in  fact,  cannot  be  separated  from  the 
immanent  architectonic  principle  which  forms 
and  coordinates  these  elements  into  one  com- 
plex whole.  Phenomena  are  what  they  are  by 
virtue  of  the  inner  working  of  the  fundamental 
laws  of  their  being.  The  form,  therefore,  is  the 
content,  and  the  content  is  the  form.  Separate 
them,  and  unrelated  they  lose  their  significance. 
Form  without  content  is  empty.  Content  with- 


APPEARANCE 


173 


out  form  is  so  indeterminate  that  it  cannot  be 
grasped  as  an  object  of  knowledge.  A true 
work  of  art  is  one  in  which  form  and  content 
are  identical.  The  style  is  the  man.  The 
Iliad  has  no  poetic  content,  Hegel  insists,  if 
we  regard  it  apart  from  its  form.  This  is  true 
of  all  great  literary  creations.  A further  illus- 
tration may  be  drawn  from  the  present-day  dis- 
cussion in  reference  to  the  relation  between 
formal  and  material  logic,  — that  is,  between  the 
form  which  our  judgments  and  inferences  may 
take,  and  their  significance  as  determined  in  the 
light  of  actual  experience.  Form  in  this  con- 
nection, without  material  significance,  is  barren 
and  without  value.  In  logic  the  form  gives 
significance  to  the  content,  and  the  content  in 
turn  determines  the  form.  There  can  there- 
fore be  no  real  distinction  between  formal  and 
material  fallacies.  They  must  be  regarded  at 
the  last  analysis,  and  apart  from  verbal  and 
superficial  distinctions,  as  one  and  the  same. 

But  the  content  must  be  conceived  not  only 
as  form  which  has  developed  from  within,  but 
also  as  that  which  has  been  determined  to  a 
certain  extent  externally  by  other  forms  with 
which  it  stands  in  some  essential  relations.  Ac- 
cordingly a phenomenon  may  be  regarded  as 


174 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


composed  of  externally  related  parts,  each 
having  its  peculiar  form,  and  yet  all  parts  co- 
ordinated by  means  of  a common  bond  which 
constitutes  an  underlying  unity.  This  concep- 
tion leads  us  to  the  second  pair  of  correla- 
tives, — the  relation  of  the  whole  to  its  parts. 

The  concept  of  that  which  we  call  the  whole 
of  anything  has  its  significance  in  the  relation 
which  the  parts  sustain  one  to  another,  and  each 
to  the  combined  aggregation.  The  whole  dis- 
appears when  we  divide  it  into  its  component 
parts.  This  is  especially  true  of  organic  life.  A 
living  body  cannot  be  divided  into  its  separate 
parts,  and  restored  at  will  to  its  original  form 
and  functions.  It  is  only  the  dead  body  that 
admits  of  dissection.  The  significance  of  all 
the  parts  lies  in  their  inherence  in  one  and  the 
same  organism  and  their  codrdinated  functions 
in  reference  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole. 
The  eye  is  an  eye  so  long  as  it  is  a member  of 
the  body.  An  organ  severed  from  its  organism 
becomes  at  once  a meaningless  and  worthless 
thing. 

Hegel  draws  attention  to  the  fact  also  that 
psychologists  often  speak  erroneously  of  the 
parts  of  the  soul,  or  the  parts  of  the  mind,  as 
though  endowing  such  parts  with  a quasi  inde- 


APPEARANCE 


175 


pendence.  It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  he  is 
here  emphasizing  by  way  of  protest  a truth 
which  modern  psychology  has  most  fully  en- 
dorsed,— namely,  that  psychical  phenomena 
must  be  regarded  as  a unity,  complex  in  the 
variety  of  functional  manifestation,  it  is  true, 
but  nevertheless  one  and  not  many.  The 
traditional  theory  of  separate  psychological 
faculties  is  here  discarded  by  Hegel.  He  pro- 
tests that  there  is  not  any  separate  faculty  of 
memory,  or  of  reason,  or  of  imagination,  any 
more  than  there  is  a separate  organ  of  the  body 
whose  life  and  function  are  independent  of  the 
other  members,  and  of  the  organism  as  the 
central  unity  of  them  all. 

It  may  be  said  in  general,  therefore,  that 
the  form,  or  formative  principle,  is  essentially 
a principle  of  organization,  uniting  the  many 
into  one  and  producing  a symmetry  of  parts, 
a harmony  of  functions,  and  a congruence  of 
relations,  so  that  the  world  of  phenomena, 
whether  of  nature  or  of  mind,  may  he  conceived 
by  us  as  a world  of  order  and  of  law. 

Hegel’s  conception  of  form,  being  essentially 
dynamic,  the  bond  of  unity  which  underlies  the 
relation  of  the  whole  to  its  parts  must  be  con- 
ceived as  a formative  principle,  also  dynamic. 


176 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


The  relation  of  the  several  parts  in  any  complex 
system  one  to  another,  and  all  to  the  whole, 
must  therefore  be  mediated  — that  is,  brought 
about  — by  the  outputting  of  some  energy. 
This  dynamic  element  Hegel  calls  force  {die 
Kraft ) ; its  outputting  is  called  its  external 
manifestation  ( die  Aeusserung').  This  pair  of 
correlatives  will  be  found  necessary  to  complete 
the  idea  of  an  underlying  dynamic  basis.  Any 
phenomenon  whatsoever  from  the  standpoint  of 
its  reflection  in  itself, — that  is,  regarded  simply  in 
its  own  light,  — presents  as  its  most  evident  char- 
acteristic a central  and  essential  unity.  The 
phenomenon  appears,  therefore,  as  an  undivided 
whole.  But  from  a different  standpoint,  and 
one  that  we  dare  not  overlook,  the  phenomenon 
appears  immediately  to  break  up  into  a diversity 
of  interrelated  and  coordinated  parts.  This  is 
the  standpoint  of  a reflection  into  something 
else,  or  the  illumination  of  the  central  unity  by 
the  light  reflected  from  each  of  its  component 
parts  and  their  several  functions.  Consequently, 
that  by  which  the  one  breaks  up  into  the  many 
and  the  many  in  turn  become  unified  in  the  one, 
must  be  referred  to  some  underlying  force  which 
produces  the  specification  of  parts,  and  at  the 
same  time  holds  them  together  in  an  all-embrac- 


APPEARANCE 


177 


ing  unity  within  one  common  system.  Thus 
the  separate  organs  of  an  animal  are  developed 
through  successive  differentiations  and  integra- 
tions, separated  into  many,  yet  combined  as 
one,  and  this  is  attained  by  the  concerted 
action  of  the  vital  forces  which  are  constantly 
operative  in  the  organism,  and  which  constitute 
it  what  it  essentially  is. 

Force,  conceived  of  as  mere  force,  and  with- 
out the  additional  considerations  which  will  be 
advanced  later  under  the  category  of  the  notion, 
must  be  regarded  merely  as  a blind  force  work- 
ing without  purpose  or  intelligence.  As  thus 
conceived,  it  would  require  for  its  activity,  accord- 
ing to  Hegel,  a special  vehicle,  as  magnetic  force 
seemed  to  require  the  presence  of  iron ; it  would, 
moreover,  be  brought  into  activity  only  by  some 
special  solicitation,  such  as  the  presence  of  some 
other  force  upon  which  it  is  dependent.  Thus, 
every  force  would  seem  to  be  dependent  upon 
some  other,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  Thus,  force 
from  this  point  of  view  must  be  regarded  as 
essentially  finite,  because  it  is  necessarily  de- 
pendent and  restricted. 

To  speak,  therefore,  of  God  as  force  merely, 
though  it  may  be  writ  large,  FORCE,  is  never- 
theless an  extremely  impoverished  conception  of 

N 


178 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


the  fulness  of  the  divine  attributes.  This  was 
the  fundamental  error  in  Herder’s  general  concep- 
tion of  God.  For  the  category  of  force  must  be 
complemented  by  the  category  of  a final  cause, 
thus  introducing  the  conception  of  an  activity 
that  is  self-determining  and  purposeful. 

Moreover,  Hegel  insists  with  characteristic 
consistency  as  regards  his  method  and  general 
point  of  view  that  the  idea  of  force  must  not 
be  divorced  in  our  thoughts  from  its  outer 
manifestation.  It  is  of  the  very  essence  of  force 
to  manifest  itself.  Force  and  its  manifestation 
are  one  and  the  same.  It  is  misleading,  there- 
fore, to  state  that  force  in  itself  is  unknowable. 
It  is  knowable,  but  only  in  its  manifestation ; but 
the  manifestation  is  the  essential  expression  of 
what  the  force  itself  really  is. 

The  final  relation,  that  of  the  inner  to  the 
outer,  is  a relation  which  follows  logically  from 
that  of  force  and  its  manifestation.  Force  in 
its  essential  nature  represents  the  inner,  and 
its  manifestation  of  course  represents  the  outer. 
The  two  are  essentially  identical.  Mere  exter- 
nality or  mere  internality  are  expressions  which 
represent  an  empty  and  meaningless  abstraction, 
and  nothing  more. 

It  is  customary  to  regard  the  essence  of  a 


APPEARANCE 


179 


thing  as  merely  that  which  is  inward.  It  must 
be  remembered,  however,  that  it  is  of  the  in- 
herent nature  of  the  essence  to  reveal  itself  in 
some  form  of  external  manifestation.  As  an 
illustration  of  this  erroneous  point  of  view, 
Hegel  cites  the  poet  Haller.  The  lines  of  Hal- 
ler, which,  by  the  way,  Hegel  quotes  incorrectly, 
are : — 

“Ins  Innere  der  Natur 

Dringt  kein  erschaffener  Geist 

Zu  gliicklich  wann  sie  noch  die  aussere  Schale 
weist.” 1 

With  these  words  of  Haller  there  may  be 
compared  the  indignant  comment  of  Goethe, 
which  runs  as  follows  : — 

“ ‘ Ins  Innere  der  Natur  ’ — 

O du  Philister ! — 

‘ Dringt  kein  erschaffener  Geist.’ 

Mich  und  Geschwister 
Mogt  ihr  an  solches  Wort 
Nur  nicht  erinnern ; 

Wir  denken  : Ort  fur  Ort 
Sind  wir  im  Innern. 

* Gliickselig  wem  sie  nur 
Die  aussere  Schale  weist ! ’ 

Das  hore  ich  sechzig  Jahre  wiederholen 
Ich  fluche  darauf,  aber  verstohlen. 

Sage  mir  tausend  tausend  Male  : 

Alles  giebt  sie  reichlich  und  gern ; 

i § 140. 


180 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


Natur  hat  weder  Kern 
Noch  Schale, 

Alles  ist  sie  mit  einem  Male ; 

Dich  priife  du  nur  allermeist 
Ob  du  Kern  oder  Schale  seist.” 1 

Thus,  as  a man  seems  to  be  outwardly,  so  is 
he  inwardly.  What  a man  is,  he  does ; and  what 
he  does,  manifests  what  he  is.  If  his  morality, 
Hegel  insists,  is  a matter  of  inner  intention 
merely,  and  if  it  never  bears  fruit  in  any  exter- 
nal word  or  deed,  then  the  inner  purpose,  how- 
ever noble  it  may  be,  loses  its  significance  and 
worth.  It  is  the  understanding  again  which 
seeks  to  separate  the  inner  from  the  outer. 
Thus  conceived,  they  become  merely  empty 
abstractions. 

Hegel  draws  attention  in  this  connection  to 
a tendency  which  seems  to  operate  in  ignoble 
minds  to  decry  and  belittle  the  great  and  heroic 

1 “ ‘ Into  the  inner  depths  of  nature  ’ — oh  ! thou  Philistine 

— ‘ no  created  mind  can  penetrate.  ’ To  me  and  mine  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  recall  such  a thought.  We  think  that 
place  for  place  we  are  in  the  inward  parts.  ‘ Happy  the 
man  to  whom  nature  merely  shows  her  outward  shell.’  I 
have  heard  this  repeated  for  sixty  years  and  curse  it  withal, 

— but  in  secret.  I say  to  myself  a thousand  thousand  times : 
Nature  gives  everything  lavishly  and  with  good  will.  She 
has  neither  kernel  nor  shell.  She  is  at  the  same  time  both 
the  one  and  the  other.  Only,  above  all  things,  test  thyself 
whether  kernel  or  shell  thou  may’st  prove  to  be.” 


APPEARANCE 


181 


deeds  of  history  by  insinuating  that  the  ex- 
ternal action  may  not  have  a corresponding 
motive  of  nobility  within.  “ If  the  heroes  of 
history,”  says  Hegel,  “had  been  actuated  by 
subjective  and  formal  interests  alone,  they 
never  would  have  accomplished  what  they  have. 
And  if  we  have  due  regard  to  the  unity  between 
the  inner  and  the  outer,  we  must  own  that 
great  men  purposed  to  do  what  they  did,  and 
that  they  did  what  they  purposed.”1 

From  any  point  which  we  may  choose  to 
view  it,  the  distinction  between  inner  and  outer 
is  resolved  in  a higher  unity  into  which  they 
are  merged  as  one  and  the  same.  It  is  through 
the  manifestation  of  force  that  every  inner  is 
necessarily  constrained  ( gesetzt ) to  show  itself 
as  outer.  Their  distinction  is  to  be  regarded 
only  as  a necessary  moment  in  the  expression 
of  their  absolute  identity.  We  speak  of  the 
relation  of  inner  to  outer  as  though  they  were 
contrasted  terms  of  a ratio.  Their  relation  is, 
however,  that  of  a unity,  in  which  the  seem- 
ingly contrasted  terms  merge  into  one.  Their 
distinction  merely  serves  to  emphasize  the 
dynamic  process,  by  which  the  manifestation  of 
the  essence  is  mediated,  and  yet  this  is  in  no 
*§  141. 


182 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


wise  contradictory  to  tlieir  underlying  unity  as 
embraced  in  one  and  the  same  system. 

The  identity  of  inner  and  outer,  of  force  and 
its  manifestation,  constitutes  the  category  of 
actuality  ( die  Wirklichkeii) . This  brings  us 
to  the  final  and  most  complete  expression  of 
the  nature  of  essence;  and  this  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  the  following  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


ACTUALITY,  OR  THE  REAL  WORLD 


CTUALITY  is  defined  by  Hegel  as  the 


unity  of  essence  and  its  manifestation,  or 
the  unity  of  inner  and  outer.  It  is  incorrect 
to  conceive  the  inner  as  the  actual,  and  the 
outer  as  merely  the  phenomenal,  the  fleeting, 
the  unreal.  The  actual  is  the  essence  as  it 
reveals  its  innermost  being  through  external 
manifestation ; it  is  the  noumenal  as  it  discloses 
its  nature  in  the  phenomenal.  It  is  a false  con- 
ception, also,  to  regard  the  external  expression 
of  that  which  is  actual  as  the  result  of  a transi- 
tion from  a preceding  state  of  quiescent  being 
to  its  outer  manifestation,  though  the  mediation 
of  some  force  which  acts  in  an  external  manner. 
The  actual  is  not  something  which  is  produced, 
turned  out  as  if  by  a machine,  and  therefore  to 
be  regarded  as  a mere  product.  It  is  rather 
that  which  is  self-producing.  It  is  not  merely 
the  result  of  a process  of  development.  It 
is  the  energizing  force  which  underlies  that 


183 


184 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  ESSENCE 


process  as  well.  We  have  already  seen  that, 
according  to  Hegel’s  general  conception  of  his 
system,  the  complete  cosmic  process  is  to  be 
conceived  as  the  expression  of  reason,  and  that 
reason  is  essentially  the  creative,  constructive, 
and  sustaining  force  in  the  universe.  But  this 
conception  may  also  be  regarded  as  the  essen- 
tial characterization  of  the  actual,  or  the  real. 
The  two  points  of  view  are  in  reality  one  and 
the  same,  and  their  significance  may  be  summed 
up  in  the  Hegelian  formula : “ The  real  is  the 
rational,  and  the  rational  is  the  real.” 

It  is  absurd,  therefore,  to  draw  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  unreality  of  thought  and  the 
reality  of  all  objective  phenomena.  It  is 
utterly  misleading  to  say,  therefore,  that  while 
an  idea  may  be  good,  or  true,  that  it  cannot  be 
realized  in  actual  experience.  Such  a diremp- 
tion  of  the  world  of  ideas  from  the  world  of 
reality,  Hegel  insists,  can  arise  only  in  the 
sphere  of  the  abstract  understanding,  — that 
separating  function  of  the  mind,  which  is  devoid 
of  all  synthetic  capacity  and  unifying  power. 

There  is  a popular  misconception  that  Plato 
recognized  the  idea  and  only  the  idea,  as  the 
truth,  and  that  Aristotle,  on  the  other  hand, 
rejected  the  idea,  and  retained  only  the  actual. 


ACTUALITY 


185 


The  true  conception  of  the  relation  between 
these  two  masters  of  Greek  thought  is  this : 
that  while  the  actual  is  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple in  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle,  neverthe- 
less, the  actual  with  him  is  not  merely  the 
brute  fact  immediately  at  hand,  but  it  embraces 
the  idea  as  actuality  also,  which  serves  both  to 
interpret  and  explain  the  given  facts  of  con- 
sciousness. Aristotle  characterized  the  idea  of 
Plato  as  a mere  Si uva/us,  — that  is,  a mere  poten- 
tiality, — and  insisted  that  the  idea  must  be  con- 
ceived essentially  as  it  reveals  itself  in  its 
manifestation,  — that  is,  as  eWpyeta.  He  there- 
fore defines  reality  as  an  entelechy  (eWeYeyeta)  — 
that  is,  the  self-realization  of  the  essence  in  the 
phenomena.1  By  this  conception  Aristotle  rec- 
onciled the  antithesis  between  the  Eleatic  and 
the  Heraclitean  points  of  view.  Hegel’s  posi- 
tion is  substantially  the  same  as  that  of  Aris- 
totle ; for  in  his  system  throughout  there  is  a 
fundamental  recognition  of  the  necessity  of 
combining  in  one  the  complementary  elements 
of  potentiality  and  actuality.  From  this  point 
of  view  the  dialectic  movement  may  be  defined 
merely  as  a process  of  transition  from  the  poten- 
tial to  the  actual. 

1 See  Windelband’s  History  of  Philosophy , Eng.  tr.,  p.  139  f. 


186 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  ESSENCE 


Approaching  now  a more  careful  analysis  of 
the  concept  of  actuality,  we  find  that  its  primary 
and  most  fundamental  element  is  the  idea  of 
possibility  (die  Mo  glichkeit) . The  possible,  ac- 
cording to  Hegel,  is  an  essential  moment  in 
every  actual  phenomenon.  It  is,  however,  not 
to  be  confused  with  the  barren  possibility  of 
mere  fancy.  In  the  world  of  the  imagination, 
all  things  are  possible.  It  is  possible  that  the 
moon  might  fall  into  the  earth.  Caesar  might 
not  have  crossed  the  Rubicon.  Charles  I of 
England  might  have  been  exiled  instead  of 
beheaded.  Napoleon  might  have  been  killed 
at  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  All  such  possibil- 
ities of  the  imagination  must  rank  as  footless 
speculations.  The  name  given  to  them  by 
Hegel  is  that  of  formal  possibilities,  that  is, 
having  the  mere  form  or  outer  shell  of  reality. 
A possibility,  however,  to  which  some  signifi- 
cance is  attached,  and  which  may  be  called 
a significant  possibility  to  distinguish  it  from 
the  merely  formal  possibility,  must  always  be 
regarded  as  the  preliminary  stage  of  every  form 
of  development  which  in  the  very  process  of  its 
unfolding  reveals  the  necessity  to  which  the 
potential  must  have  been  subjected  in  order 
to  push  itself  forth  into  the  actual.  Such  a 


ACTUALITY 


187 


possibility  may  be  called  also  with  appropriate- 
ness, real  or  actual  possibility. 

Actuality,  however,  considered  apart  from  its 
inner  potentiality  as  its  essential  ground,  pre- 
sents to  us  only  its  external  face.  Looking  at 
it  from  this  point  of  view  exclusively,  we  find 
ourselves  confronted  with  the  external  aspect 
of  actuality  which  immediately  discloses  the 
category  of  contingency  (die  Zvfalligkeit)  as 
its  basal  characteristic.  The  contingent  refers 
to  the  external  relation  which  obtains  between 
phenomena. 

This  relation  may  be  such  that  one  phenom- 
enon depends  externally  upon  some  other  phe- 
nomenon so  that  the  one  forms  the  condition  of 
the  other.  The  idea  of  the  contingent  when 
definitely  expressed  in  a concrete  relation  is 
thus  to  be  regarded  as  the  condition  (die  Be- 
dingung ) upon  the  presence  or  absence  of  which 
depends  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  phe- 
nomenon which  is  related  to  it. 

The  role  of  a phenomenon  which  fulfils  the 
function  of  a condition  may  be  characterized  as 
follows : It  is  a special  existence,  an  imme- 
diate thing ; it  has  also  a vocation,  as  it  were, 
to  be  destroyed  in  its  primary  form  in  order  to 
conserve  the  realization  of  something  else.  As 


188 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


such  it  fulfils  its  own  destiny,  and  although 
dying  in  its  own  individuality,  it  lives  in  an- 
other, and  the  other  form  for  which  it  was  evi- 
dently designed  by  its  own  nature  is  so  near 
of  kin  that  it  may  be  properly  regarded  as  its 
own  true  self.  In  other  words,  to  use  an  He- 
gelian expression,  the  condition  is  aufgehoben  in 
the  resulting  phenomenon  to  which  it  gives 
rise,  and  into  whose  actuality  its  own  essence 
enters  and  is  there  conserved.  When,  however, 
the  point  of  view  is  not  exclusively  confined 
to  the  external  manifestation,  hut  when  the 
external  manifestation  is  regarded  as  the  neces- 
sary development  of  an  inner  organizing  activ- 
ity which  has  been  characterized  as  the  real 
possibility,  or  the  possibility  regarded  as  the 
potential  of  reality,  then  the  potential,  the 
process,  and  the  resulting  product  may  be  con- 
ceived as  constituting  together  the  actual  fact. 
The  actual  fact,  moreover,  embraces  all  the 
purely  external  relations  of  contingency,  includ- 
ing all  the  conditions  which  both  contribute  to 
and  are  merged  in  the  actual  fact  itself. 

In  such  a process,  wherein  on  one  side  the 
potential  tends  to  become  actual,  and  on  the 
other  the  purely  external  conditions  themselves 
contribute  to  the  process  as  essential  factors, 


ACTUALITY 


189 


and  so  far  forth  lose  the  external  character  of 
their  relations,  — in  such  a process  the  develop- 
ment reveals  some  underlying  necessity  which 
expresses  itself  as  a law  of  uniformity  and  uni- 
versality. Hegel  defines  the  idea  of  necessity, 
( die  Nothwendigkeit ) as  the  unity  of  the  potential 
and  the  actual.  The  development  of  the  one 
into  the  other  we  are  constrained  to  believe  must 
take  place,  and  that  it  must  take  place  in  some 
one  definite  way  rather  than  in  any  other.  That 
is  what  is  meant  by  necessity.  Necessity  signi- 
fies something  more  than  that  one  thing  has  been 
derived  from  another.  The  idea  of  derivation 
does  not  exhaust  the  meaning  of  necessity.  What 
is  merely  derivative  is  a product  which  is  what 
it  is,  not  through  itself  but  through  something 
else.  That  which  is  necessary  contains  the 
additional  idea  that  it  must  be  what  it  is 
through  itself  and  through  the  activity  of  its 
own  inner  processes ; and  even  if  it  is  deriva- 
tive, it  must  still  contain  the  antecedent  whence 
it  is  derived  as  a vanishing  element  within 
itself.  The  necessary  is  something  which  is 
mediated  ( vermittelt ) and  yet  mediated  through 
that  which  belongs  to  itself,  — that  is,  mediated 
by  the  inner  constraint  of  its  own  nature.  Such 
an  inner  determination  which  arises  from  the 


190 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


very  nature  of  a thing  itself,  Hegel  refers  to  as 
gesetzt.  Any  characteristic,  according  to  Hegel, 
is  said  to  be  gesetzt  when  it  can  be  shown  as  the 
necessary  outcome  of  the  very  nature  of  the 
object  to  which  it  is  referred.  Whenever  that 
which  is  given  in  thought  leads  by  the  very 
necessity  of  the  thought  processes  themselves 
to  a conclusion  dependent  upon  it  as  its 
premise,  the  resulting  conclusion  is  always 
described  by  Hegel  as  gesetzt.  All  phases  of 
the  dialectic  process  are  gesetzt  in  the  sense  of 
following  by  a necessary  constraint  of  thought 
from  the  very  nature  of  that  which  precedes 
them.  This  term  is  so  intimately  associated  with 
the  idea  of  necessity  which  underlies  the  whole 
dialectic  movement  of  thought  that  it  has  seemed 
worth  while  to  explain  it  somewhat  at  length. 

The  contingent  represented  by  an  external 
condition  of  a fact  is  not  merely  a condition 
external  to  the  fact  and  sustaining  only  a pass- 
ing relation  to  it ; it  must  be  conceived  also  as 
an  essential  element  of  the  fact  itself.  The 
condition  and  the  fact  fall  together  in  one  and 
the  same  system.  It  is  the  business  of  philoso- 
phy to  reveal  the  necessity  which,  although  at 
a far  deeper  level,  nevertheless  always  under- 
lies the  contingent. 


ACTUALITY 


191 


It  is  again  the  work  of  the  abstract  under- 
standing which  draws  a sharp  line  of  distinction 
between  the  idea  of  necessity  and  that  of  free- 
dom ( die  Freiheit).  When  we  regard  all 
phenomena  as  necessitated,  ourselves  included, 
we  at  first  sight  seem  to  occupy,  as  Hegel  puts 
it,  “a  thoroughly  slavish  and  dependent  posi- 
tion.”1 It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however, 
that  any  kind  of  freedom  which  is  wholly  devoid 
of  the  element  of  necessity  is  nothing  more  or 
less  than  mere  caprice.  There  is  such  a thing 
as  a perfectly  free  activity  which  nevertheless 
recognizes  the  inherent  law  of  its  own  being, 
and  endeavors  freely  to  realize  it.  Such  free- 
dom is  the  only  true  freedom.  Were  a man  to 
feel  that  he  is  under  the  spell  of  an  inevitable 
fate  and  that  he  is  not  in  the  remotest  degree 
dependent  upon  his  own  exertions,  then  it 
would  follow  that  all  his  activities  would  be- 
come paralyzed,  and  he  would  find  himself  out 
of  harmony  with  the  world  system  of  which  he 
is  a part.  To  realize,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
he  is  the  architect  of  his  own  fortune  and  the 
master  of  his  fate,  is  to  inspire  him  with  the 
earnest  desire  and  strong  purpose  to  realize 
the  best  that  is  in  him.  Hegel  holds  that  the 
i § 147. 


192 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


individuality  of  man  is  so  embraced  in  the 
absolute  universal  as  to  be  conserved  and  not 
destroyed.  This  conception  will  be  more  fully 
developed  when  we  come  to  the  exposition  of 
the  notion,  which  in  its  highest  expression  is 
the  divine  reason  to  which  all  personalities 
owe  their  being,  and  which  constitutes  at  the 
same  time  the  charter  of  their  freedom. 

Necessity,  then,  is  the  expression  of  that 
binding  connection  which  links  together  condi- 
tion, fact,  and  activity  in  one  and  the  same 
system,  and  the  question  naturally  suggests 
itself,  What  is  the  fundamental  nature  of 
that  system  which  exhibits  the  underlying  ne- 
cessity as  a bond  uniting  all  of  its  essential 
elements  together?  Hegel’s  answer  to  this 
question,  as  might  be  surmised,  is  a threefold 
one.  He  views  the  idea  of  necessity  under  the 
following  categories : — 

(1)  Substantiality.  ( Die  Substantialitat.') 

(2)  Causality.  (Zh'e  Kausalitat.') 

(3)  Reciprocal  activity.  ( Die  Wechselwir- 

kung .) 

These  categories  express  the  several  possible 
ways  by  which  any  fact  is  connected  with  its 
corresponding  condition  through  some  mediat- 
ing activity. 


ACTUALITY 


193 


The  category  of  substantiality  is  the  immedi- 
ate and  primary  form  which  the  relation  of 
necessity  assumes  in  connecting  every  potential 
state  of  development  with  its  corresponding 
actual.  The  actual  which  is  present  as  a fact, 
appears  and  then  disappears  ; for  a fact  regarded 
as  a mere  fact,  and  a separate  existence  re- 
garded merely  as  a separate  existence,  have  no 
permanency.  Such  facts  rise  and  fall  again  ; 
they  are  and  again  are  not.  There  is  a per- 
petual ebb  and  flow,  growth  and  decay,  through- 
out all  nature. 

“ Our  little  systems  have  their  day, 

They  have  their  day  and  cease  to  be.” 

But  underlying  all  these  ephemeral  forms  and 
evanescent  properties,  there  is  nevertheless 
some  underlying  basis  which  remains  absolutely 
constant.  This  is  the  fundamental  substance. 
Upon  its  surface  all  things  appear  in  their  brief 
moment  of  individuality.  They  sink  again 
into  the  all-absorbing  element  whence  they 
arose.  Their  fleeting  existence  marks  them  as 
the  veriest  accidents  of  being  in  contrast  to  the 
stability  which  characterizes  the  substance  of 
which  they  are  but  the  passing  modes.  They 
are  the  many ; the  substance  is  the  one.  This 
distinction  corresponds  to  that  which  was  drawn 


194 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


between  the  whole  and  its  parts  already  re- 
ferred to  in  the  preceding  chapter  upon  the 
nature  of  the  phenomenal  world. 

Hegel’s  conception  of  substance  bears  upon 
its  face  the  stamp  of  Spinoza.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a radical  point  of  departure,  inasmuch  as 
Spinoza  ascribes  no  reality  to  the  phenomenal 
world.  The  Erscheinung  is  merely  Schein, — 
that  is,  the  phenomenal  is  only  an  illusion,  and 
possesses  no  separate  individuality  of  its  own. 
Hegel  suggests  that  this  is  an  oriental  strain 
which  has  appeared  in  Spinoza’s  thinking  owing 
to  his  Hebrew  ancestry.  Hegel  himself  enters 
a protest  against  the  elimination  of  the  idea 
of  a real  individuality.  In  this  connection 
he  introduces  into  his  system  the  principle  of 
individuality,  as  insisted  upon  by  Leibniz  in 
opposition  to  Spinoza. 

At  this  point  Hegel  also  emphasizes  the  im- 
propriety of  calling  Spinoza  an  atheist.  His 
infidelity  is  not  toward  God  so  much  as  toward 
the  world.  His  system  is  essentially  one  of 
acosmism.  He  denied  the  reality  of  the  world ; 
and  in  losing  the  world  lost  his  own  soul  at  the 
same  time,  for  the  unreality  of  the  Ego  follows 
logically  from  the  unreality  of  the  world  of 
which  it  forms  a part. 


ACTUALITY 


195 


In  the  passage  in  which  Hegel  criticises  the 
defects  of  Spinoza’s  system,1  there  is  clearly 
revealed  on  Hegel’s  part  the  desire  to  save 
his  own  system  from  a pantheistic  drift.  He 
there  disclaims  most  stoutly  any  profession  of 
pantheism.  It  is  a question,  of  course,  whether 
his  system  as  a whole  may  not  logically  lead 
to  pantheistic  conclusions,  despite  its  author’s 
protests  to  the  contrary.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a 
fact  which  is  most  significant,  that  Hegel  did 
not  himself  judge  that  his  system  necessarily 
demanded  a pantheistic  interpretation.  And 
this  fact  should  not  be  ignored  in  a criticism  of 
Hegel’s  general  position.  In  the  third  part  of 
the  Logic,  moreover,  Hegel  maintains  that  the 
Absolute  is  more  than  mere  substance,  for  in 
the  doctrine  of  the  notion  the  supreme  reason 
or  God  is  regarded  as  subject  rather  than  sub- 
stance, a personality  rather  than  an  empty  and 
indefinite  abstraction.  Without  this  qualifica- 
tion the  substance  of  Spinoza  would  be,  as 
Hegel  puts  it,  “ merely  the  universal  all-devour- 
ing [ negative ] power,  like  a vast,  dark,  and 
boundless  abyss,  into  which  all  things  sink  and 
are  forever  lost.”2 

Hegel’s  conception  of  substance  marks  but  a 
1 § 151,  Zusatz.  2 § 151. 


196 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


preliminary  stage  which  must  he  further  devel- 
oped and  supplemented.  The  Hegelian  sub- 
stance, regarded  merely  as  substance,  while 
constant  and  abiding  is  nevertheless  only  static. 
The  individual  manifestations  of  the  phenom- 
enal occur  in  connection  with  it,  proceeding 
from  it  and  again  returning  to  it.  But  sub- 
stance, as  such,  lacks  the  dynamic  power  to 
initiate  action,  and  to  produce  the  results  flow- 
ing from  it.  That  which  is  thus  connected 
with  it  is  still  only  accidental  in  reference  to 
it.  And  therefore  the  concept  of  substance  is 
necessitated  by  the  inner  constraint  of  thought 
to  develop  the  idea  of  causality  inherently  con- 
nected with  it.  The  substance  becomes  cause  ; 
the  static  passes  over  into  the  dynamic.  The 
relation  of  substance  and  accident  (that  is,  of 
substance  to  any  one  of  the  properties  connected 
with  it  and  which  rank  as  accidents  in  reference 
to  it)  we  may  regard  as  corresponding  to  the 
relation  already  discussed,  — that  of  the  whole 
to  its  parts.  In  a similar  manner,  also,  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect  may  be  considered 
as  corresponding  to  that  of  force  and  its  mani- 
festation. 

The  German  word  for  cause,  die  Ursache, 
indicates  an  original  or  originating  element. 


ACTUALITY 


197 


Cause  in  this  sense  is  to  be  regarded  as  a causa 
sui.  It  possesses,  from  this  point  of  view,  the 
capacity  of  initiation,  and  of  producing  its  effect 
as  the  necessary  consequence  of  its  own  being 
and  activity.  From  one  point  of  view  cause  and 
effect  are  distinct  terms.  But  this  represents 
a finite  and  abstract  view  of  their  relations, 
such  as  is  the  result  of  the  mere  understanding. 
From  a more  comprehensive  point  of  view  the 
two  terms,  which  seem  to  be  distinct,  in  reality 
fall  together  as  one.  The  cause  reveals  itself 
as  a cause  only  so  far  as  it  is  manifested  in  the 
effect.  And  the  effect  has  significance  as  an 
effect  only  so  far  as  it  is  seen  to  be  connected 
with  its  cause.  In  a sense,  we  speak  of  the 
rain  as  the  cause  of  the  dampness  of  the 
ground,  and  yet  a deeper  consideration  reveals 
the  fact  that  the  dampness  is  the  rain  itself, 
only  in  another  form.  The  rain  causes  the 
dampness  and  it  is  the  dampness.  The  effect, 
therefore,  is  merely  the  manifestation  of  the 
activity  of  the  cause.  The  cause  is  conserved  in 
the  effect  and  the  effect  is  potential  in  the  cause. 

Although  the  relation  which  obtains  between 
the  cause  and  the  effect  may  be  regarded  as  a 
transition  from  one  state  to  another,  with  an 
accompanying  conservation  of  the  former  state 


198 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


in  the  latter,  nevertheless  there  is  nothing  to 
limit  this  process  and  so  render  it  thoroughly 
satisfactory  as  a final  account  of  the  matter. 
Cause  leads  to  effect,  and  the  effect  in  turn 
becomes  a cause,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  Thus, 
the  causal  relation  may  be  traced  backward 
from  a given  effect  to  its  cause,  and  the  cause 
of  that  cause,  and  so  on  without  limit,  or  for- 
ward from  effect  to  effect  also  without  limit. 
There  seems  to  be  no  starting-point  and  no  end. 
As  thus  stated,  the  doctrine  of  causation  is  in- 
complete, and  therefore  most  unsatisfactory.  A 
natural  complement  to  this  conception  of  causa- 
tion is  one  that  is  found  growing  out  of  its 
very  limitations,  and  is  known  as  the  doctrine 
of  reciprocal  activity,  or  the  relation  of  action 
and  reaction. 

Causation,  therefore,  is  to  be  regarded,  accord- 
ing to  Hegel,  as  finding  its  most  complete  ex- 
pression in  the  concept  of  reciprocal  activity 
(die  Wechselwirkung'),  which  represents  the  rela- 
tion obtaining  between  cause  and  effect  as  con- 
sisting of  a mutual  interaction.  The  cause 
produces  the  effect,  and  yet  the  effect  in  turn 
reacts  upon  the  cause  in  such  a manner  that 
the  cause  is  as  much  a product  of  the  effect 
as  the  effect  is  of  the  cause. 


ACTUALITY 


199 


This  principle  of  interaction  is  best  illus- 
trated by  the  reciprocal  relations  which  parts  of 
one  and  the  same  organism  sustain  to  each 
other,  — for  example,  in  the  human  body  the 
several  organs  are  related  in  a reciprocal  man- 
ner, so  that  they  function  in  such  a way  as 
to  act  and  react  upon  one  another,  in  an 
indefinite  variety  of  manifestations.  Hegel 
draws  attention  also  to  the  relation  of  the 
character  and  customs  of  a people  to  their 
constitution,  and  insists  that  this  always  is  of 
the  nature  of  a reciprocal  relation.  The  con- 
stitution is  in  a sense  the  outgrowth  and  the 
expression  of  the  national  character,  but  from 
another  point  of  view  the  national  character  is 
intimately  affected  and  modified  by  the  consti- 
tution. So  also  we  often  say  that  drunkenness 
causes  poverty;  it  is  quite  as  true  that  pov- 
erty causes  drunkenness.  There  are  instances, 
therefore,  as  indicated  by  these  illustrations, 
wherein  the  cause  in  question  does  not  lead 
to  an  endless  causal  progression  or  regression, 
but  the  causal  series  in  such  cases  is  to  be 
conceived  no  longer  as  a line  extending  with- 
out limit  in  either  direction,  but  as  a line 
which  bends  backward  upon  itself,  represent- 
ing the  reacting  influence  of  the  effect  upon 


200 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ESSENCE 


the  supposed  cause.  This  connection  being 
established,  the  circulatory  movement  of  causa- 
tion always  works  back  again  to  the  starting- 
point.  Within  the  bounds  of  this  circle  there 
is  disclosed  a certain  kind  of  self-sufficiency. 
Cause  and  effect  fall  together  in  one  and  the 
same  area,  and  in  their  mutual  dependence 
they  are  nevertheless  independent  of  ever3>-- 
thing  else.  The  cause  finds  in  the  effect,  not 
merely  its  other,  but  its  own  real  self.  Cause 
is  not  one  thing,  and  the  effect  something 
which  is  outside  of  the  cause,  and  externally 
related  to  it.  They  together  form  one  closed 
system.  From  this  point  of  view,  cause  must 
be  conceived  as  possessing  in  a measure  the 
power  of  initiative,  of  self-direction,  and  self- 
construction. It  ranks  no  longer  as  a mere 
force  resident  in  some  underlying  substance. 
It  rises  to  the  higher  dignity  of  proceeding 
from  a source  which  partakes  of  the  nature 
of  a subject  rather  than  a substance.  The 
underlying  necessity,  a self-imposed  necessity, 
is  such  as  to  form  a natural  transition  to 
that  which  is,  therefore,  actually  the  expression 
of  the  truest  kind  of  freedom. 

The  highest  form  of  substance  we  have 
found  to  be  that  of  cause.  The  highest  form 


ACTUALITY 


201 


of  cause  is  that  of  reciprocal  action  and  re- 
action. The  highest  form  of  reciprocal  action 
is  that  which  passes  over  into  self-directed 
and  self-determined  action.  The  transition 
now  is  a natural  and  easy  one  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  notion  ( der  Begriff ),  the  self-directing 
formative  principle  of  reason  which  is  the 
underlying  and  essential  principle  of  all  being. 
This  transition  from  the  category  of  essence 
to  that  of  the  notion  may  be  expressed  in  a 
word,  — it  is  a transition  from  the  idea  of 
substance  to  that  of  subject ; from  the  idea 
of  necessity  to  that  of  freedom. 


PART  III 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 


Der  Begriff  ist  das  Princip  alles  Lebens  und  damit 
zugleich  das  schlechthin  Konkrete.  Der  Begriff  ist  das 
den  Dingen  selbst  Innewohnende  ; wodurch  sie  das 
sind,  was  sie  sind.  Die  Idee  ist  die  Wahrheit ; denn 
die  Walirlieit  ist  diess,  dass  die  Objektivitat  dem 
Begriffe  entspricht.  — Hegel. 


PART  III 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THE  NOTION 
E have  followed  the  dialectic  movement 


through  the  various  stages  of  the  cate- 
gories of  being  and  of  essence,  and  have  found 
the  development  logically  continuous  and  pro- 
gressive. Its  most  complete  expression,  as 
reached  by  our  investigation  thus  far,  has  re- 
vealed a fundamental  factor  which  is  not  merely 
a determining  factor,  but  a self-determining 
factor  as  well.  Hegel’s  Begriff , which  we  will 
translate  by  the  word  notion,  is  nothing  more 
or  less  than  this  complete  expression  of  all  that 
is  contained  in  the  categories  of  being  and  of 
essence.  Hegel  calls  the  notion  the  truth  of 
being  and  of  essence.  It  is  the  underlying 
substratum  of  all  things,  needing  no  support 
itself  because  self-supporting ; requiring  no 
further  explanation  of  itself  because  self-ex- 


205 


206  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

planatory ; dependent  upon  no  external  deter- 
mination because  it  is  self-determined. 

We  have  already  discussed  the  category  of 
form,  and  have  seen  that  Hegel  uses  this  term 
always  to  signify  a constructive  formative  prin- 
ciple essentially  dynamic  in  its  nature.  By  the 
term  notion  he  means  not  only  that  which  is 
the  source  of  this  dynamic  principle,  but  also 
that  which  is  at  the  same  time  a self-sufficient 
source.  He  has  advanced  from  the  conception 
of  form  as  the  principle  of  activity  to  that  of 
form  as  the  principle  of  self-activity. 

The  notion,  moreover,  is  not  to  be  conceived 
as  merely  a form  of  the  understanding,  ranking 
as  a logical  concept  such  as  our  idea  of  a uni- 
versal class  or  group  of  objects,  as  of  man,  dog, 
horse,  and  the  like.  Such  a group  or  class  idea, 
ranking  merely  as  a formal  concept,  is  the 
veriest  skeleton  of  thought.  It  is  dead,  empty, 
— wholly  abstract,  as  Hegel  would  put  it.  The 
notion,  on  the  contrary,  is  most  thoroughly 
concrete,  — that  is,  it  is  thought  as  an  active 
constructive  and  productive  force.  It  has  more 
than  a mere  subjective  value.  It  is  not  a mere 
idea  in  the  mind.  The  true  thought  is  a force, 
and  the  true  force  is  self-determining  and  self- 
active ; all  other  thoughts  and  all  other  forces 


THE  GENEBAL  NATUBE  OF  THE  NOTION  207 


are  but  the  shadows  of  reality.  The  true 
thought  manifests  itself  in  some  external  man- 
ner, in  the  inventions  of  the  mechanician,  in 
the  institutions  of  the  state,  in  the  charities  of 
the  church,  in  the  paintings  and  statues  of  the 
artist,  in  the  deeds  great  and  small  of  human 
beings,  who  think,  and  plan,  and  act  withal. 
Hegel  regards  the  notion  as  the  living  spirit  of 
ail  that  is  actual,  pervading  and  dominating  all 
forms  of  life  and  all  phases  of  activity,  from 
the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  and  from  the 
lowest  to  the  highest.  The  standpoint  is  evi- 
dently one  of  absolute  idealism.  The  chief  and 
most  characteristic  feature  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  notion  is  that  of  subjectivity,  for  Hegel 
says  again  and  again  that  the  underlying  sub- 
stance of  the  universe  as  conceived  by  Spinoza 
should  be  a subject  and  not  a substance.  The 
notion  he  calls,  therefore,  the  Ego,  — that  is,  the 
underlying  power  beneath,  and  in  all  things  is 
also  a personality.  It  is  essentially  self-conscious. 
It  is  not  merely  an  intelligent  force,  but  it  is  an 
intelligent  force  working  both  consciously  and 
purposefully.  There  is  in  the  Hegelian  system 
no  place  for  a force,  as  conceived  by  von  Hart- 
mann, which  works  intelligently  but  uncon- 
sciously, and  therefore  blindly. 


208  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

The  element  of  necessity,  moreover,  which 
lies  at  the  basis  of  the  concept  of  substance  and 
of  causation,  is  in  the  doctrine  of  the  notion 
transmuted  into  freedom,  inasmuch  as  the 
necessity  is  regarded  as  a self-imposed  necessity. 
The  self-determining  power  of  the  notion  is 
to  be  conceived,  therefore,  as  essentially  a free 
activity.  It  is  an  activity  not  merely  an  sich , 
— that  is,  possessing  the  potentiality  of  activity, 
nor  is  it  merely  fur  sich , — that  is,  the  explicit 
realization  of  the  potential  activity;  it  is  both 
an  sich  and  fur  sich , — that  is,  it  possesses  the 
self-sufficient  power  and  capacity  for  self-deter- 
mined activity,  an  activity  which  consciously 
transmutes  its  potential  into  the  actual. 

Thus  conceived,  the  notion,  being  spontaneous 
and  unconditional,  may  be  regarded  as  the  final 
and  most  complete  characterization  of  the  Abso- 
lute. The  Absolute,  therefore,  may  be  most 
adequately  defined  as  the  notion.  This  is  not 
only  the  highest  expression  of  the  nature  of  the 
Absolute,  it  is  the  all-comprehensive  definition 
as  well.  The  notion  embodying  the  truth  of  all 
phases  both  of  being  and  of  essence,  it  follows 
that  all  the  characterizations  of  the  Absolute 
contained  in  the  categories  of  being  and  of 
essence  which  the  successive  stages  of  the  dia- 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THE  NOTION  209 


lectic  movement  have  manifested,  may  now  be 
completely  summed  up  in  the  all-embracing 
nature  of  the  notion.  Hegel,  therefore,  defines 
the  notion  also  as  the  totality  of  all  things 
(die  Totalitdt').  It  represents  the  fulness  of 
all  content,  being  both  self-contained  and  all 
containing.  The  moments  of  all  forms  of  activ- 
ity are  embraced  within  it.  It  is  the  great  uni- 
fying  principle  of  the  cosmos.  It  forms  both 
the  whence  and  the  whither  of  all  things.  It 
must,  therefore,  be  immanent  in  all  things. 
The  notion,  moreover,  contains  all  the  earlier 
determinations  of  thought  as  conserved  in  itself. 
The  contradictions  which  have  been  necessarily 
involved  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  develop- 
ment have  been  overcome  by  being  sublimated 
in  its  higher  unity. 

The  dialectic  movement  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  notion  is  essentially  one  of  development 
( die  Entwickelung).  That  movement  in  respect 
to  the  earlier  category  of  being  we  found  to  be 
that  of  a transition,  the  passage  from  definite 
being  to  its  corresponding  other.  In  the  cate- 
gory of  essence,  the  dialectic  process  is  mediated 
by  the  idea  of  reflection  which  marks  no  transi- 
tion from  definite  being  to  its  other  but  rather 
an  illumination  of  definite  being  by  the  light 


210  THE  DOCTRINE  OE  THE  NOTION 


cast  upon  it  by  its  other.  The  other  thus  func- 
tions as  the  complementary  correlative  of  the 
original  being  in  question,  and  gives  to  it  point 
and  significance.  But  when  we  come  to  the 
category  of  the  notion,  there  is  an  actual  devel- 
opment from  that  which  is  given  into  its  other 
in  such  a manner  that  the  unity  of  the  two  is 
completely  preserved,  and  the  former  finds  in 
its  other  only  that  which  is  the  complementary 
part  of  itself.  As  such  it  forms  the  truth  of 
the  transition  which  characterizes  the  dialectic 
movement  in  being,  and  of  the  reflection  which 
characterizes  the  dialectic  movement  in  essence. 

The  evolution  which  is  due  to  the  activity  of 
the  notion  is  essentially  a self-development.  It 
is  of  the  very  nature  of  the  notion  that  it  should 
manifest  itself,  and  that,  too,  in  all  the  various 
phases  of  its  manifold  possibilities.  The  idea  of 
development,  the  continuous  unfolding  of  all 
that  is  potential  in  the  notion,  demands  a single 
unifying  principle  in  the  midst  of  the  super- 
abounding  diversity  of  content,  manifesting  it- 
self in  a progressive  process  in  which  each 
succeeding  stage  is  more  completely  realized 
than  the  one  before. 

The  manifestation  of  this  principle  takes  place 
in  time,  producing  the  present  cosmic  order; 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THE  NOTION  211 


nevertheless,  the  truth  of  this  principle  in  its  ful- 
ness and  in  all  the  logically  coordinated  stages 
of  its  evolution  must  be  regarded  as  uncon- 
ditioned and  undetermined  by  time.  The  essen- 
tial nature  of  this  evolution  is  primarily  dialectic, 

— that  is,  each  stage  must  be  regarded  as  the  nec- 
essary complement  of  the  one  before,  in  the 
sense  that  it  overcomes  its  contradictions  and 
supplies  its  defects.  This  is  fundamentally  a 
logical  demand.  As  Hegel  would  put  it,  any 
given  stage  is  gesetzt  by  that  which  precedes, 

— that  is,  from  that  which  is  contained  in  the 
former,  the  reason  is  necessarily  constrained  to 
infer  the  latter.  Thought  is  thus  under  com- 
pulsion, — the  compulsion  of  its  own  nature  to 
develop  its  concepts  from  the  simplest  to  the 
more  and  more  complex.  Each  stage  of  such  a 
development,  because  unsatisfactory  as  the  com- 
plete expression  of  truth,  demands  a fuller  and 
more  satisfactory  stage  which  lies  just  beyond, 
which  will  in  a measure  correct  its  errors  and 
supplement  its  defects,  but  which  in  turn  will 
cause  new  questions  to  arise  which  it  cannot 
answer  and  new  contradictions  which  it  cannot 
resolve.  And  thus  the  onward  dialectic  move- 
ment proceeds  not  from  one  period  of  time  to 
another  so  much  as  from  the  idea  of  imperfec- 


212  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

tion  to  that  of  perfection,  from  the  idea  of  in- 
completeness to  that  of  completeness.  When 
the  temporal  process  has  been  completed,  it  fur- 
nishes a completed  product.  You  cannot  go 
backward,  rolling  it  up  again,  as  it  were,  into  its 
closed  potentiality,  and  then  repeat  the  process 
at  will.  Movement  in  time  is  from  the  bud  to 
the  full-blown  rose,  but  the  rose  cannot  shut 
and  be  a bud  again.  But  this  reverse  move- 
ment is  always  possible  in  reference  to  the 
thought  relations  which  underlie  any  series  of 
development.  Given  certain  premises,  the  con- 
clusion must  develop  itself  out  of  them ; and 
given  the  conclusion  containing  its  major  and 
minor  terms,  it  is  possible  to  work  backward 
when  once  the  proper  middle  term  has  been 
discovered  to  the  original  premises.  It  is  the 
so-called  process  of  reduction  which  reverses 
the  forward  movement  of  deduction. 

Moreover,  the  development  in  time  is  essen- 
tially finite ; the  dialectic  development  of 
thought  is  essentially  infinite.  The  develop- 
ment in  time  represents  a gradual  change  from 
stage  to  stage;  the  dialectic  development  is  a 
fuller  and  fuller  revelation  of  that  which,  in 
spite  of  its  indefinitely  varied  manifestations,  is 
ever  one  and  the  same,  — the  absolute.  The 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THE  NOTION  213 


temporal  development  falls  within  the  dialectic 
movement,  and  may  be  regarded  as  a moment  in 
the  larger  process.1 

In  the  revelation  of  the  full  significance  of 
the  notion,  or  in  other  words,  in  its  dialectic 
movement,  three  stages  appear  which  are  so 
related  that  either  the  first  or  the  second  taken 
by  itself  proves  to  be  misleading  and  unsatisfac- 
tory, and  has  a final  significance  only  when  it 
unites  with  the  other  to  form  a complete  syn- 
thesis which  constitutes  the  third  stage.  These 
stages  form  the  three  divisions  of  the  category 
of  the  notion.  They  are  as  follows  : — 

(1)  The  Notion  as  Subjective.  ( Der  sub- 
jective Begriff.) 

(2)  The  Notion  as  Objective.  ( Der  objective 
Begriff. 

(3)  The  Notion  as  the  Synthesis  of  Sub- 
jective and  Objective.  (Die  Idee.') 

The  fundamental  thesis  which  Hegel  endeav- 
ors to  maintain  is  that  the  reality  of  thought 
consists  in  its  productiveness.  He  regards 
thought,  as  we  have  seen,  as  a constructive, 
self-determining  force  underlying  the  universe 
of  things,  fashioning  all  creatures,  and  shaping 

1 See  Bailie  : Hegel's  Logic , Chapter  IX  ; also  McTag- 
gart : Studies  in  Hegelian  Dialectic , Chapter  V. 


214  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  THE  NOTION 

all  events.  Now,  if  thought  is  merely  subjec- 
tive, it  appears,  as  regards  its  essential  function 
as  a force  centre  completely  paralyzed.  On  the 
other  hand,  mere  objectivity  which  is  regarded 
as  separated  from  any  subjective  thought  what- 
soever is  essentially  irrational,  and  such  a state, 
from  the  Hegelian  point  of  view,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  unreal.  The  objective  is  not  set  over 
against  the  subjective,  but  the  subjective  is 
immanent  in  the  objective ; and  it  is  of  the  very 
nature  of  the  subjective  as  a thought  activity 
that  it  should  strive  to  realize  itself  in  the 
objective.  As  Hegel  puts  it,  our  “ thoughts  do 
not  stand  between  us  and  things,  shutting  us 
off  from  things ; they  rather  shut  us  together 
with  things.”  The  synthesis  of  these  two 
moments  constitutes  the  notion  in  its  true 
form  and  function.  The  notion  thus  in  its 
highest  expression  is  the  Idea  ( die  Idee ) 
— that  is,  the  supreme  Reason,  the  Absolute. 
The  subjective  notion  and  the  objective  notion 
are  eacli  indeterminate  and  incomplete.  In  the 
synthesis  of  subject  and  of  object,  the  world  of 
thought  and  the  world  of  reality,  we  find  the 
true  type  of  notion,  — not  merely  formal  and 
abstract,  but  concrete,  dynamic,  conscious,  all- 
controlling, all-embracing,  free. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 
HE  subjective  notion,  as  we  have  seen,  is 


the  notion  regarded  merely  in  one  of  its 
aspects,  as  constituting  the  sum  of  the  thought 
processes.  These  processes  taken  together  form 
a system  in  which  all  of  the  thought  relations 
are  determined  by  the  fundamental  nature  of 
thought  itself.  These  relations  divide  naturally 
into  three  typical  thought  forms,  and  in  this 
division  Hegel  follows  the  traditional  logic. 
These  forms  are  as  follows  : — 

(1)  The  Notion  regarded  simply  as  a formal 
Notion.  (JDer  Begriff  als  soldier.') 

(2)  The  Judgment.  (Das  Urtheil.') 

(3)  The  Syllogism.  (Der  Schluss .) 

The  primary  type  of  thought  which  Hegel 
calls  the  notion,  regarded  simply  as  notion, 
corresponds  in  some  of  its  main  features  to  the 
ordinary  concept  of  formal  logic.  It  is  treated 
in  the  Hegelian  system  without  reference  to  its 
natural  setting  as  one  of  the  component  parts 


215 


216  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

of  the  judgment  and  syllogism.  This  view 
of  the  notion  is  of  course  only  a provisional 
one  which  represents  merely  an  abstract 
analysis  of  the  thought  processes,  preliminary 
to  a subsequent  synthesis,  which  will  represent 
their  component  parts  as  properly  coordinated 
and  unified.  The  notion  thus  conceived  as  a 
separate  thought  element,  is  found  to  contain 
three  essential  factors,  or  as  the  Hegelian  ter- 
minology goes,  moments,  — that  of  universal- 
ity, of  particularity,  and  of  individuality  ( das 
Allgemeine , das  Besondere,  das  Einzelne) . 

It  should  be  noticed  that  Hegel  does  not 
divide  notions  into  three  kinds,  the  universal, 
the  particular,  and  the  individual,  but  he  re- 
gards the  one  and  the  same  notion  as  embrac- 
ing in  a unity  these  three  coordinated  aspects. 
Hegel  at  the  outset  in  the  discussion  of  the 
notion  evidently  wishes  to  emphasize  the  truth 
that  while  the  categories  of  reflection,  such  as 
appearance  and  ground,  cause  and  effect,  and 
the  like,  may  be  separately  apprehended  each 
apart  from  its  correlative,  this  however  is  not 
the  case  concerning  the  categories  of  the  notion. 
These  categories  must  be  conceived  as  insepa- 
rable moments  of  the  one  notion,  and  if  they 
do  not  all  appear  in  a complete  synthesis  of 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


217 


thought,  the  very  integrity  of  the  simple  notion 
itself  is  essentially  impaired.  A notion  regarded 
as  representing  a universal  merely,  that  is  a 
class  or  group  idea,  must  rank  in  our  thoughts 
as  an  absolutely  empty  genus  unless  it  contains 
some  suggestion  at  least  of  the  capacity  to  real- 
ize itself  in  different  kinds  of  species  which 
would  then  represent  its  particularity.  And  a 
particular  notion,  representing  a species,  not 
only  implies  a higher  genus  which  is  its  neces- 
sary universal,  but  it  in  turn  must  suggest  also 
the  capacity  of  realizing  itself  in  definite  indi- 
viduals. The  relations  of  genus,  species,  and 
the  individual,  represent  most  clearly  and  ade- 
quately the  three  Hegelian  moments  of  the 
simple  notion,  — universality,  particularity,  and 
individuality.  Any  one  of  them  necessarily 
implies  the  other  two. 

Hegel’s  criticism  of  the  traditional  logic  is 
that  its  general  term  or  class  idea  is  a notion 
in  only  one  of  its  aspects,  that  of  its  uni- 
versality, and  that  the  other  two  moments 
of  particularity  and  of  individuality  are  over- 
looked. Thus  it  follows  that  the  purely 
formal  logician,  the  literalist,  often  ignores  par- 
ticular instances  which  are  not  in  accord  with 
his  general  notions,  or  else  wrests  his  individual 


218  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 


facts  so  that  they  may  conform  to  his  precon- 
ceived theories.  It  is  the  moment  of  individual- 
ity in  the  notion  which  constitutes  its  actuality, 
which  differentiates  it  from  the  mere  fancy 
of  the  imagination.  The  individual  object 
is  always  the  most  convincing  proof  as  well 
as  the  clearest  illustration  of  the  universal. 
Nothing  will  so  quickly  reveal  the  emptiness 
of  thought  as  a succession  of  glittering  gener- 
alities which  admit  of  no  particular  application 
or  definite  verification.  And  on  the  other  hand, 
also,  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  if  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  individual  is  to  be  adequately 
interpreted,  it  must  be  possible  to  refer  it  un- 
erringly to  some  universal.  The  work  of  the 
scholar  or  of  the  man  of  science  is  not  complete 
when  he  has  collected  facts,  however  numerous 
they  may  be ; he  must  relate  fact  to  law  and 
rise  above  the  particular  results  of  his  investi- 
gation to  the  appreciation  of  the  universal 
which  they  embody.  This  relation  of  the  in- 
dividual object  to  the  universal,  Hegel  illus- 
trates by  showing  that  it  was  only  when  the 
world  came  to  recognize  every  man,  whether 
Greek  or  barbarian,  bond  or  free,  as  possessing 
an  infinite  and  universal  nature,  that  man’s  real 
significance  for  himself  and  for  society  was 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


219 


fully  understood  and  properly  valued.  The 
recognition  of  a man  as  a person  and  not  a 
thing  is  simply  the  recognition  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  personality  is  in  reality  a principle  of 
universality.  The  universal  is  not  to  be  con- 
ceived, therefore,  as  merely  the  sum  total  of  the 
various  elements  which  a number  of  individuals 
have  in  common ; it  is  rather  that  active  princi- 
ple which  specifies  and  determines  the  individ- 
uals, building  them  together  in  a unity  with 
itself.  As  Hegel  says,  “ Things  are  what 
they  are  through  the  action  of  the  notion  im- 
manent in  them  and  revealing  itself  in  them.”1 
Thus  every  individual  in  the  midst  of  all  his 
particular  traits  of  character  and  conduct  re- 
veals the  universal  strain  of  humanity. 

Corresponding  respectively  to  the  three  mo- 
ments of  universality,  particularity,  and  individ- 
uality are  the  three  categories  which  were  found 
to  constitute  the  fundamental  elements  of  the 
idea  of  essence,  — namely,  that  of  identity,  of 
difference,  and  of  ground.  Thus  the  universal  is, 
in  its  nature  essentially  self-identical,  — that  is, 
perfectly  homogeneous  throughout  and  without 
distinction  as  to  the  particular  varieties  which 
embody  and  illustrate  it.  It  is,  however,  under 
1 § 163,  Zusatz  (2). 


220  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

an  irresistible  compulsion  of  thought  ( gesetzt ) 
to  break  up  into  particular  varieties  or  species, 
and  this  it  does  through  the  process  of  differ- 
entiation according  to  the  category  of  difference. 
But  in  these  particular  manifestations  it  is  the 
underlying  universal  which  is  always  present. 
Moreover,  the  universal  can  manifest  itself  as 
an  identity  in  the  midst  of  all  differences  only 
in  that  which  can  form  the  common  ground  of 
such  a union,  — namely,  in  a series  of  differ- 
ent individuals. 

When  the  universal  subjects  itself  to  the 
natural  compulsion  of  thought,  and  becomes 
more  specific  by  manifesting  the  various  aspects 
of  its  particularity,  then  we  have  the  notion 
developed  in  the  form  of  a judgment.  To  judge 
is  to  make  definite  and  specific  the  complete 
nature  of  the  notion. 

This  specification  of  the  notion  which  is  the 
essential  function  of  the  judgment,  is  a process 
of  breaking  up  the  homogeneity  of  the  notion 
in  its  purely  universal  features,  and  showing 
that  it  admits  of  a varied  manifestation  in 
respect  to  a number  of  particular  instances  of 
the  universal,  each  ranking  as  a distinct  species 
within  the  all-embracing  genus.  To  specify  these 
particular  instances  in  detail,  and  give  at  the 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


221 


same  time  their  differentiating  characteristics, 
would  necessitate  a series  of  judgments  whose 
sum,  when  complete,  would  exhaust  the  full 
significance  of  the  universal  notion  as  such. 
The  German  word  for  the  judgment  is  das 
Urtheil , — that  is,  the  primary  division,  — and 
thus  signifies  most  strikingly  the  original  break- 
ing up  of  the  notion  into  the  particular  forms  of 
its  manifestation,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  con- 
stitutes the  essential  function  of  the  judgment. 

The  judgment  when  expressed  in  words 
naturally  shapes  itself  in  the  following  form, 
“ The  individual  is  the  universal.”  This  as- 
serts an  underlying  identity  between  the  uni- 
versal, as  such,  and  its  particular  manifestation 
in  some  concrete  individual  instance. 

Hegel’s  conception  of  the  essential  function 
of  the  copula  will  be  found  to  be  in  complete 
accord  with  the  view  of  the  modern  logic. 
The  copula  does  not  signify  that  the  subject 
and  predicate  of  a proposition  have  been  brought 
together  merely  by  a juxtaposition  of  thought, 
and  thus  connected  by  a convenient  thought 
form.  Its  function  is  rather  to  emphasize  the 
fact  that  the  two  seemingly  separate  elements, 
appearing  as  subject  and  predicate  terms,  respec- 
tively, are  in  reality  identical,  and  that  their 


222  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

fusion  into  one  is  indicated  by  their  union  in 
one  and  the  same  judgment  through  the  con- 
necting copula.  The  subject  and  predicate 
terms  must  not  be  regarded  as  two  independent 
extremes.  Nor  is  the  predicate  to  be  conceived 
as  a general  characteristic,  lying  outside  the 
subject,  and  having  a separate  existence  some- 
where in  our  heads.  It  is  an  essential  phase  of 
the  subject  itself. 

It  must  be  remembered  in  this  connection 
that  the  judgment  is  merely  an  expanded  form 
of  the  notion.  There  is  an  obvious  unity 
attaching  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  notion. 
This  unity  is  not  lost,  therefore,  when  the 
notion  puts  itself  in  the  more  explicit  form  of 
the  judgment.  The  seemingly  separate  terms 
which  the  copula  connects  have  no  really  sepa- 
rate subsistence  apart  from  their  underlying 
connection.  When  we  say  “ This  rose  is  red,” 
we  mean  that  the  particular  rose  now  in  the 
field  of  perception  partakes  of  the  nature,  and 
is  a specific  instance,  of  the  universal  red ; and 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  universal  red,  in 
connection  with  this  particular  rose,  manifests 
itself  in  the  specific  shade  of  red  which  char- 
acterizes this  special  rose  in  question. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said,  that  in  every  judg- 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


223 


ment  the  subject  and  predicate  so  blend  to- 
gether that  the  particularity  of  the  subject 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  the  universality  ex- 
pressed in  the  predicate,  and  that  on  the  other 
hand  the  universality  of  the  predicate  in  turn 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  the  particularity  ex- 
pressed in  the  subject.  The  identity  of  the 
subject  and  predicate,  thus  bound  together  in 
one,  constitutes  what  Hegel  calls  the  specific 
content  of  the  judgment  (der  bestimmte  Inhalt 
des  Urtheils).  It  is  that  which  constitutes  the 
judgment’s  essential  significance. 

The  relation,  moreover,  in  which  the  subject 
and  predicate  become  one  is  not  due  to  our 
thinking,  which,  as  it  were,  imposes  this  con- 
nection externally  upon  things.  The  relation, 
on  the  contrary,  exists  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
things  themselves,  and  our  thought  about  them 
is  only  our  discovery  of  a relation  already  exist- 
ing. If  the  notion  is  to  be  regarded,  as  Hegel 
insists,  as  the  constructive  force  immanent  in  all 
things,  then  the  judgment  is  merely  the  definite 
manifestation  of  the  indwelling  potentiality  of 
the  notion  in  an  explicit  manner  and  in  certain 
specific  instances.  It  is  an  actual  manifestation, 
moreover,  and  one  which  is  subjectively  revealed 
to  be  that  which  it  is  in  its  objective  reality. 


224  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

In  this  connection  Hegel  distinguishes  be- 
tween a judgment  and  a proposition  ( der  Satz). 
The  proposition  contains  an  assertion  in  refer- 
ence to  a given  subject,  which  does  not  stand 
in  any  relation  of  universality  to  its  predicate, 
but  expresses  some  single  state  or  action  which 
is  the  result  of  a contingent  relation  of  subject 
and  predicate,  as  the  so-called  narrative  judg- 
ments, such  as  “ Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon,”  or 
“It  rained  last  evening.”  In  the  judgment 
proper,  the  connection  between  subject  and 

predicate  is  freed  from  any  disturbing  element 
of  contingency.  This  distinction  does  not  obtain, 
however,  in  the  formal  logic,  as  the  proposition 
is  a term  there  employed  to  indicate  merely  the 
judgment  as  expressed  in  language  in  the  form 
of  a sentence. 

Hegel  divides  the  judgment  into  three  types, 
which  correspond  to  the  three  main  divisions  of 
the  Logic : — 

(1)  The  Judgment  of  Being. 

(2)  The  Judgment  of  Essence. 

(3)  The  Judgment  of  Notion. 

These  types  of  judgment  form  a series  of  pro- 
gressive development.  The  distinctions  between 
them  are  due  in  each  case  to  the  logical  signifi- 
cance of  the  predicate.  There  is,  for  instance, 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


225 


a manifest  difference  in  logical  value  between 
the  two  judgments : — 

The  rose  is  red. 

The  statue  is  beautiful. 

The  former  is  the  result  of  a simple  percep- 
tion, while  the  latter  is  the  result  of  a more 
complicated  thought  process  which  is  based 
upon  a comparison  between  the  object  of  percep- 
tion and  the  kind  of  being  which  we  conceive 
it  ought  to  realize,  — that  is,  its  ideal  or  its  es- 
sential notion. 

Corresponding  to  the  category  of  being,  we 
have  the  qualitative  judgment  ( das  qualitative 
Urtheil ). 

Corresponding  to  the  category  of  essence,  we 
have  two  judgments,  — that  of  reflection,  and 
that  of  necessity  ( das  Reflexionsurtheil , das 
Urtheil  der  Nothwendigkeit). 

Corresponding  to  the  category  of  the  notion, 
we  have  the  notional  judgment  (c?as  Urtheil 
des  Begriffs). 

The  qualitative  judgment,  or  the  judgment  of 
being,  Hegel  defines  as  one  which  ascribes  to  the 
particular  subject  a quality  which  is  universal, 
and  yet  which  does  not  characterize  all  the  in- 
dividuals of  the  same  class  to  which  the  subject 
belongs.  For  instance,  when  we  say,  “ The  rose 

Q 


226  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

is  red,”  the  universal  quality  of  redness  is 
ascribed  correctly  to  the  rose  in  question,  but  it 
is  not  possible  to  extend  that  ascription  to  all 
roses  generally.  Therefore,  in  asserting  “ The 
rose  is  red,”  we  imply  that  some  roses  exist 
which  are  not  red.  Consequently,  for  every 
affirmative  judgment  of  this  kind  there  must  be 
a possible  negative  judgment  which  parallels  it. 
The  predicate,  in  other  words,  belongs  to  the 
special  subject  under  consideration,  but  not  to 
the  underlying  universal  notion  of  which  the 
subject  is  a particular  manifestation. 

It  is  proper,  therefore,  to  characterize  a quali- 
tative judgment  as  correct  or  incorrect,  but 
never  as  true  or  untrue.  For  to  affirm  that  a 
judgment  is  true  means  that  the  predicate  is  an 
essential  element  of  the  underlying  notion  to 
which  the  subject  must  be  referred.  Hegel 
says,  “ In  the  judgment  of  the  notion  the  predi- 
cate is,  as  it  were,  the  soul  of  the  subject  by 
which  the  subject  as  a body  is  characterized 
through  and  through.”1 

If,  instead  of  starting  with  an  affirmative 
judgment  and  deducing  by  necessary  implica- 
tion a corresponding  negative  judgment,  we 
should  start  with  the  negative  judgment,  such 
1 § 172,  Zusatz. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


227 


as  “This  rose  is  not  red,”  we  are  as  necessarily 
constrained  to  deduce  the  implied  affirmative ; 
for  the  negative  statement  that  the  rose  is  not 
red  implies  some  other  color.  Inasmuch  as  the 
subject  in  such  cases  is  not  a universal,  the 
negative  either  expresses  an  empty  identity,  that 
the  rose  which  you  see  has  the  color  which  you 
see,  or  else  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a so-called 
infinite  judgment  in  which  an  absolute  incom- 
patibility is  set  forth  such  as  might  be  expressed 
in  the  judgment  “ A circle  is  not  a tree.”  In 
the  formal  logic,  such  a judgment  is  regarded 
as  representing  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  of 
irrelevant  negation.  But  Hegel  insists  that  a 
judgment  of  such  a nature  may  possess  some 
significance  as  the  description  of  certain  con- 
crete relations  whose  nature  can  only  be  thus 
characterized.  For  instance,  death  is  the  infinite 
negative  as  regards  life,  since  death  signifies 
a total  negation  of  life.  Disease,  on  the  other 
hand,  represents  merely  a simple  negation,  inas- 
much as  certain  functions  may  be  only  tempora- 
rily impaired,  that  is,  contingently  negatived ; 
and  this  negation  is  at  once  overcome  when 
with  returning  health  the  normal  functioning  is 
resumed,  but  not  so  with  the  negation  which  is 
expressed  by  death. 


228  THE  DOCTRINE  OE  THE  NOTION 

When  we  come  to  the  judgment  of  reflection, 
we  find  that  Hegel  defines  this  type  of  judgment 
substantially  as  one  in  which  the  subject  no 
longer  appears  as  a special  case  or  particular 
instance,  but  is  represented  as  related  to  some- 
thing else  which  is  implied  in  the  predicate. 
The  relation  which  is  thus  stated  is  true  not 
only  for  the  particular  subject  in  question  but 
for  all  others  of  the  same  class  universally. 
The  following  is  a judgment  of  this  type : — 
“ This  plant  is  edible.”  This  signifies  a uni- 
versal connection  between  all  plants  of  the  same 
kind  represented  by  the  subject  and  a certain 
effect  which  it  is  possible  for  them  to  produce 
upon  a definite  part  of  the  great  world  system 
to  which  they  belong,  — namely,  the  gustatory 
and  digestive  processes  of  man.  It  is  called  a 
judgment  of  reflection,  because  it  is  only  in  the 
light  of  something  else  brought  into  relation  to  it 
that  the  adjective  edible  can  be  applied  to  a plant. 
Its  edibility  is  a characteristic  which  arises  simply 
from  its  being  brought  into  relation  with  man. 

This  type  of  judgment  in  general  breaks  up 
into  three  varieties  : — 

(1)  The  Singular  Judgment. 

(2)  The  Particular  Judgment. 

(3)  The  Universal  Judgment. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


229 


If  we  have  a singular  judgment  such  as  the 
following,  “ This  plant  is  wholesome,”  there  is 
implied  in  this  that  there  are  some  other  plants 
also  which  are  wholesome.  This  latter  form 
would  then  be  a particular  judgment.  In  some 
cases,  moreover,  the  nature  of  the  particular 
judgment  is  such  that  it  may  be  found  possible 
upon  further  investigation  to  enlarge  it  to  such 
an  extent  that  it  will  embrace  the  universal  as 
well.  The  progress  of  knowledge  is  from  the 
singular  to  the  particular,  and  then  from  the 
particular  to  the  universal.  For  instance,  we 
start  with  the  judgment,  “ This  metal  conducts 
electricity.”  Then  we  advance  to  the  larger 
statement  in  the  form  of  a particular  judgment 
“ Some  other  metals  conduct  electricity.” 
Finally  we  reach  the  universal,  “ All  metals 
conduct  electricity.”  These  judgments  repre- 
sent widening  circles  of  knowledge.  Thus  the 
individual  merges  its  seemingly  individual  char- 
acteristics with  those  which  are  common  to  the 
other  members  of  the  same  species,  to  every 
one  of  which  the  same  predicate  may  be  applied 
as  was  primarily  applied  to  the  individual  in 
the  form  of  a singular  judgment.  There  are 
predicates,  moreover,  of  such  a nature  that, 
when  ascribed  to  an  individual  subject,  imply 


230  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  THE  NOTION 

not  merely  an  advance  to  a particular,  but  to 
an  all-embracing,  universal  judgment.  In  such 
cases  there  are  no  negative  instances,  and  there- 
fore the  individual  is  to  be  regarded  as  a type 
of  the  whole  class.  As  Hegel  puts  it,  “ The 
individual  man  is  what  he  is  in  particular  only 
in  so  far  as  he  is  before  all  things  a man  as  man 
and  in  general.”  1 Any  property  which  belongs 
to  the  individual,  and  at  the  same  time  to  every 
other  member  of  the  same  species,  ranks  as 
a necessary  attribute.  It  is  universal  for  the 
very  reason  that  it  is  necessary.  The  judgment 
of  reflection  which  expresses  a universal  relation 
between  an  attribute  and  the  subject  as  a whole, 
must  be  consequently  a judgment  of  necessity 
as  well.  And  thus  the  transition  from  the  judg- 
ment of  reflection  to  the  judgment  of  necessity 
is  a natural  one. 

Hegel  discusses  the  judgment  of  necessity 
under  its  three  aspects,  as,  — 

(1)  Categorical.  ( Das  hategorische  Urtheil.') 

(2)  Hypothetical.  (Z>as  hypothetische  Ur- 
theil.) 

(3)  Disjunctive.  (I) as  disjunctive  Urtheil.) 

In  the  categorical  judgment,  the  predicate 

expresses  the  essential  nature  of  the  subject. 

1 § 175.  Zusatz. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


2B1 


It  represents  the  essence  of  the  subject,  more- 
over, in  respect  to  the  most  elemental  of  the 
categories  of  essence,  that  of  substantiality. 
Thus,  in  the  judgment  of  simple  assertion,  which 
is  the  characteristic  feature  of  the  categorical 
judgment,  such  as  “ Iron  is  a metal,”  the  idea 
of  metallity  is  regarded  as  the  underlying  sub- 
stance which  constitutes  the  essential  nature 
of  iron.  The  categorical  judgment,  however, 
lacks  completeness,  inasmuch  as  it  does  not 
embrace  in  its  statement  the  elements  of  par- 
ticularity,— that  is,  of  definite  and  specific 
description. 

When  we  introduce  the  specifying  element 
which  renders  a general  statement  more  par- 
ticular and  therefore  more  definite,  we  have 
always  the  hypothetical  form  of  judgment, — 
if  A is  B,  C is  D,  — that  is,  where  the  subject 
only  under  specified  conditions  leads  to  its 
necessary  consequent.  This  specified  condition 
gives  to  the  subject  a particular  aspect.  In  the 
hypothetical  judgment  the  relation  which  is  set 
forth  is  that  of  cause  and  effect,  the  second  of 
the  categories  of  essence. 

When,  however,  the  subject,  regarded  as  a 
genus,  is  completely  specified  through  an  ex- 
haustive division  into  its  component  species, 


232  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

we  have  the  disjunctive  judgment.  It  is  of  the 
form,  “A  is  either  B,  or  C,  or  D.”  In  such  a 
judgment  the  predicate  is  coextensive  with  the 
subject,  the  genus  always  being  equal  to  the 
sum  total  of  its  several  species.  Therefore 
the  genus  is  expressed  in  its  totality,  and  the 
totality  of  any  genus  is  its  notion.  This  marks 
the  point  of  transition  to  the  judgment  of  the 
notion. 

In  this  latter  class  of  judgments  the  subject 
is  regarded  as  conforming  more  or  less  ade- 
quately to  its  ideal,  — that  is,  to  its  notion. 
The  predicates  which  are  available  in  this  form 
of  judgment  are  such  as  the  adjectives  good, 
true,  beautiful,  wise,  perfect,  and  the  like. 
Each  one  implies  a norm  which  the  subject  in 
question  is  judged  as  completely  illustrating ; 
and  in  the  negative  judgments,  of  course,  as 
failing  to  illustrate. 

The  judgment  of  the  notion  divides  into  three 
classes : — 

(1)  The  Assertory  Judgment.  (Das  asserto- 
rische  Urtheil.') 

(2)  The  Problematic  Judgment.  (Das  prob- 
lematische  Urtheil .) 

(3)  The  Apodictic  Judgment.  ( Das  apodik- 
tische  Urtheil.') 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


233 


The  assertory  judgment  is  one  which  contains 
the  bare  statement  that  a given  subject  is  in 
full  accord  with  its  ideal.  Such  a judgment, 
however,  may  be  challenged  by  one  who  holds 
an  opposite  opinion.  This  gives  rise  to  the 
second  form,  the  problematic  judgment. 

The  problematic  judgment  is  one  which  is 
qualified  by  the  modal  copula,  may  be,  implying 
obviously  the  possibility  also  that  it  may  not 
be.  However,  if  the  relation  between  the  sub- 
ject and  predicate  is  reenforced  by  a subsidiary 
statement,  either  expressed  or  implied,  which 
indicates  the  ground  of  their  connection,  we  have 
the  third  form,  the  apodictic  judgment. 

The  apodictic  judgment  is  one  which  asserts 
that  the  relation  between  subject  and  predicate 
is  such  that  it  must  be  true.  It  is  no  longer  a 
matter  of  opinion,  but  of  necessity.  When  the 
reason  which  reenforces  the  cogency  of  a judg- 
ment is  fully  elaborated,  we  pass  by  a natural 
transition  to  the  syllogism.  For  example,  the 
judgment  that  a certain  law  will  prove  harmful 
to  the  best  interests  of  the  community,  can  be 
shown  to  be  an  apodictic  judgment,  — that  is, 
necessarily  true,  if  we  show  that  it  is  essentially 
unjust,  — and  our  judgment  would  then  be  put 
in  the  following  form  : — 


234  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

“ This  law,  being  obviously  unjust,  must  neces- 
sarily prove  harmful  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
community.” 

Expanded  into  the  form  of  a syllogism,  it 
would  run  as  follows : — 

All  unjust  laws  are  harmful. 

This  law  is  unjust. 

.*.  It  must  prove  harmful. 

Whenever  a judgment  under  challenge  reveals 
its  underlying  ground  as  its  justification,  we  have 
a syllogism.  The  statement  that  anything  must 
he  true  is  justifiable  only  when  it  can  be  shown 
that  there  is  a sufficient  reason  to  warrant  it. 
The  syllogism,  therefore,  is  merely  the  expanded 
form  of  the  apodictic  judgment. 

A syllogism  is  a judgment  which  is  accom- 
panied by  its  own  proof.  In  the  apodictic  judg- 
ment, we  have  an  individual  subject  whose 
particular  characteristics  warrant  our  reference 
of  it  to  its  universal.  In  its  elaborated  form, 
as  expressed  by  the  three  terms  which  make  up 
the  syllogistic  structure,  the  individual  and  uni- 
versal are  brought  together  by  means  of  a com- 
mon term,  the  traditional  middle  term  of  the 
formal  logic,  in  such  a way  as  to  form  together 
a logical  unity.  In  the  major  and  minor  prem- 
ises we  have  separate  judgments,  their  point  of 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


235 


articulation  being  the  middle  term ; this  separa- 
tion of  the  major  and  minor  terms  in  the 
premises  is  completely  overcome  in  the  con- 
clusion, and  we  have  a return  to  the  unitary 
notion  which  holds  the  major  and  minor  terms 
together  in  one  judgment.  Thus  Hegel  defines 
the  syllogism  as  the  unity  of  the  judgment  and 
the  notion,1  — that  is,  the  separate  judgments  of 
the  premises  coalesce  in  the  one  notion  which 
underlies  the  conclusion.  The  statements  con- 
tained in  the  two  premises  are  the  result  of  the 
analytic  function  of  thought.  The  fusion  of 
the  major  and  minor  terms  in  the  conclusion  is, 
however,  the  result  of  the  synthetic  function. 

The  syllogism  should  not  be  regarded  as  an 
arbitrary  or  artificial  grouping  of  judgments 
together  in  thought.  We  do  not,  properly 
speaking,  construct  syllogisms.  The  syllogistic 
process  is  rather  the  universal  mode  in  which 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe  manifest  them- 
selves. It  is,  moreover,  a true  description  of  the 
endless  activity  by  which  the  Absolute  ever 
manifests  Himself.  Hegel  means  by  this  that 
all  being  and  all  activity  of  the  universe  are  to 
be  regarded  as  the  manifestation  of  a universal 
by  means  of  certain  particular  and  specific 
1 § 181. 


236  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

characteristics  which  it  reveals  in  the  sphere 
of  some  definite  concrete  individuality.  The 
syllogism  is  merely  an  expression  in  general 
of  the  process  which  provides  for  the  varied 
interplay  of  the  universal,  the  particular,  and 
the  individual  in  their  manifold  relations. 
Every  notion  as  a universal  manifests  itself  in 
individual  instances  through  particular  charac- 
teristics which  differ  with  the  various  species 
which  it  embraces.  And  on  the  other  hand 
every  individual  reveals  its  full  significance 
only  when  it  may  be  referred  to  its  correspond- 
ing universal  by  virtue  of  its  particular  charac- 
teristics. It  seems  to  be  of  the  very  nature  of 
thought  to  bind  together  in  one  the  three  ideas 
of  universality,  particularity,  and  individuality, 
which  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  the  syllogistic 
process.  Therefore,  reason  by  its  very  nature 
tends  to  express  itself  in  the  form  of  a syllogism; 
and  as  it  is  of  the  essence  of  reason,  according 
to  Hegel,  to  manifest  itself  dynamically  as  the 
essential  constructive  force  of  the  universe,  it 
follows  that  the  syllogistic  principle  underlies 
the  active  processes  of  all  nature  and  of  all 
mind. 

Hegel  discusses  the  syllogism  under  its  three 
aspects  as  follows : — 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


237 


(1)  The  Qualitative  Syllogism.  ( Der  quali- 
tative Schluss .) 

(2)  The  Syllogism  of  Reflection.  ( [Der  Reflex- 
ions-Sclduss.} 

(3)  The  Syllogism  of  Necessity.  (Der  Schluss 
der  Nothwendiglceit .) 

In  the  qualitative  syllogism  the  subject  of  the 
conclusion  as  an  individual  is  referred  to  its 
predicate,  a universal  because  of  a certain 
quality  which  it  possesses. 

The  qualitative  characteristics  are  expressed 
by  the  middle  term,  which  is  of  the  nature  of 
a particular. 

Thus  in  the  form  of  the  syllogism  the  subject 
of  the  conclusion,  which  is  always  the  minor 
term,  is  the  individual. 

The  predicate  of  the  conclusion,  which  is 
always  the  major  term,  is  the  universal. 

The  middle  term,  which  does  not  appear  in 
the  conclusion  but  in  each  of  the  premises,  is 
the  particular.  All  this  Hegel  expresses  in  the 
formula  I-P-U,  which  means  that  P,  the  par- 
ticular, is  the  middle  term  between  I,  the 
individual  as  minor  term,  and  U,  the  univer- 
sal as  major  term.  In  similar  formulae  the 
same  order  is  preserved  to  designate  all  possible 
varieties  of  syllogistic  structure,  — namely,  the 


238  THE  DOCTEIHE  OF  THE  XOTIOX 

first  letter  always  represents  the  minor  term; 
the  last,  the  major  term;  and  the  middle  letter, 
naturally,  the  middle  term.1 

Expanded  into  the  form  of  a syllogism,  the 
formula  I-P-U  would  become:  — 

An  individual  has  certain  particular  charac- 
teristics. 

All  such  particular  characteristics  belong  to 
a certain  universal. 

.•.  The  individual  belongs  to  this  universal. 

It  will  be  noticed  in  the  above  that  the  first 
premise  stated  is  the  minor,  and  the  second  the 
major.  Reversing  this  order,  and  abbreviating, 
the  syllogism  runs  as  follows : — 

All  P is  U. 

I is  P. 

.-.  I is  U. 

This  will  be  recognized  as  a syllogism  of  the 
first  figure,  in  which  the  middle  term  appears  as 
subject  of  the  major  premise,  and  as  predicate 
of  the  minor.  Now,  in  this  syllogism,  each 
premise  in  turn  must  be  regarded  in  the  light 
of  a conclusion  which  has  been  previously  medi- 
ated by  some  other  middle  term.  In  other 
words,  if  the  ground  of  each  premise  is  fully 

1 Hegel  uses  the  letters  E,B,A  for  das  Einzelne,  das 
Besondere,  and  das  Allgemeine,  respectively. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


239 


expressed,  it  necessarily  reveals  a syllogistic 
structure.  If,  therefore,  we  should  assume  that 
the  major  premise,  “ All  P is  U,”  is  the  conclusion 
of  a subsidiary  syllogism,  the  middle  term  in 
that  case  must  be  of  the  nature  of  an  indi- 
vidual. Putting  it,  therefore,  as  the  middle 
term  between  the  particular  as  minor  and  the 
universal  as  major,  the  formula  for  this  new 
syllogism  would  be,  P-I-U. 

If  this  formula  should  be  elaborated  so  as  to 
express  fully  the  syllogistic  structure,  it  would 
be  as  follows  : — 

Certain  individuals  have  particular  marks. 

These  individuals  all  belong  to  a certain  uni- 
versal. 

.*.  These  particular  marks  characterize  this  uni- 
versal. 

This  syllogism  is  in  the  third  figure,  — that 
is,  the  middle  term  appears  as  subject  in 
each  of  the  premises.  It  will  be  observed  that 
such  a conclusion  is  valid  only  when  the  indi- 
viduals examined  are  so  numerous  and  of  such 
a kind  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  the  dis- 
covery of  any  negative  instances  ; otherwise  the 
third  figure  can  prove  only  a particular  state- 
ment. 

If  in  a similar  way,  we  assume  the  minor 


240  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

premise  of  the  original  syllogism,  “ This  I is  P,” 
to  be  the  conclusion  of  a subsidiary  syllogism, 
then  the  remaining  term  which  does  not  appear 
in  this  conclusion,  — in  this  case  the  universal, 
— would  be  the  middle  term,  and  the  syllogistic 
formula  would  be  I-U-P.  In  its  expanded 
form  it  gives  the  following  syllogism : — 

The  individual  is  the  universal. 

The  particular  is  the  universal. 

.*.  The  individual  is  the  particular. 

This  is  in  the  second  figure,  — that  is,  the 
middle  term  appeal's  as  predicate  in  each  of  the 
premises.  The  conclusion  is  not  valid  unless 
we  regard  the  major  premise  as  having  the  force 
of  a judgment  in  the  following  form,  “ Only 
the  particulars  in  question  are  the  universal.” 
Otherwise,  the  second  figure  can  prove  only  a 
negative  conclusion.  To  secure  from  it  an 
affirmative  conclusion,  the  major  premise  must 
always  be  qualified  in  some  such  manner  as  is 
indicated  above. 

These  transitions,  which  Hegel  thus  effects 
from  figure  to  figure  may  be  seen  more  clearly 
perhaps  in  the  following  concrete  illustrations. 
The  syllogism  in  the  first  figure,  corresponding 
to  the  formula  I-P-U,  may  be  expressed  as 
follows : — 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


241 


This  whale  is  a mammal. 

All  mammals  are  vertebrates. 

.*.  This  whale  is  a vertebrate. 

In  this  syllogism 

I = whale  (individual). 

P = mammal  (particular  species). 

U = vertebrate  (universal  genus). 

The  syllogism  in  the  third  figure  proves  as  its 
conclusion  the  major  premise  of  the  above,  “All 
mammals  are  vertebrates.”  Its  formula  is  P-I-U. 

It  may  be  illustrated  by  the  following : — 

Certain  individuals  (I)  are  mammals  (P). 

The  same  individuals  (I)  are  vertebrates  (U). 
.*.  All  mammals  (P)  are  vertebrates  (U). 

This  conclusion  follows  only  upon  the  sup- 
position that  the  individuals  examined  warrant 
an  inductive  generalization  upon  the  ground 
that  the  possibility  of  negative  instances  has 
been  completely  eliminated.  Again,  the  syl- 
logism in  the  second  figure,  proving  as  its 
conclusion  the  minor  premise  of  the  original 
syllogism,  “ This  whale  is  a mammal  ” may  be 
illustrated  according  to  the  formula  I-U-P  as 
follows  : — 

Only  mammals  (P)  suckle  their  young  (U). 

The  whale  (I)  suckles  its  young  (U). 

The  whale  (I)  is  a mammal  (P). 


242  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

In  these  syllogisms  the  judgments  all  express 
an  identity  in  spite  of  differences,  as  when  we 
say  “The  individual  is  the  universal.”  Now, 
if  in  such  judgments  the  element  of  difference 
is  wholly  eliminated,  then  the  subject  and  pred- 
icate in  every  case  may  he  simply  equated,  and 
all  the  terms  in  the  syllogism  will  become  strictly 
identical,  giving  us  the  quantitative  or  mathe- 
matical syllogism  which  would  appear  in  the 
following  form : — 

I = P. 

P=  U. 

.-.  I = U. 

The  truth  which  is  contained  in  such  a syllo- 
gism may  be  expressed  by  the  axiom,  “ Things 
which  are  equal  to  the  same  third  thing  are 
equal  to  each  other.”  This  may  be  regarded  as 
the  limiting  case  of  the  syllogism  proper. 

In  the  qualitative  syllogism  the  individual  is 
represented  under  the  aspect  of  some  one  of  its 
attributes,  and,  therefore,  an  indefinite  number 
of  syllogisms  may  be  formed  in  reference  to  any 
individual  object  of  investigation  or  of  interest, 
according  as  we  choose  to  vary  the  several  attri- 
butes which  may  for  the  time  being  happen  to 
attract  our  attention.  Thus  we  say  that  a cer- 
tain rose  is  red,  or  fragrant,  or  it  is  fading,  or 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


243 


is  not  yet  full  blown,  and  so  on  indefinitely. 
When,  however,  we  choose  an  attribute  which 
is  an  essential  property  of  all  roses  whatsoever, 
we  have  always  the  syllogism  of  reflection,  — 
that  is,  the  concept  of  a rose  is  illuminated  by 
the  light  reflected  upon  it  by  one  of  its  essential 
attributes.  Or  in  other  cases,  it  may  not  be  a 
specific  property  so  much  as  an  essential  rela- 
tion which  the  object  of  thought  sustains;  when, 
for  instance,  we  fail  to  understand  the  essential 
significance  of  a certain  tool  until  we  discover 
the  particular  use  to  which  it  is  adapted,  and 
this  is  allowed  to  reflect  its  light  upon  the 
nature  of  the  tool  itself.  In  the  syllogism  of 
reflection,  therefore,  the  quality  which  is  taken 
as  the  middle  term  is  not  merely  one  of  many 
attributes  chosen  at  random,  or  through  caprice, 
or  suggested  by  some  passing  circumstance,  but 
it  should  be  an  attribute  of  such  a nature  that 
it  must  necessarily  belong  to  every  other  mem- 
ber of  the  same  species  which  is  represented  by 
the  individual,  as  well  as  to  the  individual  itself. 
The  significance  of  the  species  is  thus  reflected 
in  its  characteristic  attributes  which  all  its  in- 
dividual members  possess  in  common.  It  is  the 
bond  of  unity  which  holds  together  all  individ- 
uals of  the  same  class  in  one  group. 


244  THE  DOCTRINE  OE  THE  NOTION 

The  syllogism  of  reflection  therefore  may  be 
divided  into  three  subsidiary  kinds : — 

(1)  The  Syllogism  of  Allness.  (Der  Schluss 
der  Allheit.) 

(2)  The  Syllogism  of  Induction.  ( Der  Schluss 
der  Induktion.') 

(3)  The  Syllogism  of  Analogy.  ( Der  Schluss 
der  Analogic.') 

The  primary  form  of  the  syllogism  of  reflec- 
tion is  a syllogism  in  the  first  figure,  and  is 
known  as  the  syllogism  of  allness.  It  endeav- 
ors to  show  what  distinctive  attribute  or  attri- 
butes are  common  to  all  members  of  a class. 
Hegel  illustrates  this  by  the  traditional  syllo- 
gism : — 

All  men  are  mortal. 

Caius  is  a man. 

.*.  Caius  is  mortal. 

The  weakness  of  this  syllogism  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  universality  of  the  major  premise,  “ All 
men  are  mortal,”  obviously  depends  upon  the 
tacit  assumption  that  the  conclusion  is  true. 
The  major  premise  implies  that  a previous  in- 
duction of  an  exhaustive  nature  has  been  made. 

Thus  a transition  is  effected  by  the  necessi- 
ties of  thought  to  the  inductive  syllogism,  such 
as  the  following  : — 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


245 


This  man,  and  this  man,  and  so  on  indefinitely, 
are  mortal. 

This  man  and  this  man,  and  so  on  indefinitely, 
constitute  all  men. 

.\  All  men  are  mortal. 

The  formula  for  this  syllogism  would  be 

I. 

U-I-P. 

I. 

etc., 

wherein  is  signified  that  the  middle  term  (I)  is 
indefinitely  repeated,  and  is  the  sum  of  a number 
of  individual  cases.  Passing  from  the  individual 
instances,  however  numerous  they  may  be,  to  the 
universal,  which  must  necessarily  transcend  our 
experience,  our  reason  rests  upon  the  postulate 
that  whatever  is  observed  to  be  an  essential 
property  which  a number  of  individuals  have  in 
common,  will  be  found  to  obtain  in  all  the  indi- 
viduals which  resemble  them  sufficiently  to  be 
regarded  as  members  of  one  and  the  same  class, 
or  species. 

This  gives  us  the  third  form  of  the  syllogism 
of  reflection,  which  expresses  an  underlying 
analogy  as  the  warrant  for  the  inductive  gen- 
eralization previously  performed.  In  this  syllo- 
gism of  analogy  the  inference  is  based  upon  the 


246  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

logical  principle  that  inasmuch  as  some  things 
of  a certain  kind  possess  a certain  well-marked 
quality,  therefore  the  same  quality  will  be 
found  in  the  case  of  other  things  of  the  same 
kind.  The  individual  instance  under  investiga- 
tion may  be  regarded  as  a typical  case,  and, 
therefore,  as  standing  for  a class,  it  so  far 
forth  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a universal. 
The  common  bond,  moreover,  which  unites  to- 
gether objects  of  the  same  kind,  and  by  virtue 
of  which  they  are  what  they  are,  cannot  be 
merely  the  result  of  a fortuitous  coincidence  of 
similar  qualities,  but  is  a necessary  and  essential 
characteristic  of  the  very  nature  of  the  things 
themselves.  This  forms  a natural  transition  to 
the  syllogism  of  necessity. 

The  syllogism  of  necessity  may  be  divided 
into  three  kinds  : — 

(1)  The  Categorical  Syllogism. 

(2)  The  Hypothetical  Syllogism. 

(3)  The  Disjunctive  Syllogism. 

In  the  categorical  syllogism  the  individual  is 
referred  to  its  appropriate  universal  by  means 
of  the  intermediate  particular,  or  species  to 
which  it  more  proximately  belongs.  This 
syllogism  would  be  in  some  such  form  as 
follows  : — 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  NOTION 


247 


A certain  individual  belongs  to  a particular 
species. 

The  species  belongs  to  a certain  genus. 

. \ The  individual  belongs  to  that  same  genus. 

In  the  hypothetical  syllogism  the  universal  or 
the  genus  is  represented  as  the  ground  of  the 
particular  or  the  species.  Its  major  premise  is 
of  the  form,  “If  A is,  so  is  -B.”  The  minor 
premise  represents  the  presence  or  the  absence 
of  the  necessary  condition,  and  the  conclusion 
the  resultant  realization  of  the  effect,  or  the 
failure  to  realize  it,  as  the  case  may  be. 

In  the  disjunctive  syllogism  the  universal  is 
resolved  into  its  component  parts.  It  is  the  high- 
est form  of  the  syllogism,  for  it  represents  an 
exhaustive  manifestation  of  the  full  concrete 
essence  of  the  universal.  The  minor  premise 
of  this  syllogism  expresses  what  parts  in  any 
given  cases  are  present  or  absent,  and  the  con- 
clusion expresses  the  resulting  presence  or 
absence  of  the  other  parts  as  thus  determined. 

This  syllogism  in  its  disjunctive  form  marks 
the  natural  transition  also  to  the  category  of  the 
notion  in  its  second  aspect,  that  of  objectivity ; 
for  an  exhaustive  manifestation  of  the  universal 
shows  not  merely  the  sum  total  of  its  thought 
relations,  — that  is,  in  reference  to  its  purely  sub- 


248  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

jective  aspect,  for  then  its  manifestation  would 
be  partial  and  not  exhaustive,  but  it  furnishes 
as  well  scope  for  its  external  actualization  in  the 
world  of  reality.  The  notion  represents  a total- 
ity, and  that,  too,  is  the  essential  function  of  the 
disjunctive  syllogism,  — to  represent  the  given 
object  of  thought  in  its  totality.  Moreover, 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a totality  which  is  not 
realized  in  all  of  its  concrete  fulness.  The 
notion,  therefore,  as  a fundamental  constructive 
principle,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a force  opera- 
tive in  vacuo , but  in  the  concrete  system  of 
things,  of  persons  and  of  events,  in  life  and  its 
wealth  of  inexhaustible  possibilities. 


CHAPTER  XYI 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 
S we  have  seen,  Hegel  regards  the  disjunc- 


tive syllogism  as  the  point  of  transition 
from  the  subjective  to  the  objective  notion. 
Let  us  examine  this  statement  more  in  detail, 
in  order  that  we  may  the  more  clearly  under- 
stand the  essential  relation  of  the  subjective  to 
the  objective  notion.  The  disjunctive  syllo- 
gism is  merely  the  subjective  notion  expressed 
in  its  highest  and  most  complete  form.  It  sig- 
nifies as  regards  its  syllogistic  structure  that 
the  subjective  notion  is  essentially  an  active 
process  of  thought,  for  this  is  the  meaning  of 
the  syllogism  in  general ; and  as  regards  its  dis- 
junctive character,  it  indicates  that  the  process 
in  question  is  a complete  unfolding  of  the  total 
significance  of  the  notion.  Gathering  together 
these  characteristics  in  a single  statement,  we 
find  that  Hegel  regards  the  subjective  notion 
in  its  highest  form  of  expression  as  an  active 


249 


250  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 


force,  revealing  its  various  phases  through  a 
process  of  mediation,  in  a manner  which  gives 
complete  scope  for  the  realization  of  all  its 
possibilities.  The  subjective  notion  as  thus 
conceived  contains  within  the  very  conception 
itself  the  ground  of  its  objectivity.  In  speak- 
ing of  the  transition  from  the  subjective  notion 
to  the  objective,  we  do  not  express  correctly 
the  significance  of  the  Hegelian  conception.  It 
is  not  a transition  properly  speaking,  for  the 
objective  lies  within  the  subjective  as  a poten- 
tial moment  of  the  same.  Hegel  insists  as  a 
fundamental  postulate  of  his  whole  system  that 
the  syllogistic  process  is  not  merely  an  act  of 
consciousness.  We  have  seen  that  the  sub- 
jective notion  contains  the  implicit  categories 
of  being,  essence,  existence,  substantiality,  cause 
and  effect,  and  the  like.  The  subjective  may, 
therefore,  be  regarded  as  the  programme  of  cosmic 
evolution,  while  the  objective  is  the  historical 
evolution  itself.  Either  would  be  incomplete 
without  the  other.  Again,  the  idea  of  an  active 
process  which  is  the  essential  significance  of  the 
subjective  notion,  necessitates  a resulting  prod- 
uct ; and  the  product,  which  is  the  result  of  a 
mediation,  it  is  true,  is  nevertheless  as  a product 
something  immediate,  and  this  immediacy  is  one 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


251 


of  the  characteristic  features  of  objectivity. 
Hegel  defines  an  object  as  that  which  is  “ in- 
dependent, concrete,  and  complete  in  itself.”1 
There  is  only  one  conceivable  object  which  per- 
fectly fulfils  the  requirements  of  this  defini- 
tion,— the  Absolute,  God.  The  totality  of 
all  things,  the  universe  in  its  progressive  un- 
folding in  space  and  time,  represents  the  one 
all-embracing  object.  And  while  within  this 
totality,  Hegel  recognizes  separate  and  indepen- 
dent objects,  nevertheless  their  reality  is  assured 
only  in  so  far  as  they  partake  of  the  nature  of 
the  unifying  Absolute  underlying  them,  whose 
essential  nature  and  being  are  independent  of 
space  and  of  time. 

At  this  point  Hegel  refers  to  Kant’s  criticism 
of  the  ontological  proof  of  the  being  of  God, 
which  is  based  upon  the  statement  that  the 
thought  of  a thing  does  not  necessarily  imply 
its  existence,  and  insists  that  the  highest  expres- 
sion of  the  subjective  notion  is  an  altogether 
unique  thought,  of  such  a nature  as  to  combine 
the  notion  of  God  and  His  being  in  one.  Hegel 
says,  in  commenting  upon  the  Kantian  criticism, 
in  the  introductory  part  of  his  Logic : — 

“The  unexampled  favor  and  acceptance  which 
1 § 193. 


252  THE  DOCTRINE  OE  THE  NOTION 

attended  Kant’s  criticism  of  the  ontological 
proof  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  illustration 
which  he  made  use  of.  To  mark  the  differ- 
ence between  thought  and  being,  he  cited  the 
instance  of  a hundred  thalers  which,  as  far  as 
the  notion  is  concerned,  are  the  same  hundred 
thalers,  whether  real  or  only  possible,  though 
the  difference  is  manifest  as  regards  their  effect 
upon  a man’s  purse.  Nothing  can  be  more 
obvious  than  that  anything  we  only  think  or 
fancy  is  not  on  that  account  actual,  and  that 
a picture  of  the  imagination  or  even  a logical 
notion  cannot  attain  to  being.  Setting  aside 
the  fact  that  it  may  not  incorrectly  be  styled  a 
barbarism  of  language  to  apply  the  term  notion 
to  things  like  a hundred  thalers,  it  is  still  true 
that  they  who  like  to  taunt  the  philosophic  con- 
ception with  the  fundamental  difference  between 
being  and  thought,  might  have  admitted  that 
philosophers  were  not  wholly  ignorant  of  the 
fact.  Can  there  be,  indeed,  any  more  trivial 
observation  than  this  ? Above  all,  it  must  be 
remembered,  when  we  speak  of  God,  that  we 
have  an  object  of  a very  different  kind  than 
any  hundred  thalers,  and  unlike  any  particular 
notion,  idea,  or  whatever  we  may  choose  to  call 
it.  The  very  nature  of  everything  finite  is 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


253 


expressed  by  saying  that  its  being  in  time  and 
space  differs  from  its  notion.  God  should  be, 
however,  expressly  conceived  to  be  that  which 
can  only  be  ‘thought  of  as  existing.’  His 
notion  involves  being.  It  is  this  unity  of  the  notion 
and  being  that  constitutes  the  notion  of  God.”  1 
The  question  which  naturally  suggests  itself  at 
this  point  is  whether  Hegel’s  system  is  not  pan- 
theistic, whether  the  individuality  of  man  is 
not  completely  lost  in  the  universality  of  God. 
If  man  is  only  a spectator  for  a brief  time  of 
an  extremely  limited  portion  of  the  great  world 
evolution  which  is  solely  the  external  manifesta- 
tion of  God,  which  is  in  fact  God,  then  the 
whole  Hegelian  system,  as  the  product  of  the 
human  mind,  contradicts  and  stultifies  itself  by 
thus  eliminating  the  human  individuality  as  a 
real  factor  of  the  system  itself.  The  question 
whether  the  system  leads  logically  to  pantheism, 
it  is  not  in  the  scope  and  purpose  of  this  work, 
as  one  simply  of  exposition,  to  discuss ; never- 
theless, it  may  be  remarked  in  passing  that 
Hegel  himself  stoutly  maintains  that  individu- 
ality is  not  suppressed  in  universality,  but  is 
conserved  (aufgehoben ) in  a higher  state  of 
being  and  existence,  and  he  most  emphatically 
1 § 51. 


254  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  THE  NOTION 

disclaims  for  his  system  this  imputation  of  a 
pantheistic  taint.1 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  warrant  for  the 
notion  of  objectivity  is  contained  at  the  last 
analysis  in  the  notion  of  the  Absolute,  “ the 
only  true  being.”  So  also,  in  a similar  manner, 
the  warrant  for  the  notion  of  human  personality, 
Hegel  declares,  is  to  be  found  only  in  the  un- 
derlying, all-embracing  personality  of  God.  It 
is  a thought  similar  to  that  of  St.  Paul,  “In 
Him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being.” 

The  notion  of  objectivity,  as  developed  by 
Hegel,  manifests  itself  in  three  forms  : — 

(1)  Mechanism.  ( Der  Mechanisnms.') 

(2)  Chemism.  ( Der  Chemismus.') 

(3)  Teleology.  ( Die  Teleologie.') 

In  the  mechanical  type,  the  objects  stand  related 
in  an  external  manner,  and  without  evincing  any 
natural  affinity  as  regards  each  other.  They 
are  immediate,  and  each  indifferent  to  all  the 
others. 

In  the  chemical  type,  the  objects  exhibit  an 
essential  tendency  to  change  and  unite  with 
others,  so  that  their  significance  really  lies  in 
their  union  with  something  else. 

In  the  third  type,  the  teleological  relation 
1 See  § 151,  Zusatz. 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


255 


expresses  the  unity  of  mechanism  and  chemism. 
Like  the  mechanical  object,  it  is,  in  a sense,  a 
self-contained  totality,  inasmuch  as  a purpose 
has  always  some  complete  effect  as  an  end  in 
view ; at  the  same  time,  it  is  subjected  to  the 
principle  of  differentiation  and  change  in  order 
to  realize  the  end,  which  principle  is  the  essential 
characteristic  also  of  chemism. 

Hegel  divides  the  principle  of  mechanism  into 
three  kinds : — 

(1)  Formal  Mechanism.  (Formeller  Mechan- 
ismus.) 

(2)  Mechanism  accompanied  by  affinity. 
( Differenter  Mechanismus.) 

(3)  Absolute  Mechanism.  ( Absoluter  Mech- 
anismus.') 

Formal  mechanism  possesses  two  essential 
characteristics.  The  object  has  the  notion 
within  it  only  as  a potential ; for  the  notion  as 
subjective  is  primarily  outside  of  it.  And  in 
the  second  place,  the  objects  remain  independent 
and  are  related  to  each  other  only  in  an  external 
manner.  Figuratively,  we  speak  of  a mechanical 
memory,  where  ideas  are  associated  externally 
and  where  the  element  of  thought  to  a large 
extent  is  omitted.  Hegel  says,  “Whenever  a 
man’s  mind  and  will  are  not  in  his  actions,  his 


256  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

conduct  is  called  mechanical.” 1 The  relation 
which  obtains  between  objects  which  are 
mechanically  connected  is  one  of  pressure  and 
of  impact,  which  operate  essentially  as  external 
forces. 

The  second  form  of  mechanism  has  associated 
with  it  the  element  of  affinity.  An  object 
which  is  operated  upon  by  some  external  force 
is  affected  by  it  not  merely  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  force  operating  upon  it,  but  as 
well  by  its  own  nature.  Thus  a billiard  ball 
made  of  ivory  and  another  made  of  putty 
behave  differently  when  subjected  to  precisely 
the  same  impact.  Therefore,  what  it  is  possible 
for  any  object  to  effect  mechanically  does  not 
depend  merely  upon  its  own  native  force,  or  as 
Hegel  puts  it,  its  own  centrality  ( die  Central- 
itat ),  but  also  upon  the  nature  of  the  object 
upon  which  it  acts  as  well,  — that  is,  the  central- 
ity of  the  other  lying  outside  of  itself.  In  other 
words,  no  object  is  fully  self-centred ; and  when 
two  objects  are  so  related  that  the  centre  of 
each  must  receive  some  complementary  element 
which  belongs  to  the  centre  of  the  other  in 
order  to  complete  its  significance,  the  relation 
between  them  is  of  this  second  type,  that  of 
1 § 195. 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


257 


mechanism  with  affinity.  The  illustrations  of 
this  order  of  mechanism  which  Hegel  gives  are 
the  relation  of  gravitation,  in  which  the  result 
varies  according  to  the  relative  centrality  of 
each  of  the  objects  mutually  attracted ; the  rela- 
tion of  desire  to  its  object ; and  the  relation  of 
the  social  instinct  which  binds  together  the 
different  members  of  one  and  the  same  society. 

Every  object  may  be  regarded  as  a system 
within  itself.  The  centre  of  such  a system 
Hegel  calls  an  abstract  centre,  — that  is,  without 
reference  to  anything  outside  of  itself.  When 
two  objects  come  into  a mechanical  relation, 
one  to  the  other,  the  centre  of  each  in  turn 
becomes  the  relative  centre  of  the  other.  The 
centre  of  that  system  which  includes  the  two 
objects  and  their  relative  centres  within  its 
scope  is  the  absolute  centre.  Absolute  mechan- 
ism is  merely  the  fully  expressed  form  of  the 
type  of  mechanism  with  affinity.  These  rela- 
tions of  the  various  kinds  of  centres  may  be 
illustrated  by  the  mutual  attraction  of  two 
masses,  each  of  which  may  be  represented  as 
concentrated  at  a single  point,  which  is  its 
abstract  centre.  Each  point  has  in  turn  a rela- 
tive centre  in  the  other,  and  both  are  referable 
to  an  absolute  centre  which  lies  between  them. 


258  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

Thus  the  earth  revolves  about  the  sun  as  its 
relative  centre ; its  absolute  centre  lies  between 
earth  and  sun  in  such  a way  that  the  earth  and 
sun  both  revolve  about  it.  However,  the  abso- 
lute centre  is  so  near  the  sun  centre  that  the 
difference  is  discounted,  and  we  refer  simply  to 
the  earth’s  revolution  about  the  central  sun. 
But  to  speak  precisely,  the  real  centre  of  the 
system  lies  between  the  earth  centre  and  the 
sun  centre.  Inasmuch  as  this  is  a mechanical 
relation,  it  is  dynamic.  And  the  dynamic  always 
expresses  itself  in  a syllogistic  process,  — that  is, 
the  mediation  of  two  terms  by  means  of  a com- 
mon or  middle  term.  We  have,  therefore,  a 
triad  of  syllogisms,  corresponding  to  the  three 
possible  mechanical  relations.  Let  I represent 
any  individual  object,  P its  particular  or  rela- 
tive centre,  and  U the  universal  or  absolute 
centre. 

The  resulting  syllogisms  would  be  as  fol- 
lows : — 

(1)  The  type  expressed  by  the  formula 
I-P-U,  in  which  the  relative  centre  is  regarded 
as  the  mediating  term  between  the  individual 
object  and  its  absolute  centre. 

(2)  The  type  expressed  by  the  formula 
U-I-P,  in  which  the  individual  object  forms 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


259 


the  mean  between  its  relative  and  absolute 
centres. 

(3)  The  type  expressed  by  the  formula  P-U-I, 
in  which  the  universal  or  absolute  centre  is  the 
mean  between  the  individual  object  and  its 
relative  centre. 

As  an  illustration  of  these  three  syllogisms, 
Hegel  cites  the  state  in  its  various  relations  to 
the  individual  and  his  particular  needs.  “ In  the 
first  instance,  the  individual  in  virtue  of  his 
particular  being,  or  his  physical  and  mental 
needs  (which  when  completely  developed  give 
civil  society)  enters  into  union  with  the  uni- 
versal, — that  is,  with  society,  law,  right,  gov- 
ernment. Secondly,  the  will  or  conduct  of  the 
individuals  is  the  intermediating  force  which 
procures  for  these  needs  satisfaction  in  society, 
in  law,  etc.,  and  which  gives  to  society,  law,  etc., 
their  fulfilment  and  realization.  But,  thirdly,  the 
universal  — that  is,  the  state,  government,  and 
law — is  the  mean,  the  underlying  substance  in 
which  the  individuals  and  their  satisfaction 
have  and  receive  their  fulfilled  reality,  inter- 
mediation, and  persistence.”  1 

In  mechanism  the  related  objects  preserve  a 
quasi  independence ; but  when  they  lose  their 
i § 198. 


260  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

independence  in  the  affinity  which  each  has  for 
its  antithesis,  and  they  so  coalesce  that  the 
identity  of  each  is  merged  in  the  product  result- 
ing from  their  combination,  then  the  relation 
thus  characterized  is  that  of  chemism.  Thus  a 
natural  transition  is  effected  from  the  mechani- 
cal relation  to  the  chemical.  The  product 
thus  formed  is  a neutral,  inasmuch  as  the  indi- 
vidual striving  of  each  of  the  elements  which 
constitute  it  ceases  completely  when  the  process 
has  been  finished  and  the  product  alone  re- 
mains. However,  concerning  this  neutral, 
which  we  may  regard  as  the  mean,  it  may  be 
resolved  by  chemical  analysis  into  the  two 
original  extremes.  But  the  inverse  process  is 
independent  of  the  former  combining  process. 
The  resulting  product  does  not  of  itself  separate 
into  its  component  parts.  The  first  process 
exhausts  itself,  and  its  activity  ceases  when 
once  the  product  has  been  formed.  There  is 
in  these  operations  of  chemical  combination  and 
of  chemical  analysis  no  centre  of  initiation. 
Chemical  affinity  seems  in  a manner  to  be  a 
kind  of  selective  attraction,  and  yet  there  is  no 
self-directing  activity.  If  there  were,  it  would 
have  a longer  life,  and  not  consume  its  energy 
in  the  process  of  using  it.  The  chemical  pro- 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


261 


cess,  therefore,  does  not  rise  above  a conditioned 
and  finite  activity.  “ The  notion,  as  notion,  is 
only  the  heart  and  core  of  the  process,  and  does 
not  in  this  stage  come  to  existence  in  its  own 
individual  being.  In  the  neutral  product  the 
process  is  extinct,  and  the  existing  cause  falls 
outside  of  it.”  1 

This  lack  of  spontaneous  activity,  of  all  initia- 
tive, indicates  a state  which  is  unsatisfactory  in 
the  extreme.  The  very  nature  of  thought  con- 
strains us  to  demand  some  more  fundamental 
relation  than  either  mechanism  or  chemism 
as  the  supreme  principle  of  activity  in  the 
universe.  Such  a relation  must  involve  the 
element  of  purpose  or  finality,  in  which  there 
is  a liberation  of  the  notion  or  reason.  It  is  in 
the  teleological  relation  that  we  find  an  ex- 
plicit and  undisguised  manifestation  of  a 
supreme  principle  of  intelligence  in  its  free 
conscious  activity.  In  mechanism  and  chem- 
ism the  notion  is  present,  it  is  true,  but  only 
in  the  germ,  and  not  yet  evolved.  The  notion, 
however,  in  the  form  of  the  aim  or  end  ( der 
Zwecfc)  comes  into  an  existence  of  its  own.  In 
the  lower  relations  the  notion  is  imprisoned,  as 
it  were,  behind  the  barriers  of  objectivity.  But 
1 § 202,  Zusatz. 


262  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

in  the  teleological  relation  these  barriers  are 
burst  asunder,  the  objectivity  overcome,  and 
the  subjectivity  of  the  notion  completely 
asserted.  Hegel  expresses  this  by  saying  that 
the  idea  of  an  end  to  be  achieved  is  the  nega- 
tion of  immediate  objectivity ; it  is  also  a 
recognition  of  the  antithesis  between  subject 
and  object,  and  the  overcoming  of  the  same. 
Thus  when  we  entertain  a purpose  in  mind, 
its  subjective  character  is  antithetical  to  the 
purpose  conceived  as  realized  objectively.  But 
when  the  purpose  in  the  mind  goes  forth  into 
action,  and  the  objective  end  is  actually  realized, 
then  all  difference  between  the  end  in  view  and 
the  end  achieved  has  been  overcome,  and  there  is 
a complete  synthesis  of  subjective  and  objective. 

The  difference  between  efficient  cause  and 
final  cause  may  be  indicated  at  this  point.  The 
efficient  cause  appears  as  passing  into  its  other, 
the  effect,  and  it  therefore  loses  its  essential 
priority  in  the  latter  by  sinking  into  a sort  of 
dependency.  The  aim  or  end,  on  the  other 
hand,  must  necessarily  contain  in  its  own  nature 
the  determining  and  significant  factors  of  the 
whole  resulting  process.  In  the  simple  causal 
relation  the  effect  seems  to  emphasize  its  nature 
of  otherness  as  regards  its  cause. 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


263 


By  aim  or  end  we  must  not  think  merely  of 
the  purposes  which  are  ever  present  in  con- 
sciousness, and  which  we  achieve  by  means  of 
objects  external  to  us.  There  is  also  an 
inner  design,  an  immanent  finality  in  things 
themselves,  as  has  been  emphasized  both  by 
Aristotle  and  Kant.  The  purely  external  de- 
sign, the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  may 
be  seen  in  the  various  phenomena  of  utility. 
Hegel  cites  as  an  illustration  of  the  relation 
of  the  subjective  to  the  objective  in  teleology 
the  case  of  appetite  or  desire.  There  is  the 
subjective  desire,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
object  which  will  satisfy  it,  on  the  other.  But 
the  two  are  apart,  and  therein  consists  the  con- 
tradiction between  them.  It  is  only  in  the 
complete  satisfaction  of  the  desire  through  the 
attainment  of  its  object,  that  this  contradiction 
is  overcome,  and  the  two  extremes,  subjec- 
tivity and  objectivity,  become  reconciled.  The 
teleological  relation  is  represented  by  a syl- 
logism, in  which  the  subjective  design  coa- 
lesces with  its  external  object,  by  means  of 
a middle  term  which  constitutes  the  unity 
of  both.  The  middle  term  is  the  means 
which  is  used  to  bring  about  the  desired 
result. 


264  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  THE  NOTION 

Hegel  marks  three  stages  in  the  development 
of  the  subjective  design. 

(1)  The  Subjective  End.  ( Der  subjective 
Zweck .) 

(2)  The  End  in  process  of  accomplishment. 
( Der  sich  vollfiihrende  Zweclc.') 

(3)  The  End  accomplished.  ( Der  vollfuhrte 
Zweck.) 

The  first  syllogism  of  final  cause  is  made  up 
of  the  following  three  terms  : — 

The  universal  is  the  end  indefinitely  desired. 

The  particular  is  the  end  definitely  desired,  as 
a particular  mode  of  the  universal  in  question. 

The  individual  is  the  self  whose  activity 
makes  a particular  choice  out  of  the  various 
possibilities  which  the  indefinite  universal 
embraces. 

Thus,  we  might  have  as  an  indefinite  end  in 
view,  the  building  of  a house.  This  would 
stand  as  a universal  admitting  of  an  indefinite 
variety  of  particular  modes  of  realization.  The 
individual  choice  would  then  appear  as  the  de- 
termining force,  initiating  the  actual  process  of 
accomplishment  towards  a specific  end. 

In  the  second  place  the  initiative  activity  of 
the  individual  throws  itself  immediately  upon 
something  objective  which  it  appropriates  to 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


265 


itself  as  means  of  bringing  about  the  desired 
end.  Here  the  middle  term  is  the  subjective 
power  of  the  notion  tending  to  bring  together 
the  subjective  end  desired  and  the  objective 
material  which  is  to  be  used  in  its  realization. 
In  finite  design  the  mediating  term  in  this  pro- 
cess is  twofold,  a combination  of  the  active 
powers  of  the  individual,  and  the  objective 
material  upon  which  they  work  as  the  means  of 
realizing  the  end  in  view.  Thus,  in  the  illus- 
tration of  building  a house,  the  materials  used 
in  its  construction  must  be  first  immediately 
appropriated  by  the  constructive  mind  before 
they  can  become  its  instruments  in  the  actual 
putting  together  of  part  to  part  in  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  complete  architectural  design,  which 
process  is  essentially  one  of  mediation,  — that  is, 
syllogistic.  Or  to  cite  Hegel’s  illustration, 
drawn  from  another  and  a higher  source : 
“ Every  living  being  has  a body  ; the  soul  takes 
possession  of  it,  and  in  that  act  has  at  once 
objectified  itself.  The  human  soul  has  much  to 
do  before  it  makes  its  corporeal  nature  into  a 
means.  Man  must,  as  it  were,  take  possession 
of  his  body,  so  that  it  may  be  the  instrument  of 
his  soul.”  1 


1 § 208,  Zusatz. 


266  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

All  this  is  preliminary  to  the  actual  realization 
of  the  design  by  means  of  the  objective  mate- 
rials and  forces  which  have  been  both  invaded 
and  pervaded  by  the  purposing  mind.  This 
brings  us  to  the  point  where  the  end  is  finally  real- 
ized, — the  third  and  last  stage  in  the  process. 
Now  while  the  subjective  end  rules  these  material 
processes  which  are  the  mechanical  and  chemical 
forces  already  described,  it  does  so  without 
losing  itself  in  them.  It  takes  advantage  of 
their  activity  and  compels  them  to  serve  its 
ends,  while  its  controlling  intelligence  is  in  the 
background.  This  Hegel  calls  the  craft  of 
reason  (die  List  der  Vernuft).  The  craft  of 
reason  consists  in  the  controlling  sway  which  it 
exercises  over  objects  while  yet  permitting  them 
to  obey  their  own  mechanical  or  chemical  bent. 
“ Divine  Providence,”  says  Hegel,  “ may  be  said 
to  stand  to  the  world  and  its  processes  in  the 
capacity  of  absolute  craft.1  God  lets  men  direct 
their  particular  passions  and  interests  as  they 

1 Wallace  in  this  connection  translates  the  word  List  as 
cunning.  When  applied  to  the  Deity,  it  is  apt  to  leave  an 
incorrect  and  rather  disconcerting  impression.  The  word 
“ craft,”  which  may  also  offend  the  sentiments  of  some  when 
applied  to  God,  seems,  however,  to  be  less  objectionable  in 
this  respect,  and  has  therefore  been  used  in  the  above 
translation. 


THE  OBJECTIVE  NOTION 


267 


please  ; but  the  result  is  accomplished,  — not  of 
their  plans  but  of  His,  and  these  differ  decidedly 
from  the  ends  primarily  sought  by  those  whom 
He  employs.”1 

The  realized  end  expresses  the  complete  unity 
of  the  subjective  and  the  objective  ; but  in  finite 
design  the  accomplished  aim  is  itself  no  less 
fragmentary  and  defective  than  was  the  ini- 
tial aim  and  means  used  in  the  process  of  its 
realization.  The  end  which  is  achieved  is  only 
itself  an  object,  which  may  again  become  the 
means  or  material  for  other  purposes,  and  so 
on  ad  infinitum. 

Infinite  design  is,  on  the  other  hand,  of  such 
a nature  that  it  comprises  within  its  own  self 
the  means  to  realize  its  ends.  The  process  of 
the  same  is  one  of  self-mediation.  It  is  the 
self-determined  notion,  representing  the  com- 
plete unity  of  subject  and  object.  This  Hegel 
calls  the  idea  (die  Idee'), — a term  which  he  has 
selected  in  order  to  emphasize  its  nature  as  that 
which  is  essentially  and  fundamentally  reason 
itself. 

In  mechanism  and  chemism  the  notion  appears 
as  an  sick , — that  is,  implicit.  In  the  teleologi- 
cal relation,  it  is  fur  sicJi , — that  is,  explicit. 

*§  229,  Zusatz. 


268  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

But  in  the  eternal  purpose  ( die  Idee ) it  is 
both  an  sick  und  fur  sich,  — that  is,  revealing 
itself  by  the  light  of  its  own  nature  in  a mani- 
festation completely  self-determined  and  self- 
directed. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON 

HEGEL  identifies  the  idea  with  truth.  By 
truth  he  means  the  complete  correspond- 
ence of  any  object  with  its  notion.  That  is 
only  a formal  truth,  mere  correctness,  which  con- 
sists solely  in  a reference  to  our  consciousness. 
Truth  in  a deeper  sense  is  the  identification 
of  subject  and  object.  In  this  sense  the  Abso- 
lute is  the  idea,  the  truth  itself.  Every  indi- 
vidual object  of  knowledge  represents  a phase 
of  the  Absolute,  but  a partial  and  imperfect 
phase.  Every  finite  object  fails  to  realize  its 
notion  completely,  and  therefore  is  so  far  forth 
limited  and  defective.  All  objects  are  true  so 
far  as  they  prove  to  be  what  they  ought  to  be. 
The  true  man  is  the  ideal  man,  — that  is,  one 
who  perfectly  realizes  the  idea  of  a man.  So 
also  the  true  state,  the  true  work  of  art,  are 
such  so  far  only  as  they  realize  their  ideal. 

The  idea,  moreover,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
is  not  merely  the  underlying  substance  of  all 
269 


270  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

tilings.  It  is  essentially  the  subject.  It  is 

personal  and  conscious  as  well  as  intelligent. 
All  individuals  find  their  truth  in  this  one  uni- 
versal mind  which  upholds  all  things  by  His 
wisdom,  power,  and  love.  Far  from  being  a 
mere  abstract  conception,  the  idea  is  the  most 
concrete  of  all  possible  manifestations,  for  it 
embraces  the  totality  of  all  objectivity.  The 
categories  of  being,  essence,  and  the  notion  find 
their  truth  only  in  this  supreme  category  of  the 
idea. 

The  mere  understanding  would  criticise  the 
doctrine  of  the  idea  as  containing  inconsistencies 
and  contradictions,  such  as  are  expressed  in  the 
terms,  “ subject  and  object,”  “ finite  and  infinite,” 
“ the  ideal  and  the  real,”  “ the  one  and  the 
many.”  Yet  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  is 
of  the  very  nature  of  the  dialectic  that  the 
idea,  inasmuch  as  it  embraces  the  totality  of 
the  universe,  should  involve  contradictions  ; but 
which,  however,  at  the  same  time  it  is  sufficient 
to  overcome,  and  to  present  in  a profounder 
unity.  The  activity  of  the  idea  is  eternal. 
The  cosmic  process  is  fundamentally  the  mani- 
festation of  reason ; it  is  the  idea  revealing 
itself  in  objectivity.  The  idea  represents  an 
infinite  judgment  whose  several  terms  consti- 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  271 


tute  an  independent  totality  of  such  a nature 
that  each  term  growing  to  the  fulness  of  its 
own  being  passes  over  into  its  other  and  advanced 
form,  thus  providing  for  a progressive  evolution 
of  the  one  central  idea  which  is  eternally  self- 
complete  and  self-sufficient.  None  of  the  other 
categories  exhibits  this  totality  as  complete  in 
its  two  essential  aspects  of  subjectivity  and 
objectivity. 

Hegel  refers  to  the  dialectic  process  of  the  mani- 
festation of  the  idea  as  an  absolute  negativity  ( ab- 
solute Negativitcit ), — that  is,  a process  in  which 
there  is  an  antagonism  of  opposites,  which  is  the 
first  negative ; but  this  antagonism  is  overcome 
by  means  of  the  negation  of  the  first  negative, 
which  is  the  absolute  negation  or  real  affirmation. 
Thus  the  notion  as  subjective  is  arrayed  against 
the  notion  as  objective,  but  this  contradiction  is 
overcome  by  an  immanent  dialectic  which  finds 
its  way  back  again  to  a subjectivity  which 
embraces  objectivity  as  well.  This  state  is 
something  more  than  the  mere  unity  of  subjec- 
tive and  objective,  or  of  the  infinite  and  finite ; 
for  as  Hegel  insists,  the  idea  is  essentially  a 
process  which  implies  the  idea  of  movement, 
whereas  the  term  unity  implies  rest.  Moreover, 
it  is  not  a mere  unity  in  which  the  infinite 


272  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

lias  been  neutralized  by  the  finite,  the  subjective 
by  the  objective,  thought  by  being ; but  in  the 
absolute  negative  function  of  the  idea,  — that  is, 
the  overcoming  of  antithesis  by  a more  profound 
synthesis,  — the  infinite  is  to  be  regarded  as 
overlapping  and  embracing  the  finite  ; so  also 
thought  embraces  being,  and  subjectivity  em- 
braces objectivity.  The  idea  in  its  process  of 
development  passes  through  three  distinct 
stages : — 

(1)  The  Idea  as  Life.  ( Das  Leben.') 

(2)  The  Idea  as  Knowledge.  ( Das  Ur- 

kennen.') 

(3)  The  Absolute  Idea.  (Die  absolute  Idee.') 

In  the  first  form  the  idea  is  revealed  in  its 

simplest  state  as  immediate, — that  is,  without 
manifesting  the  underlying  ground  by  which 
it  is  constituted  and  the  relations  which  it  is 
capable  of  sustaining. 

In  the  second  form  the  idea  appears  in  its 
state  of  mediation  or  differentiation,  — that  is,  it 
has  become  specified  and  definite  by  the  mani- 
festation of  its  particular  characteristics  and 
relations.  It  is  in  this  stage  that  the  idea 
becomes  conscious  of  itself.  Its  essential  form 
is  that  of  knowledge,  both  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical. The  process  of  knowledge  leads  to  a final 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  273 

synthesis  which  embraces  all  of  the  specific  differ- 
ences revealed  in  the  process  of  development. 
This  gives  the  third  form  of  the  idea,  the 
absolute  idea  which  as  the  last  term  of  the 
evolution  proves  itself  to  be  the  first  also,  and 
the  underlying  basis  of  the  process  as  a whole. 
It  is  the  source,  ground,  consummation  all  in  one. 
In  its  primary  form  the  idea  is  manifested  im- 
mediately as  life.  This  is  the  initial  point  in  the 
objectifying  of  the  subjective  notion.  As  a begin- 
ning, it  is  to  be  merely  accepted  as  immediately 
given.  Starting,  therefore,  with  this  datum  of  a 
living  being,  Hegel  proceeds  to  analyze  its  nature. 
Every  living  being  is  an  individual,  preserving  its 
individuality  through  all  the  various  changes  of 
bodily  growth,  and  the  indefinite  variety  of  its 
particular  moods  and  activities.  Moreover,  all 
particular  manifestations  are  to  be  referred  to  a 
central  principle  which  is  the  ground  of  their 
unity  and  the  source  of  their  being  and  activity. 
This  central  principle  is  by  nature  essentially  a 
universal.  Thus  in  a living  body  we  have  exhib- 
ited the  universal  principle  of  its  being,  its  soul 
centre,  also  its  particular  activities  and  phenome- 
nal manifestation,  and  the  individuality  which  is 
self-preserved  in  the  midst  of  all  possible  varia- 
tions. The  living  body,  therefore,  embraces  in 


274  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

the  simplest  possible  form  the  three  moments  of 
the  notion,  individuality,  particularity,  and  uni- 
versality. All  of  its  component  parts  form  a 
complex  system  exhibiting,  as  Hegel  styles  it, 
a negative  unity  ( negative  Einheit'),  — that  is,  a 
unity  which  combines  within  itself  differentiated, 
opposed,  but  at  the  same  time  essentially  related 
parts ; it  is  a unity  in  the  midst  of  difference. 

The  defect  of  life  consists  in  the  fact  that  its 
notion  and  its  reality  do  not  correspond.  It  is 
characteristic  of  life  that  soul  and  body  are  sep- 
arable. The  notion  of  life  is  the  soul,  and  the 
soul  has  the  body  for  its  reality.  But  in  its 
simplest  and  primary  manifestation  the  soul  is, 
as  it  were,  poured  out  and  diffused  into  the  cor- 
poreal elements,  and,  therefore,  the  soul  is  in  its 
earliest  stage  sentient  only,  and  not  yet  freely 
self-conscious.  The  process  of  life  consists  in 
overcoming  this  preliminary  stage  of  being  and 
reaching  the  stage  of  self-consciousness.  This 
process,  however,  has  to  run  through  three 
stages  before  it  attains  to  the  higher  level  of 
knowledge. 

The  first  stage  is  the  process  of  the  living 
being  within  itself.  Its  corporeal  parts  are  rela- 
tively external,  and  present  an  evident  distinc- 
tion and  antagonism  between  its  elements  which 


THE  IDEA  OK  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  275 


are  surrendered  to  one  another,  assimilate  one 
another,  and  persist  by  reproducing  themselves. 
All  these  functions,  however,  are  to  be  referred 
to  the  activity  of  the  architectonic  principle 
within ; consequently  the  underlying  unity  is 
preserved  in  the  midst  of  this  indefinite  variety 
of  seemingly  independent  functions.  The  pro- 
cess of  the  vital  subject  within  its  own  limits 
appears  in  the  three  forms  of  sensibility,  irrita- 
bility, and  reproduction. 

As  sensibility  the  soul  is  present  in  every  part 
of  the  body,  so  that  their  independence  and  mu- 
tual exclusiveness  is  only  a seeming,  and  they 
are  in  reality  merely  elements  of  one  and  the 
same  central  and  all-pervading  subject. 

As  irritability,  the  living  being  seems  to  break 
up  into  separate  parts, a process  of  differentiation. 

As  reproduction,  the  living  being  is  perpetu- 
ally restoring  itself  out  of  the  inner  differentia- 
tion of  its  members. 

In  the  second  stage  the  living  being  proceeds 
to  exert  its  power  over  inorganic  nature  ; it  sub- 
dues and  assimilates  it  to  itself.  The  result  of 
this  process  is  not  a neutral  product  as  in  chern- 
ism,  but  the  living  being  embraces  the  inorganic 
elements  within  its  own  life.  The  inorganic  na- 
ture, however,  which  is  subdued  by  the  vital 


276  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

agent,  surrenders  itself  in  the  process  because 
it  is  potentially  what  life  is  actually.  This  is 
in  full  accord  with  the  fundamental  postulate 
of  the  Hegelian  system  that  there  is  but  one 
elemental  force  in  the  universe,  the  mind  force, 
and  that  it  underlies  the  elements  of  inert  mat- 
ter as  well  as  the  vital  forces  and  activities. 
When,  therefore,  a living  being  assimilates  its 
corporeal  elements,  matter  is  raised  to  a higher 
level  in  which  is  effected  the  realization  of  its 
potential  essence.  Thus,  even  in  its  material 
elements,  the  living  body  may  be  said  to  find 
itself.  When,  however,  the  soul  is  separated 
from  its  body  in  death,  the  elemental  forces  of 
objectivity  begin  their  play  upon  the  lower 
mechanical  and  chemical  level.  There  is  even 
in  life  a constant  tendency  in  these  forces  to 
assert  their  lower  functions,  and  life  is  a per- 
petual battle  to  subdue  and  elevate  them. 

The  result  of  this  continuous  process  of  assimi- 
lation gives  us  the  third  stage  in  the  develop- 
ment of  life,  a combination  of  particular  organs 
and  functions  constituting  a definite  and  specific 
order  of  the  living  being,  which  Hegel  charac- 
terizes as  implicitly  a genus  or  kind  ( eine  Grat- 
tung  an  sicli).  The  living  being,  regarded  as  a 
genus,  ranks  as  a universal.  This  universal 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  277 


particularizes  itself  in  a number  of  individuals 
through  the  connection  of  the  living  subject 
with  another  subject  of  its  own  kind. 

The  process  of  the  genus  brings  it  to  a being 
of  its  own.  But  the  being  as  an  individual  is 
dependent  and  mediated.  The  individual  is 
implicitly  a universal,  but  in  his  immediate 
existence  is  merely  an  individual.  Death  shows 
that  the  universal  is  the  power  that  upholds  the 
immediate  individual.  The  mere  animal  never 
proceeds  so  far  in  its  generic  life  as  to  have  a 
being  of  its  own.  It  yields  to  the  domination 
of  the  genus.  Tennyson  has  given  expression  to 
this  Hegelian  idea  in  the  lines  : — 

“ Are  God  and  Nature  then  at  strife, 

That  Nature  lends  such  evil  dreams,  — 

So  careful  of  the  type  she  seems, 

So  careless  of  the  single  life.” 

In  the  process  of  life,  however,  there  is  a 
constant  struggle  to  overcome  the  immediacy 
which  is  the  defect  of  life,  so  that  the  idea  may 
come  to  itself,  and  realize  its  own  truth  in  a free 
existence  of  its  own.  That  which  appears  as  a 
generic  universal  in  a lower  sphere  extricates 
itself  and  manifests  itself  as  Ego  or  conscious- 
ness in  its  higher  evolution.  It  is  the  process 
of  the  idea  coming  to  a consciousness  of  itself, 


278  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  THE  NOTION 

and  in  this  higher  form  it  exists  free  and  for 
itself.  In  this  consciousness,  two  judgments 
are  involved.  The  first  is  a distinguishing  of 
itself  in  its  pure  nature  as  subjectivity;  the 
second,  the  recognition  of  an  objectivity  seem- 
ingly external  to  itself.  On  the  one  hand,  there 
is  the  Ego,  the  universal  reason,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  non-ego,  or  the  objective  world.  The 
one  is  spirit,  the  other  is  nature.  The  two  are 
implicitly  identical  but  not  yet  necessarily  rec- 
ognized as  explicitly  identical.  That  the  iden- 
tity of  nature  and  spirit  should  he  only  implicit 
is  the  mark  of  finitude.  It  is  the  peculiar  office 
of  reason  to  render  explicit  their  fundamental 
identity.  It  is  in  the  process  of  cognition,  there- 
fore, in  the  idea  coming  to  a self-consciousness, 
that  the  onesidedness  of  subjectivity  and  of  ob- 
jectivity is  overcome.  In  this  process  there  is, 
on  the  one  hand,  a rationalizing  of  the  objective 
world, — that  is,  its  translation  into  subjective 
conception  and  thought ; and  on  the  other,  an 
assertion  of  subjective  ideals  in  the  midst  of  the 
objective  phenomena  of  being,  modifying  and 
adapting  them  to  its  needs  and  standards.  The 
tendency  of  thought  to  rationalize  the  universe, 
— to  interpret  by  reducing  it  to  the  simplest 
forms  of  description  and  formulating  its  funda- 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  279 


mental  laws,  — this  is  the  labor  of  science  in 
its  search  for  truth,  and  is,  according  to  Hegel, 
cognition  properly  so  called,  or  the  theoretical 
activity  of  the  idea.  The  tendency  to  compel 
the  phenomenal  world  to  conform  to  the  ideals 
of  reason,  and  to  realize  the  ascendency  of  the 
good,  is  the  peculiar  office  of  the  practical 
activity  of  the  idea,  or  volition.  Thus  cogni- 
tion is  of  two  kinds  : — 

(1)  Theoretical  Knowledge,  or  Cognition 

Proper.  ( Das  JErkennen  als  solches .) 

(2)  Practical  Knowledge,  or  Volition.  ( Das 

Wollen.') 

The  finite  cognition  labors  under  the  difficulty 
of  being  unable  to  overcome  the  antithesis  of 
subject  and  object.  The  reception  of  the  mate- 
rial data  of  the  senses  by  the  cognizing  sub- 
ject seems  to  be  merely  an  assimilation  by  the 
thought  process  of  that  which  is  in  a way 
foreign  to  it.  Its  categories  never  enter  into 
complete  union  with  it.  Therefore,  while  rea- 
son is  active  here  as  everywhere,  it  is  reason  in 
the  form  of  the  understanding  merely,  and  it 
fails  to  reach  the  higher  level  of  reason  in  two 
particulars : It  presupposes  an  objective  world 
already  given  and  ready  made,  and  secondly, 
it  views  the  mind  as  a tabula  rasa,  which  is 


280  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

perfectly  passive  in  receiving  and  recording 
impressions  made  upon  it  by  the  data  of  sense- 
perception.  The  true  view  of  the  subject  in 
its  cognition  of  the  object  is  that  the  mind  is 
an  active  force  not  merely  confronting  the 
objective  world,  but  in  it,  and  through  it,  and 
underlying  it  as  well. 

Finite  cognition,  working  even  upon  the  lower 
level  in  which  a ready-made  world  in  antithesis 
to  the  knowing  subject  is  the  nature  of  the 
presupposition  framed  by  the  perceiving  mind, 
operates  in  two  distinct  forms : — 

(1)  The  Analytic  Method.  ( Die  analytische 
Methode .) 

(2)  The  Synthetic  Method.  QDie  synthetische 
Methode.') 

The  analytic  method  examines  every  individ- 
ual phenomenon  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
its  various  particular  characteristics,  separating 
the  essential  from  the  unessential,  and  then 
referring  it  to  its  appropriate  genus,  cause,  or 
law  as  the  case  may  be,  any  one  of  which  would 
represent  its  corresponding  universal. 

The  movement  of  the  synthetic  method  is 
the  reverse  of  the  analytic  method.  The  start- 
ing-point of  the  synthetic  method  is  that  of  the 
universal.  Its  activity  is  essentially  construe- 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  281 


tive.  It  works  as  an  architectonic  principle  to 
produce  all  the  particular  manifestations  of 
itself  which  are  possible  in  accordance  with 
its  essential  and  universal  nature,  and  as  re- 
vealed ultimately  in  the  organization  and  com- 
pleted being  of  concrete  individuals.  For  the 
various  elements  which  enter  into  the  construc- 
tive activity  of  the  notion,  Hegel  employs  the 
following  terms : — 

The  essential  nature  of  the  fundamental  uni- 
versal in  its  synthetic  activity  is  given  by  defini- 
tion. 

The  particular  manifestations  of  which  it  is 
in  general  capable  are  given  by  division. 

The  concrete  individuality,  which  is  always 
some  definite  object,  constituted  by  a nexus  of 
complex  relations,  is  called  a theorem. 

The  process  which  supplies  the  necessary  ele- 
ments which  serve  as  mediating  terms  in  the 
nexus  of  complex  relations  is  called  the  process 
of  construction.  Its  function  is  to  fuse  into 
one  these  different  elemental  parts. 

The  process  from  which  cognition  derives  the 
necessity  of  this  nexus  is  called  demonstration. 

Hegel  has  taken  the  names  of  these  familiar 
logical  processes,  which  in  the  traditional  logic 
are  essentially  thought  processes,  and  in  the 


282  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

present  connection  has  applied  them  to  the 
actual  dynamic  processes  operative  throughout 
the  entire  realm  of  nature  in  the  production  of 
all  beings  animate  and  inanimate,  each  fashioned 
in  particular  forms  according  to  its  kind.  More- 
over, it  is  the  function  of  cognition  to  prove 
that  the  relations  between  the  different  elements 
in  the  objective  world  which  it  perceives  are 
necessary  relations.  It  is  in  this  process,  which 
Hegel  calls  demonstration,  that  an  underlying 
necessity  is  revealed,  whereas  in  the  primary 
presupposition  of  finite  thought  the  world  is 
regarded  as  simply  given  and,  as  far  as  known, 
its  relations  contingent  and  variable.  But  in 
the  process  of  cognition  itself,  there  has  been 
a progress  towards  an  appreciation  of  existent 
relations  as  necessary.  This  necessity,  Hegel 
affirms,  is  the  necessity  of  reason.  It  is  reached 
by  subjective  agency.  This  subjectivity  was 
conceived  at  the  starting-point  by  mere  under- 
standing as  a tabula  rasa.  This  conception 
must  now  give  place  to  the  higher  conception 
of  the  reason.  Subjective  thought  must  be 
regarded  as  essentially  active,  as  a modifying 
and  determining  principle  in  the  midst  of  the 
crude  data  of  sense-perception.  The  knowing 
mind  is  essentially  active,  and  in  the  manifesta- 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  283 


tion  of  this  activity  it  determines  the  manner 
and  the  end  of  that  activity.  Thus  the  transi- 
tion is  effected  from  theoretical  to  practical 
cognition,  — that  is,  from  cognition  proper  to 
volition.  The  significance  of  this,  according  to 
Hegel,  is  that  a true  appreciation  of  the  nature 
of  the  universal  necessitates  its  apprehension 
as  subjectivity,  as  a notion  self-moving,  active, 
and  imposing  modifications.  It  merely  empha- 
sizes in  this  particular  connection  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  entire  Hegelian  system, 
the  recognition  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  reason 
as  dynamic,  — or,  in  other  words,  that  the  all- 
embracing  unitary  force  in  the  universe  is  spirit 
and  not  matter. 

In  volition  the  subjective  idea  is  ever  striving 
to  assert  itself  and  to  mould  the  world,  which 
stands  seemingly  opposed  to  it,  into  a shape 
conformable  to  its  own  ends.  The  end  which  is 
ever  dominant  in  the  activity  of  the  universal 
reason  is  the  realization  of  the  good.  At  this 
point  in  Hegel’s  system  the  dialectic  movement 
reaches  a level  at  which  the  logical  and  ethical 
lines  converge.  Thus,  intelligence  takes  the 
world  as  it  finds  it ; the  will  proposes  to  make 
the  world  what  it  ought  to  be.  But  here  the 
finitude  of  volition  is  obvious,  inasmuch  as  there 


284  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  THE  NOTION 

exists  a constant  contradiction  between  the  world 
as  it  is  and  the  world  as  it  ought  to  be.  How- 
ever, in  the  process  of  the  will  itself,  it  abolishes 
its  own  finitude  and  overcomes  the  contradiction 
therein  involved,  and  this  is  effected  by  pro- 
ducing a unity  between  the  theoretical  and 
practical  idea,  — that  is,  when  that  which  is  corre- 
sponds perfectly  with  that  which  ought  to  be. 
The  idea  possesses  the  deeper  insight  which 
recognizes  that  the  discrepancies  between  the  real 
and  ideal  are  merely  superficial,  that  essentially 
they  are  in  accord,  and  that  the  world  perfectly 
reveals  the  full  purpose  of  its  immanent  notion. 

Thus  the  idea  is  stripped  of  all  finitude.  It 
is  the  Absolute  Idea;  as  defined  by  Hegel,  it  is 
the  unity  of  the  theoretical  idea  which  regards 
the  world  as  it  is,  and  the  practical  idea  which 
endeavors  to  make  the  world  what  it  ought  to 
be.  Moreover,  as  cognition  implies  life,  the 
Absolute  Idea  is  a unity  of  cognition  and  life 
as  well.  It  embraces  naturally  all  the  moments 
which  enter  into  the  evolution  of  the  idea.  In 
life,  regarded  merely  as  immediate  being,  the 
idea  appears  an  sich , — that  is,  implicitly ; in  cog- 
nition it  appears  fur  sich , — that  is,  the  idea  as 
explicitly  conscious  of  itself.  In  the  Absolute 
Idea  it  is  both  an  sich  und  fur  sich , — that  is, 


THE  IDEA  OR  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  285 


self-contained  and  all-embracing.  All  the  move- 
ments of  its  development  fall  within  the  sphere 
of  its  own  determination.  The  idea  has  need 
of  no  support  upon  which  to  rest ; it  acknowl- 
edges no  dependence  upon  any  element  outside 
of  itself.  In  its  evolution  there  are  no  con- 
tingent factors  or  external  conditions.  “ The 
idea,”  says  Hegel,  “ is  the  vo'^cri?  voijcreoos  which 
Aristotle  long  ago  termed  the  supreme  form  of 
the  idea.”  1 The  true  content  of  this  idea,  that 
which  it  thinks  about  and  acts  upon,  — for  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  idea  is  both 
cognitive  and  active,  — must  be  regarded  as  the 
entire  system,  whose  development  we  have  been 
following.  Of  this  evolution  the  Absolute  Idea 
is  the  consummation,  — a consummation,  how- 
ever, which  is  not  the  resulting  product  of  the 
process  itself ; for  while  the  idea  is  the  last 
term  of  the  series  it  is  also  the  first  term,  and 
the  ground  of  the  whole  process  as  well.  The 
true  significance  of  the  idea  is  admirably  illus- 
trated by  Hegel  in  the  following  paragraph, 
which  is  well  worth  quoting  in  full  : — 

“ With  this  retrospect  of  the  process  of  devel- 
opment the  Absolute  Idea  may  be  likened  to 
an  old  man,  who  expresses  the  same  religious 
1 § 236,  Zusatz. 


286  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

convictions  as  a child,  but  for  whom  they  pos- 
sess the  added  significance  of  his  whole  life, 
Even  if  the  child  understands  in  a measure  the 
truths  of  religion,  still  they  have  value  for  him 
only  in  a limited  sphere,  outside  of  which  lies 
the  whole  span  of  life  and  the  wide,  wide  world. 
Such  is  the  case  with  human  life  in  general 
and  the  various  events  which  constitute  its  ful- 
ness. All  labor  is  directed  towards  some  goal, 
and  when  it  is  reached,  we  are  surprised  to  dis- 
cover nothing  else  save  the  bare  end  itself 
which  had  been  purposed.  The  interest,  how- 
ever, lies  in  the  whole  movement.  As  a man 
pursues  his  life’s  vocation,  the  mere  end  itself 
may  appear  to  him  very  circumscribed ; but  in 
the  attainment,  whatever  it  may  be,  the  whole 
decursus  vitce  is  comprehended.  So,  also,  the 
content  of  the  Absolute  Idea  is  the  complete 
sweep  of  its  onward  movement  which  we  have 
followed  thus  far.  There  is,  finally,  the  recogni- 
tion that  the  development  as  a whole  constitutes 
both  its  content  and  its  interest.  Moreover,  it 
is  peculiarly  the  philosophical  insight  which  is 
able  to  appreciate  that  while  everything,  when 
regarded  in  its  isolation,  may  appear  restricted, 
nevertheless,  its  real  value  consists  in  its  rela- 
tion to  the  whole  and  its  function  as  an  essential 


THE  IDEA  OK  THE  ETERNAL  REASON  287 


moment  or  factor  in  the  Absolute  Idea.  Thus 
it  is  that  having  had  the  content,  we  now 
have  the  knowledge  that  this  content  is  the 
living  unfolding  of  the  idea,  and  that  this 
simple  retrospect  is  contained  in  the  very  form 
of  the  idea  itself.  Each  of  the  stages  hitherto 
surveyed  is  an  image  of  the  Absolute,  at  the 
beginning,  however,  with  restricted  limitations, 
and  consequently  it  is  self-constrained  to  press 
forward  to  a complete  revelation,  which  process 
is  the  dialectic  method  of  development.”  1 
1 § 237,  Zusatz. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


THE  RELATION  OE  THE  LOGIC  TO  THE  PHI- 
LOSOPHY OP  NATURE  AND  THE  PHILOSOPHY 
OP  MIND 

HE  exposition  of  the  Logic  would  be  incom- 


plete without  a word,  at  least,  in  reference 
to  the  relation  of  the  Logic  to  the  two  other  philo- 
sophical disciplines  of  Hegel.  The  Philosophy 
of  Nature  (Die  Natur philo sophie') , The  Philoso- 
phy of  Mind  (Die  Philosophie  des  Greistes). 
These  two  form  the  second  and  third  parts 
respectively  of  the  Encyclopedia  of  the  Philo- 
sophical Sciences. 

It  would  seem  at  the  first  glance  as  though 
these  sciences  were  arranged  in  the  order  of  a 
serial  development,  so  that  The  Philosophy  of 
Nature  would  represent  an  advance  upon  the 
first  part  of  the  Encyclopedia , the  Logic ; and 
The  Philosophy  of  Mmd,  the  completion  and 
consummation  of  the  two  preceding  disciplines. 
This  view,  however,  is  erroneous  and  mislead- 


288 


THE  LOGIC,  NATUKE,  AND  MIND  289 

ing.  A careful  student  of  the  Logic  cannot 
fail  to  be  impressed  with  its  fundamental  doc- 
trine, that  the  supreme  reason,  or  the  Absolute 
Idea,  is  the  creative  and  sustaining  principle 
of  all  being,  and  not  merely  a principle  of 
abstract  thought  as  such.  And  this  present 
exposition  will  have  failed  of  its  purpose  if 
it  has  not  left  a similar  impression  upon  the 
reader’s  mind.  This  principle,  being  granted 
as  fundamental  and  essential  to  the  Hegelian 
system,  — namely,  that  the  rational  is  also  the 
real  and  that  the  laws  of  thought  are  the  laws 
of  being,  — it  follows,  consequently,  that  both 
nature  and  mind  must  be  regarded  as  falling 
within  the  scope  of  the  all-embracing  reason,  or 
idea.  It  is  affirmed  again  and  again  of  the 
idea  that  it  constitutes  the  totality  of  all  being, 
and  as  such,  therefore,  it  must  comprehend  the 
spheres  both  of  nature  and  of  mind. 

Moreover,  Hegel  himself  insists  that  it  is  a 
false  mode  of  statement  to  speak  of  the  tran- 
sition from  the  idea  to  nature,  and  thence  to 
mind.  The  term  transition  (der  Uebergang') 
has  acquired  in  the  Hegelian  usage  a peculiar 
significance.  It  means  always  an  advance 
from  an  incomplete  stage  of  development  to  a 
higher  and  more  complete.  This  was  found  to  be 


290  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

the  case  in  every  step  of  the  progress  from  the 
simplest  conception  of  immediate  being  to  the 
complete  all-embracing  idea.  The  idea,  more- 
over, represents  that  stage  of  development  which 
is  absolutely  sufficient  unto  itself.  It  not  only 
completes  all  defects,  removes  all  limitations, 
and  resolves  all  contradictions,  but  it  is  in  the 
fulness  of  its  own  nature  incapable  alike  of 
supplementation  or  of  deterioration.  To  speak, 
therefore,  of  a transition  from  the  idea  to 
nature,  would  imply  that  the  idea  needed  the 
concept  of  nature  as  a necessary  complement 
in  order  to  supply  its  defects  and  overcome 
its  contradictions.  Hegel  expressly  states  that 
the  idea  does  not  become  nature,  but  that  it  is 
nature.  From  this  point  of  view,  therefore,  The 
Philosophy  of  Nature  may  be  regarded  as  an 
attempt  to  rationalize  nature,  — that  is,  to  show 
that  throughout  all  of  its  processes  and  under- 
lying all  its  forces,  and  forming  the  essence  of 
all  its  laws,  there  is  ever  present  the  immanent 
reason. 

Again,  the  transition  from  any  given  stage  of 
development  to  a higher  and  complementary 
stage  is  always  brought  about  through  the  inner 
constraint  of  thought.  The  transition  is  always 
conceived  as  a necessary  one  ( gesetzt.')  The 


THE  LOGIC,  NATURE,  AND  MIND  291 

nature  of  thought  is  such  that  it  is  constrained 
to  proceed  onward  to  perfection.  But  from  the 
idea  to  nature  there  is  no  transition  in  such  a 
sense.  On  the  contrary,  Hegel  insists  most 
emphatically  that  the  entire  system  of  nature  is 
the  result  solely  and  simply  of  the  free  activity 
of  the  idea.  As  he  expresses  it,  “ the  idea  pri- 
marily resolves  as  the  outcome  of  its  own 
inherent  being  to  allow  itself  freely  to  reveal  its 
essential  being  as  nature.”  1 We  have  seen  that 
the  idea  possesses  not  merely  a knowing  func- 
tion but  also  a willing  function  as  well.  It  is 
essentially  an  active  force.  The  whole  ten- 
dency of  its  being  as  dynamic  is  to  reveal  its 
activity  along  the  lines  of  the  free  manifesta- 
tion of  its  own  nature.  The  Absolute  Idea, 
however,  by  no  means  exhausts  itself  or  loses 
itself  in  its  self-revelation  as  nature  and  as 
mind.  The  supreme  reason,  the  Absolute  Idea, 
God,  however  He  may  be  named,  is  in  and 
through  all  His  works,  yet  nevertheless  tran- 
scends them.  This  is  unequivocally  expressed 
by  Hegel  in  the  larger  Logic  as  follows : — 
“ The  content  of  the  Logic  is  the  revelation  of 
God  as  He  is  in  His  eternal  essence  before  ever 
the  world  was  formed,  or  a finite  spirit  came 
i § 244. 


292  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

into  being.”  1 We  may  say,  therefore,  that  it 
is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  divine  spirit  to 
reveal  Himself,  and  that  such  a revelation  com- 
prehends both  nature  and  mind,  and  yet  the 
Absolute  Ego  is  not  absorbed  in  the  revelation 
itself. 

But  may  it  not  be  possible  that  the  revelation 
itself  is  illusory,  a passing  shadow  with  no 
corresponding  substance  ? The  dialectic  move- 
ment which  we  have  been  following  from  its 
beginning  to  end  would  seem  to  confirm  this 
view,  inasmuch  as  all  finite  beings  and  all  finite 
relations  fail  of  self-sufficiency  and  permanency 
in  the  various  stages  of  their  development,  and 
only  in  the  Absolute  Idea  is  there  found  a 
satisfactory  resting-place  for  the  thought  which 
has  tested  all  preceding  stages  and  found  them 
wanting.  “ The  things  which  are  seen  are 
temporal,  but  the  things  which  are  unseen  are 
eternal.”  Is,  then,  the  whole  cosmic  process  in 
time  and  space  a fleeting  show?  Is  the  spirit 
of  man  but  the  flashing  ray  of  the  central  sun, 
lost  forever  in  the  dark  and  void,  or  perchance 
returning  again  in  other  forms  to  be  reabsorbed 
in  the  primeval  light?  On  the  contrary,  Hegel 
in  his  Philosophy  of  Nature  and  his  Philosophy  of 
1 Log.,  I,  33. 


THE  LOGIC,  NATURE,  AND  MIND  293 

Mind  endeavors  to  ground  these  essential  mani- 
festations of  being  upon  substantial  foundations. 
Nature  cannot  be  illusory,  a mere  seeming,  for 
there  is  immanent  in  it  the  Absolute  Idea.  And 
so  also  the  finite  mind  does  not  fall  outside  of 
the  infinite,  but  within  the  area  of  its  being 
and  power.  Moreover,  inasmuch  as  the  Abso- 
lute Idea  is  essentially  a free  activity,  and  as 
the  human  spirit  partakes  of  the  very  nature 
of  this  Idea,  its  freedom  is  thereby  assured  and 
with  its  freedom,  its  immortality. 

By  way  of  summary,  it  may  be  stated  that 
the  problem  of  the  Logic  is  solved  in  the  Abso- 
lute Idea,  that  fundamental  principle  of  reason 
which  is  self-explanatory  and  capable  of  explain- 
ing all  lower  categories  which  are  to  be  regarded 
merely  as  particular  phases  of  its  own  self. 
But  in  the  unfolding  of  the  dialectic  process 
which  eventuates  in  the  Absolute  Idea,  it  is 
discovered  that  reason  is  essentially  a principle  of 
activity  as  well  as  a principle  of  knowledge.  The 
Absolute  Idea,  therefore,  as  the  supreme  expres- 
sion of  reason,  reveals  its  own  nature  in  the 
cosmic  processes ; and  in  spite  of  the  temporal 
and  spatial  contingencies  of  the  great  world 
system,  it  demonstrates  its  own  eternal  nature 
and  purposes  as  the  ground  and  end  of  it  all. 


294  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  NOTION 

For  the  enduring  and  abiding  elements  in  the 
cosmic  order  are  those  which  partake  of  the 
nature  of  the  Absolute  Idea,  and  which  come  to 
a full  revelation  in  the  mind  of  man,  disclosing 
his  affinity  with  the  Absolute  Mind,  and  stirring 
within  his  breast  intimations  of  divinity  and 
immortality. 


APPENDIX 


A GLOSSARY  OF  THE  MORE  IMPORTANT  PHIL- 
OSOPHICAL TERMS  IN  HEGEL’S  LOGIC 

Absolut:  That  which  is  unconditioned  and  conditions  all 
things.  That  which  is  complete  within  itself,  all- 
embracing,  all-determining,  the  infinite,  the  eternal, 
God.  In  its  highest  expression,  it  is  the  absolute  Idee. 

Abstrakt : A one-sided  and  partial  view  of  any  object  of 
knowledge ; a term  used  in  contrast  to  concrete,  which 
signifies  a comprehensive  view  of  things  embracing 
all  possible  considerations  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
things  themselves,  their  origin,  and  the  manifold 
relations  which  they  may  sustain. 

Allgemein,  Allgemeinheit:  Universal,  universality.  The 
universal  is  not  merely  the  summation  of  the  various 
marks  which  are  common  to  a number  of  individuals, 
by  virtue  of  which  they  are  regarded  as  members  of 
one  and  the  same  group  or  class.  The  term  has 
attached  to  it  the  additional  significance  of  possess- 
ing a dynamic  essence  which  is  the  source  and  the 
active  constructive  principle  of  all  its  particular 
manifestations. 

Analytisch  : Analytical;  in  contrast  with  synthetical  (syn- 
tlietiscli).  The  analytical  method  examines  every 
individual  phenomenon  for  the  purpose  of  discover- 
ing its  various  particular  characteristics,  separating 
the  essential  from  the  unessential,  and  referring  it  to 
its  appropriate  cause,  law,  or  genus,  — that  is,  to  its 
corresponding  universal. 

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The  synthetical  method  starts,  on  the  other  hand, 
with  the  universal.  Its  activity  is  essentially  con- 
structive. It  works  as  an  architectonic  principle  to 
produce  all  the  particular  manifestations  which  are 
possible  in  accordance  with  its  essential  and  universal 
nature,  and  as  revealed  ultimately  in  the  organization 
and  completed  being  of  concrete  individuals. 

Das  Andere:  The  other,  — that  is,  the  complementary 
aspect,  of  any  object  of  knowledge  which  is  necessary 
to  the  complete  understanding  of  its  significance ; its 
correlative.  The  other  may  be  a cognate  species,  or 
the  end  for  which  the  object  in  question  may  be 
used,  or  some  other  object  with  which  it  is  essentially 
related ; it  is,  in  short,  the  complete  setting  of  the 
object  which  gives  to  it  depth  and  completeness  of 
meaning.  As  applied  to  the  process  of  development, 
the  other  of  any  stage  in  the  process  is  the  subsequent 
stage  which  lies  immediately  beyond  it,  and  which 
for  the  time  being  is  contrasted  with  it,  but  into 
which  it  passes  through  the  constraint  of  the  dialectic 
movement. 

Anschauuny : Perception.  A direct  and  immediate  know- 
ing, as  opposed  to  knowledge  obtained  by  the  medi- 
ating process  of  thought.  The  object  may  belong 
either  to  the  internal  or  to  the  external  sense.  See 
Vorstellung. 

An  sick:  In  itself;  a phrase  used  to  signify  that  which  is 
implicit,  or  potential,  in  contrast  to  the  phrase  fur 
sick,  which  signifies  that  which  is  explicit  or  actual. 
The  phrase  which  is  compounded  of  these  two  con- 
trasted phrases,  an  und  fur  sicli,  signifies  that  which 
possesses  the  capacity  of  transforming  whatever 
is  potential  into  the  actual  manifestation  of  the 
same  ; it  is  the  capacity  for  self-determination  and 
self-direction. 


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297 


Aufheben,  aufgehoben  : To  transmute,  transmuted.  There 
are  three  distinct  though  related  ideas  which  this 
term  expressess,  — to  destroy  a thing  in  its  original 
form,  to  restore  it  in  another  form,  and  to  elevate 
it  upon  a higher  plane.  It  represents  always  a 
progress  in  thought  and  in  development.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  translate  this  term  by  any  one  English 
word.  To  transmute  or  to  conserve  would  perhaps 
approximately  express  its  meaning. 

Bedingung : Condition ; whatever  is  necessary  in  causa- 
tion to  the  eventuation  of  the  effect. 

Begriff : Notion.  It  is  the  universal  principle  of  reason 
which  underlies  all  processes  of  thought.  It  is 
essentially  dynamic.  It  is  not  merely  the  supreme 
category  of  thought,  but  it  is  also  the  fundamental 
law  of  being  as  well.  It  is  the  creative  architectonic 
force  of  the  universe.  While  Seyn  is  being,  regarded 
merely  as  that  which  is  immediately  given,  unex- 
plained, unrelated,  and  unanalyzed,  and  Wesen  refers 
to  the  underlying  principles  of  being,  its  manifold 
relations,  and  essential  ground,  the  Begriff  represents 
a far  deeper  insight ; it  is  more  than  the  mere  source 
of  determination  and  efficiency,  it  is  the  central  force 
of  self-determination  and  self-specification,  realizing 
its  own  subjective  purposes  through  their  essential 
manifestation  in  the  world  of  objectivity,  and  as  such 
it  constitutes  the  truth  both  of  Seyn  and  of  Wesen. 

Beisichseyn : Being  by  itself ; applied  to  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge to  indicate  that  it  is  self-sufficient  and  self- 
contained.  See  Fiirsichseyn. 

Besonderheit : Particularity;  having  significance  only, 
however,  when  recognized  as  the  particular  of 
some  universal. 

Bestimmung : From  bestimmen,  to  define  or  determine;  it 
is  that  differentiating  capacity  which  gives  to  any 


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object  of  thought  definite  form  and  character.  The 
Denkbestimmungen  are  the  most  general  forms  of 
thought  determination,  and  which  themselves  de- 
termine all  others  of  a more  particular  or  specific 
nature,  — the  categories. 

Bestimmt : Specifically  determined. 

Bestiinmtheit : The  actual  realization  of  the  capacity 
expressed  by  Bestimmung ; it  signifies  a state  of 
definiteness ; it  refers  to  the  specific  and  determinate 
character  of  any  object  of  knowledge. 

Beweis : Demonstration.  See  Definition. 

Beziehung  auf  sich : A phrase  which  indicates  a relation 
existing  within  the  boundaries  of  the  object  of 
knowledge  itself.  From  such  a point  of  view  the 
object  of  knowledge  is  regarded  as  a closed  system, 
and  for  the  time  being,  at  least,  isolated  in  reference 
to  any  larger  system  or  systems  with  which  it  may 
sustain  essential  relations. 

Beziehung  in  Anderes : Indicates  the  essential  relation 
of  any  object  of  knowledge  to  that  which  confronts 
it  as  peculiarly  its  other,  — that  is,  its  necessary  com- 
plement in  some  larger  system  of  thought  within 
which  the  given  object  of  knowledge  together  with 
its  other  necessarily  fall. 

Sich  auf  sich  beziehende  Negativitat.  See  Negativitdt. 

Daseyn : Being  which  is  definitely  determined  in  contrast 
to  Seyn,  mere  being  which  is  wholly  indefinite  and 
undetermined.  Daseyn  is  also  used  in  contrast  to 
Existenz,  which  latter  signifies  being  which  is  defi- 
nitely determined,  but  with  air  implied  reference 
to  the  source  of  the  being  in  question,  its  essential 
ground.  The  terms  Seyn,  Daseyn,  Existenz,  form  a 
series  which  represents  successive  stages  in  the 
progress  of  thought  as  regards  a more  precise  de- 
termination and  explanation. 


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299 


Definition:  Definition.  The  essential  nature  of  the  fun- 
damental universal  in  its  synthetic  activity  is  given 
by  definition.  The  particular  manifestations  of 
which  it  is  in  general  capable  are  given  by  division 
(Division).  The  concrete  individuality  which  is 
always  some  definite  object  constituted  by  a nexus 
of  complex  relations  is  called  a theorem  (Theorem). 
The  process  which  supplies  the  necessary  elements 
which  serve  as  mediating  terms  in  this  nexus  of  com- 
plex relations  is  called  the  process  of  construction 
(Konstruktion) ; its  function  is  to  fuse  into  one 
these  different  elemental  parts.  The  process  from 
which  cognition  derives  the  necessity  of  this  nexus  is 
called  demonstration  (Beweis). 

Denkhestimmungen : Categories.  See  Bestimmung. 

Dialektik:  Dialectic,  a term  used  as  a general  characteri- 
zation of  the  Hegelian  method.  It  signifies  that 
process  of  thought  which  recognizes  the  inherent 
contradiction  involved  in  every  finite  statement,  and 
at  the  same  time  possesses  the  capacity  of  overcoming 
by  an  appropriate  synthesis  every  observed  contra- 
diction upon  a higher  level  of  thought. 

The  term  is  used  in  two  senses,  the  one  referring 
to  the  threefold  process  as  a whole ; the  other  solely 
to  the  second  stage  of  the  process,  that  of  contradic- 
tion. 

Dijferenz:  Difference.  This  term  can  be  defined  only  in 
its  relation  to  the  term  Identitat  (identity).  They 
are  so  related  that  the  differences  which  obtain 
between  objects  have  significance  only  when  con- 
trasted with  an  essential  identity  which  forms  their 
backgroimd,  and  in  like  manner  the  identity  which 
may  be  affirmed  in  any  instance  has  significance 
only  when  brought  into  relief  by  the  contrast  of 
some  underlying  difference.  When  identity  and 


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difference  are  used  as  predicates  without  this  refer- 
ence to  each  other,  there  arises  the  false  and  unmean- 
ing abstraction  of  mere  difference  or  mere  identity. 

Ding  an  sick  : The  thing  in  itself.  This  Kantian  phrase 
is  used  in  a peculiar  manner  by  Hegel.  With  him 
the  Ding  an  sick  refers  always  to  the  thing  in  its 
germinal  or  potential  state.  The  seed,  for  instance, 
is  the  plant  in  itself ; the  child  is  the  man  in  himself. 

Division : Division.  See  Definition. 

Eigenschaft : The  quality,  property,  or  attribute  of  a thing. 

Einzelnheit:  Individuality.  The  individual  object  of 
knowledge  has  significance  only  when  the  particular 
and  differentiating  characteristics  are  known  which 
make  it  possible  to  refer  the  individual  in  question 
to  its  proper  universal. 

Entwickelung : Evolution,  development.  The  dialectic 
movement  is  essentially  one  of  development,  though 
it  traces  the  logical  rather  than  the  temporal  stages 
of  the  process. 

Erkennen  : Cognition  ; one  of  the  higher  forms  in  which 
the  Begriff  manifests  itself.  It  is  the  notion  rising 
to  the  level  of  a consciousness  of  itself  and  its  own 
processes  and  the  objects  of  its  own  knowledge. 

Erscheinung : Appearance  or  phenomenon.  It  is  that 
aspect  of  being  which  is  revealed  in  the  world  of 
phenomena.  It  is  to  be  distinguished  from  Schein, 
which  is  the  mere  appearance,  the  shadow,  illusion. 
The  Erscheinung  is  the  shining  forth  of  that  which 
is  the  underlying  ground  and  essence  of  being. 
With  Hegel  the  phenomenon  has  no  significance 
apart  from  its  noumenon.  The  one  is  the  necessary 
complement  of  the  other. 

Etwas : A somewhat  or  something.  Any  object  of  knowl- 
edge which  possesses  determinate  being  ( Daseyn ). 
Every  Etwas  is  posiliv  by  virtue  of  what  it  is,  negativ 


APPENDIX 


301 


in  so  far  as  it  excludes  from  its  own  being  its  corre- 
sponding other. 

Existenz : See  Daseyn. 

Form:  Form;  with  Hegel  it  signifies  a formative,  con- 
structive principle,  which  is  immanent  in  the  under- 
lying substance  of  things. 

Freiheit:  Freedom. 

Fur  sich  : Explicit,  actual.  See  A n sich. 

Fursichseyn : Being  for  itself,  — that  is,  being  which  de- 
fines its  own  bounds  and  determines  its  own  proper- 
ties. It  is  self-determined,  self-contained  being.  Its 
independence  however  is  asserted  but  not  explicitly 
justified.  In  Beisichseyn,  the  independence  of  being 
is  regarded  as  fully  justified. 

Gedanken:  Thoughts;  a term  often  used  by  Hegel  to 
mean  merely  abstract  thoughts,  the  ordinary  con- 
cepts of  the  formal  logic. 

Gegensatz : Antithesis ; the  second  stage  of  every 

dialectic  movement  and  an  essential  moment  or 
factor  in  the  resulting  synthesis  by  which  it  is 
united  upon  a higher  plane  to  that  which  upon  a 
lower  level  of  thought  appeared  as  its  opposite. 

Gesetzt ; From  the  verb  setzen.  Any  object  of  thought  is 
gesetzt  which  is  necessarily  and  explicitly  determined 
by  the  logic  of  the  situation.  Whenever  that  which 
is  given  in  thought  leads  by  the  very  necessity  of 
the  thought  processes  themselves  to  a conclusion 
depending  upon  it,  that  conclusion  is  always  de- 
scribed by  Hegel  as  gesetzt.  Every  phase  of  the 
dialectic  process  is  gesetzt  in  the  sense  of  following 
by  the  very  momentum  of  thought  itself  from  the 
nature  of  the  stage  immediately  preceding  it. 

Gesetztseyn : The  condition  or  state  of  being  gesetzt. 

Grad:  Degree  or  intensity  of  qualitative  variation,  as 
the  degree  of  heat  or  cold,  etc. 


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Granze : Limit,  marking  the  line  of  differentiation  be- 
tween any  object  of  knowledge  and  its  other.  See 
Schranke. 

Grund : The  ground  underlying  all  surface  appearance; 
the  basis  upon  which  the  existence  of  any  object 
of  knowledge  depends.  It  is  the  noumenon  under- 
lying every  phenomenon.  It  is  the  constant 
and  permanent  essence  of  all  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. 

Idealitat,  Ideel  : Ideality,  ideal.  The  ideal  is  essentially 
characteristic  of  the  truly  infinite.  It  is  the  abiding 
and  constant  element  in  every  definite  being  under- 
lying the  changing  and  unstable  elements  which 
constitute  its  finiteness.  Therefore  the  finite  and 
the  infinite,  the  real  and  the  ideal,  are  not  irreconcil- 
able opposites.  Every  finite  being  possesses  elements 
of  infinity.  The  truly  real  is  such  by  virtue  of  some 
essential  strain  of  ideality.  And  the  human  has  the 
capacity  of  becoming  partaker  of  the  divine  nature. 

Idee : The  Idea ; the  highest  form  of  the  Begriff,  or  notion, 
as  manifesting  its  conscious,  free,  and  self-determin- 
ing essence,  the  consummation  and  the  source  of  all 
knowledge  and  of  all  being. 

Identitdt:  Identity.  See  Differenz. 

A bstrakte  Identitdt : Abstract  identity ; an  incom- 
plete and  colorless  view  of  things. 

Absolute  Identitdt:  Complete  identity;  mere  same- 
ness, an  indefinite  homogeneity. 

Mil  sich  identisch  : Self-identical,  — that  is,  pre- 
senting a sameness  throughout  and  lacking  any 
differentiation  of  parts  or  specification  of  functions. 
Any  tiling  which  is  completely  homogeneous  through- 
out is  mit  sich  identisch. 

Inhalt : Content.  It  has  meaning  only  when  it  is  re- 
garded as  one  with  the  form. 


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303 


Kausalitat : The  category  of  causality. 

Konkret : Concrete ; a complete  comprehensive  view  of 
things.  See  Abstrakt. 

Konstruktion  : Construction.  See  Definition. 

List:  Craft.  It  is  a characterization  of  the  manner  in 
which  reason  works  out  its  ends  in  nature  by  bring- 
ing under  its  control  the  mechanical  and  chemical 
forces  of  the  world  and  swaying  them  at  will. 

Maass  : Measure.  The  standard  measure  or  typical  form 
to  which  all  things  in  their  several  spheres,  more 
or  less  perfectly  correspond. 

Mittelbar : Mediate.  This  term  is  used  in  contrast  to 
unmittelbar,  immediate.  Anything  is  unmittelbar,  im- 
mediate, which  is  represented  as  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge given  but  un  analyzed  and  unexplained.  And 
anything  is  mittelbar,  mediate,  which  is  regarded 
as  a product  due  to  a certain  process  by  which  it  is 
brought  about  or  mediated. 

Immediate  knowledge  is  given ; mediate  is  ex- 
plained. The  immediate  is  unrelated;  the  mediate 
is  related.  The  immediate  is  elementary ; the  medi- 
ate is  developed.  The  immediate  marks  the  begin- 
ning ; the  mediate,  the  result. 

Moglichkeit : Possibility,  — the  possibility,  however,  not  of 
the  fancy,  but  that  possibility  which  represents  a 
definite  potential  capable  of  actual  realization. 

Moment : Moment  or  factor ; an  essential  element  in  any 
complex  system  or  process. 

Negativ : Negative  ; refers  to  the  element  of  difference  in 
the  essence  of  any  object  of  knowledge,  and  whose 
significance  lies  wholly  in  the  relation  to  its  com- 
plementary element;  the  positive.  The  two  unite 
together  in  constituting  the  essential  ground  of  being. 

Negativitat : Negation ; the  process  of  the  so-called  nega- 
tive reason  which  confronts  any  primary  thesis  with 


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its  corresponding  antithesis.  The  absolute  Nega- 
tivitat  is  the  overcoming  of  this  first  negation  by 
a denial  which  involves  a higher  point  of  view. 
This  second  negation,  being  the  denial  of  the  first 
negation,  has  the  force  of  an  affirmation.  It  is,  how- 
ever, not  a simple  reaffirmation  of  the  primary  thesis ; 
it  is  a process  which,  while  affirming  the  primary 
thesis,  at  the  same  time  embraces  its  contradiction 
in  the  resulting  synthesis  as  one  of  its  essential 
moments  or  factors.  Negation  as  a process,  more- 
over, draws  a line  of  distinction  between  any  object 
of  knowledge  and  that  which  lies  immediately  beyond 
it  as  its  other.  This  is  a line  of  definition,  inasmuch 
as  it  differentiates  that  which  a thing  is  from  that 
which  it  is  not.  In  this  sense  negation  is  a process 
of  determination. 

Negative  Einheit:  A system  containing  many  different 
parts,  all  of  which  are,  however,  united  through  an 
underlying  unity;  it  is  a unity  in  the  midst  of 
diversity. 

Sich  auf  sich  beziehende  Negativitdt : A self-imposed 
negation,  — that  is,  a system  which  contains  within 
the  sphere  of  its  own  essential  being  certain  con- 
tradictory elements  which  cause  the  system  as  it 
stands  to  fall  of  its  own  weight,  as  it  were,  and 
indicates  the  necessity  of  overcoming  such  con- 
tradictions by  the  introduction  of  some  higher  cate- 
gory of  thought. 

Nichts:  Non-being.  It  is  that  stage  which  is  not  yet 
reached  in  any  process  of  development  but  may 
become  Segn,  or  actual  being,  through  the  process 
of  becoming  ( Werden ). 

NothwendigJceit : Necessity. 

Objectiv:  Objective.  It  is  a term  used  to  designate  in  the 
Kantian  sense  all  that  is  universal  and  necessary 


APPENDIX 


305 


in  any  object  of  knowledge.  Plegel  adds,  however, 
that  thoughts  as  universal  and  necessary  are  not 
to  be  regarded  merely  as  our  thoughts  but  as  the 
real  essence  of  existing  things  as  well. 

Objectivitat : Objectivity;  that  stage  in  development  of 
being  which  is  the  explicit  manifestation  of  the  sub- 
jective notion  immanent  within  it. 

Positiv : Positive ; a term  whose  significance  lies  only  in 
its  relation  to  its  correlative,  the  negative.  See 
Negative. 

Realitat : Reality.  The  positive  aspect  of  any  determi- 
nate being  which  constitutes  it  what  it  is,  and  as  such 
it  forms  an  essential  moment  of  that  which  is  truly 
infinite  and  therefore  ideal.  See  Idealitat. 

Reflexion : Reflection  ; that  fundamental  process  of 
thought  by  which  any  object  of  knowledge  is  fully 
revealed  only  when  we  see  it  in  its  complete  setting 
and  possess  a thorough  knowledge  of  the  relations 
which  it  sustains  to  every  part  of  the  system  to 
which  it  is  referred.  The  object  itself,  therefore, 
cannot  be  said  to  shine  in  its  own  light  so  much  as 
in  the  light  reflected  from  all  the  coordinate  elements 
with  'which  it  is  related. 

Reflexion  in  sick : The  process  by  which  an  object  of 
knowledge  shines  in  its  own  light. 

Reflexion  in  Anderes : The  process  by  which  an  object  of 
knowledge  shines  in  the  light  of  something  which 
is  related  to  it  as  its  other,  or  complement ; that 
which  is  essentially  its  correlative. 

Setzende  Reflexion : Positing  reflection  ; that  phase  of  the 
process  of  reflection  which  regards  being  as  self- 
illuminated,  and  therefore  as  immediately  given  and 
independent. 

Voraussetzende  Reflexion : Presupposing  reflection.  This 
represents  a deeper  insight,  in  that  it  sees  that  the 
x 


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supposed  immediacy  and  independence  of  a given 
object  of  knowledge  must  be  referred  to  some  other 
which  is  its  necessary  presupposition. 

Aeusserliche  Reflexion:  External  reflection;  in  which  the 
relation  existing  between  being  and  that  upon  which 
the  being  depends  is  regarded  as  a purely  external 
relation,  the  one  affecting  the  other  wholly  from 
without. 

Bestimmende  Reflexion : Determining  reflection  ; which  re- 
gards the  seemingly  external  relation  as  in  reality 
obtaining  between  coordinate  elements  of  one  and 
the  same  essential  system  of  being. 

Reflexionsbestimmungen  : The  categories  of  reflection. 

Regel : Rule,  — that  is,  the  usual  or  typical  form  which  is 
found  to  characterize  members  of  the  same  class 
or  species. 

Satz : Proposition  ; a statement  which  is  correct  as  regards 
certain  circumstances  but  does  not  hold  true  uni- 
versally and  necessarily.  It  differs  in  this  respect 
from  the  judgment  (das  Urtheil ) which  contains 
this  element  of  universality  and  necessity.  The 
proposition  may  be  said  to  be  correct  or  incorrect; 
the  judgment,  however,  is  either  true  or  not  true. 

Schein : Show ; to  be  distinguished  from  Erscheinung, 
appearance  or  phenomenon,  which  see. 

Schluss : Syllogism.  This  is  not  merely  the  logical  form 
of  inference;  it  is  used  also  to  characterize  every 
active  process  in  the  world  of  being  which  unites 
together  any  two  elements  through  the  mediation 
of  a third,  the  common  or  middle  term.  The  syl- 
logistic process  is  one,  therefore,  which  underlies  the 
activities  of  being  as  well  as  of  thought. 

Schranke : The  bound ; marking  the  limit  which  any 
definite  being  may  have  attained  at  any  particular 
stage  of  its  development,  but  which  by  the  inner 


APPENDIX 


307 


constraint  of  its  own  nature  it  must  transcend  in  the 
more  advanced  stages  of  its  development. 

Seyn:  Being;  in  the  sense  of  mere  being,  indefinite  and 
undetermined.  See  Begriff. 

Subjectiv:  Subjective;  not  merely  that  which  concerns 
the  individual  and  personal  thoughts  and  interests 
in  distinction  from  the  whole  body  of  facts  in  the 
world  of  phenomena,  but  that  which  is  at  the  same 
time  immanent  in  the  fact,  and  as  thus  immanent 
constitutes  the  very  truth  of  the  fact  itself  and  its 
informing  principle. 

Substantialitat,  Substanz : Substantiality,  substance ; that 
which  is  the  absolute  formative  principle  and  source 
of  all  power  and  necessity  in  the  universe.  At  its 
last  analysis,  substance  is  revealed  as  subject,  — that 
is,  the  power  of  an  absolute  personality. 

Synlhetisch : Synthetical;  see  Analytisch. 

Theorem:  Theorem.  See  Definition. 

Tolalitdt:  The  sum  total  of  all  properties  and  relations 
pertaining  to  any  object  of  knowledge  taken  not  as  a 
mere  sum,  but  as  a systematic  unity. 

Uebergang : Transition;  a term  used  to  indicate  the 
passage  of  thought  from  any  given  stage  of  its  de- 
velopment to  that  which  lies  immediately  in  advance 
and  which  is  essentially  connected  with  the  former 
by  the  inner  necessity  of  the  thought  process  itself. 

Unvermittelt : That  which  is  not  mediated.  It  is  a term 
used  to  imply  that  although  a process  of  mediation 
doubtless  underlies  the  object  of  knowledge  to  which 
it  is  applied,  nevertheless  that  process  is  not  as  yet 
recognized  or  rendered  explicit.  See  Mittelbar. 

Unmittelbarlceit : Immediacy.  See  Mittelbar  and  Un- 
vermittelt. 

Unterschied : Difference.  It  is  something  more  than 
mere  diversity  ( Verschiedenheit)  ; it  also  signifies  a 


308 


APPENDIX 


determinate  and  specific  difference  ( bestimmter  Unter- 
schied ) which  serves  as  the  differentiating  mark  of 
a definite  species. 

Ursache:  Cause;  its  root  meaning  indicating  that  the 
cause  as  the  primary  essence  must  underlie  its  effect 
( Wirkung). 

Urtheil:  Judgment;  its  root  meaning  signifies  a division 
into  elementary  parts,  and  this  significance  is  pre- 
served in  the  essential  function  of  the  judgment 
which  is  the  process  of  breaking  up  an  indefinite 
and  incoherent  universal  into  particular  forms  of 
its  manifestation  which  are  both  definite  and  co- 
herent. As  a process,  judgment  applies  not  merely 
to  the  activity  of  thought  but  to  the  activity  of 
being  as  well. 

Verhaltniss : Relation ; applied  especially  to  the  relation 
which  obtains  between  any  object  of  knowledge  and 
its  correlative  as  mediated  by  the  category  of  reflec- 
tion, such  as  the  causal  relation  or  the  relation  of 
reciprocal  activity. 

Vermitlelt,  Vermittelung : Mediated,  mediacy.  See  Mittel- 
bar  and  U nvermiltelt. 

Vernunft : Reason ; as  distinguished  from  Verstand,  the 
understanding.  Reason  is  that  function  of  the  mind 
which  overcomes,  in  a higher  synthesis,  the  con- 
tradictions which  it  is  the  function  of  the  under- 
standing to  observe  and  which,  however,  it  cannot 
reconcile.  The  understanding  regards  the  various 
objects  of  knowledge  as  distinct,  separate,  isolated. 
Reason  is  the  synthetical  function  of  thought  which, 
while  it  by  no  means  ignores  the  differences  amidst 
the  world  of  phenomena,  nevertheless  possesses  the 
capacity  of  apprehending  the  unity  which  underlies 
all  differences. 

Verschiedenlieit : Diversity. 


APPENDIX 


309 


Verstand:  Understanding.  See  Vernunft. 

Voraussetzung : Postulate. 

Vorstellung:  A generalized  image  of  a class  or  group 
of  objects  in  distinction  from  Anscliauung,  which  is 
the  immediate  perception  of  an  object,  and  Begriff 
which  is  the  thought  grasp  of  the  essential  signifi- 
cance of  a universal  idea  without  any  adventitious 
aid  from  the  pictures  which  the  imagination  may 
attempt  to  form  of  the  same. 

Wahrlieit:  Truth;  according  to  Hegel  truth  consists  in 
the  complete  conformity  of  any  object  of  knowledge 
with  its  fundamental  Begriff,  and  this  implies  a 
process  in  which  it  is  seen  in  the  totality  of  its 
relations. 

Wechselwirkung : The  category  of  reciprocal  activity. 

Werden : Becoming ; the  process  through  which  non- 
being  issues  into  being. 

Wesen:  Essence.  See  Begriff. 

Widerspruch : Contradiction. 

W irliichkeit : Actuality.  The  concrete  unity  of  essence 
and  appearance. 

Wirkung : Effect.  See  Ursache. 

ZufalligTceit : Contingency;  the  contingent  is  that  which 
does  not  have  the  ground  of  its  being  in  itself,  but 
in  some  other. 


INDEX 


Absolute,  20  f.,  52,  81,  98,  100, 
106  1.,  122,  146  f.,  208,  212, 
214,  235,  251,  269. 

Abstract,  70. 

Actuality,  169,  Chap.  XIII. 
Alteration,  97. 

Antinomies,  51  f.,  108. 
Appearance,  166,  Chap.  XII. 
Aristotle,  8,  184,  185,  263,  285. 
Arithmetical  Operations,  109  f. 
Atomic  philosophy,  103. 
Attraction,  103. 

Avfgehoben,  138  f.,  161,  188, 
253. 

Becoming,  89  f. 

Being,  68  f . ; determinate  160  f . ; 
for  itself,  98  f. ; of  God,  33  f., 
53,  65. 

Categories,  8 f. 

Causality,  192,  196  f. 
Centrality,  256  f. ; syllogistic 
formulae  of,  258  f. 

Chemism,  260  f. 

Cognition,  278  f. 

Conceptual  capacity,  5. 
Condition,  187. 

Construction,  281. 

Content,  171  f. 

Contingency,  187. 

Continuous  quantity,  107. 
Contradiction,  150. 

Copula,  221  f. 

Cosmology,  28,  32  f. ; 51. 


Cosmological  proof,  53. 

Craft  of  Reason,  266  f. 

Critical  philosophy,  Chap.  IV. 

Definition,  281. 

Degree,  105,  112. 
Demonstration,  281. 
Development,  209  f. 

Dialectic,  10  f.,  185,  209  f. 
Difference,  151  f.  ; 219,  242. 
Ding  an  sich,  48,  163,  170. 
Discrete,  107  f. 

Diversity,  151  f. 

Division,  281. 

Dualism,  34. 

Empiricism,  Chap.  III. 
Empiricist,  67. 

End,  261  f. ; subjective,  264  f. ; 
in  process  of  accomplish- 
ment, 264  f.;  accomplished, 
264  f. 

Entelechy,  185. 

Essence,  68  f.,  72  f.,  78,  Part 
II. 

Ethics,  42,  57  f. 

Excluded  middle,  154. 
Existence,  160  f. 

Explicit,  267. 

Extensive  quantity,  112  f. 

Feuerbach,  43. 

Force,  171,  176  f. 

Form  165  f.,  171  f.,  172,  206. 
Freedom,  33, 191  f. 

311 


312 


INDEX 


Genus,  276. 

Gesetzt,  181,  190,  211,  220,  290. 

Goethe,  179. 

Ground,  219 ; of  existence, 
Chap.  XI. 

Haller,  115;  179  f. 

Yon  Hartmann,  207. 

Hegelians  of  the  Left,  43. 

Heraclitus,  91  f.,  185. 

Herder,  178. 

Hindoo  Philosophy,  26. 

Hume,  41. 

Idea,  20,  213  f. ; Chap.  XVII ; 
as  life,  272  f. ; as  knowledge, 
272  f.;  absolute,  272  f.,  284, 
286  f.,  291  f. 

Idealism,  19  f.,  49,  100  f. 

Ideality,  5. 

Identity,  71,  150  f.,  219,  242. 

Immediacy,  62  f.,  71,  136  f. 

Implicit,  267. 

Individual,  216  f. 

Infinity,  97,  212. 

Inner,  171,  178  f. 

Intensive  quantity,  112  f. 

Intuition,  67. 

Intuitive  knowledge,  Chap.  V. 

Jacobi,  62. 

Judgment,  221  f. ; specific  con- 
tent of,  223;  of  being,  224; 
of  essence,  224;  of  notion, 
224,  225  f. ; qualitative,  225  f. ; 
of  reflexion,  225  f. ; of  neces- 
sity, 225  f . ; singular,  228  f . ; 
particular,  228  f . ; universal, 
228  f. ; categorical,  230  f . ; 
hypothetical,  230  f. ; disjunc- 
tive, 230  f. ; assertory,  232  f. ; 
problematic,  232  f. ; apoditic, 
232  f. 


Kant,  30,  45  ff.,  100,  251,  252, 

263. 

Leibniz,  157,  159,  194. 

Limit,  94. 

Logic,  formal,  217 ; modern, 

221. 

Magnitude,  105. 

Manifestation,  171,  176  f. 

Materialism,  43. 

Matter,  164  f. 

Measure,  Chap.  IX. 

Measureless,  127. 

Mechanism,  106;  formal,  255; 
with  affinity,  256  f. ; abso- 
lute, 257  f. 

Mediation,  62  f.,  73,  136  f.,  158, 
189  f. 

Metaphysical  systems,  23  f., 
Chap.  II. 

Metaphysician,  67. 

Method,  11  f. ; analytic,  280; 
synthetic,  280  f. 

Mind,  31,  56;  philosophy  of, 
Chap.  XVIII. 

Mode,  in  frequent  curves,  124. 

Nature,  35;  philosophy  of, 
Chap.  XVIII. 

Necessity,  33;  189  f. 

Negation,  14  f.,  55,  74  f.,  136  f. ; 
absolute,  14  f.,  271. 

Negative,  155. 

Neutral,  The,  260. 

Nodes,  126  f. 

Non-being,  86  f. 

Notion,  18,  29  f.,  68  f.,  76  f., 
159,  201,  Part  III.;  the  ob- 
jective, Chap.  XVI. ; the  sub- 
jective, Chap.  XV. 

Noumenal,  183. 

Number,  doctrine  of,  116. 


INDEX 


313 


Objective,  46  f.,  213  f. 

Ontology,  28  f. 

Ontological  argument,  56  f., 
251. 

Opposition,  154. 

Other,  the,  95  f . 

Outer,  171, 178  f. 

Pantheism,  34,  253. 

Parmenides,  91  f. 

Particular,  216  f. 

Parts,  171,  174  f. 

Permanence,  136,  142  f . 
Personality,  6,  100,  149,  194, 
207,  277. 

Phenomenal,  Chap.  XII. 
Philosophy,  Logic  as  a system 
of,  3 ff. ; history  of,  16  f. 
Pliysico-theological  proof,  53. 
Plato,  11,  184,  185. 
Pneumatology,  28,  30. 

Positive,  154  f . 

Possibility,  186  f. 

Potential,  72,  77,  88,  185,  188  f., 
193,  250. 

Property,  163  f . 

Proposition,  224. 

Psychology,  28,  30. 

Pythagoras,  116  f. 

Quality,  Chap.  VII. 

Quantity,  93  f.,  Chap.  VIII; 
determinate,  105,  109. 

Reality,  101. 

Reason,  12;  negative,  12;  posi- 
tive, 12. 

Reciprocal  activity,  192,  198  f. 
Reflection,  73,  136,  140,  168, 
209. 


Religion,  42. 

Repulsion,  103. 

Rule,  123  f. 

Socrates,  11. 

Soul,  30,  50  f. 

Spencer,  66,  78  f. 

Spinoza,  75,  115,  194,  195,  207. 
Strauss,  43. 

Subjective,  46  f. ; 213  f. 
Substantiality,  192  f. 

Sufficient  reason,  157. 
Syllogism,  54,  234  f. ; qualita- 
tive, 237  f. ; of  reflection, 
237  f. ; of  the  notion,  237  f. ; 
formulae  of,  2.37  f. ; figures 
of,  238  f . ; categorical,  246  f . ; 
hypothetical,  246  f. ; disjunc- 
tive, 246  f. 

System,  136,  144  f.,  158,  257. 

Teleology,  261  f. 

Tennyson,  277. 

Theology,  28,  33  f . 

Theorem,  281. 

The  thing,  162  f.,  167. 

Thought,  General  nature  of, 
4 ff. 

Totality,  209. 

Transition,  289  f . 

Truth,  22. 

Understanding,  12  f . 

Unity,  negative,  274. 
Universal,  3 f.,  216  f. 

Volition,  279  f.,  283. 

Wallace,  266  n. 

Whole,  171,  174  f. 


Zeno,  10,  115. 


' 


• *••• 


fRANS.FROMFti 

1993 


